

श्रीमद्गोस्वामिपुण्ड्रिहामणि नीलभायन श्रीगोवर्धनशाल्मी ।



प्राक्कृत्य मकर १९१७ आश्विन कृष्ण १

*Discusses how far Sankaracharya truly
represents the view of the author
of the Brahmasutras.*

BY
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Vakil, HIGH COURT

WITH A SHORT SKETCH OF HIS LIFE

Motto: "प्राणा एवैव सदा निरन्तरास्तु सत्यं परं परावदि."

SECOND EDITION



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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

This is one of the two essays selected by the Bombay University for the Sujna Gokulji Zala Vedant Prize 1915. The essay was submitted in June 1915; and the result was declared in December 1917. Except Appendix A and a footnote on page 90, no new matter has been added to the original, and no material change made. I have to thank Mr. Tribhuvandas Pitambardas Shah of Nadiad, for defraying the expenses of printing this essay from the Nadiad Pushti-margiya Library Funds, and Mr. D. V. Sankalia, B. A., LL. B., for revising it and reading the proofs.

Bombay. }
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M. T. TELIVALA.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

This is a reprint of the first Edition. A short sketch of the life of the departed scholar has been added and proofs corrected by his colleagues and friends Messrs. Dhirajlal Sankalia, Vadilal Shah, Jamnadas Morporia, Gordhandas Pragji, Hiralal Mulji and Purushottam Morporia.

Bombay. }
20-7-1928.

RANGHHODDAS VARJIWANDAS.

“घाज्ञा स्वेन सदा निरस्तकुहकं सत्यं परं धीमहि”.

“Discuss how far S'āṅkarāchārya truly represents the view of the author of Brahmasūtras.”

The Sujna Gokulji Zala Vedanta Prize

Essay for the Year 1915.

Before taking up the main subject, let us advert to some preliminary points, which are worked out by commentators of the Brahma-sūtras. The first of these is:-who is the Adhikārin of this S'ūtra? In the S'ugādhikarana (1-3-34-38, B. S.), the Sūtrakāra declares that, among mortals, S'ūdras have no Adhikāra in this Vedic S'ūtra, though a god has. Among the members of the first three castes who is the Adhikārin? Of course the Traivarnika must be learned in the Vedas, he must be capable of undertaking *Sravana*, *manana* etc., he must be possessed of some desire for spiritual elevation. These requirements are necessary, they are suggested, *arthā-
hskipta*, but beyond this, in the whole of the Brahma-
mīmāṃsā, the Sūtrakāra does not consider the question of Adhikāra. However, Śaṅkara maintains that before one undertakes Brahma-Jijñāsā, he ought to be possessed of the four requirements, viz. (1) नित्याभ्यासः, (2) इन्द्रियसं-
भोगविराग, (3) रामदमादिषाधनसम्पत्, and (4) सुमुमुक्षु. These four requirements are, according to Śaṅkara, *sine qua non* to the inquiry of Brahman, and these are, he thinks, suggested by the Sūtrakāra by the word 'अथ' in the 'अथतो
प्रसङ्गिनाम्'. This 'अथ' is used in the sense of आदन्तये, and

presupposes the existence of the four requirements mentioned above, and not a कर्मावबोध.. A knowledge of the Karma-mimāṃsā is no condition precedent to the study of Brahma-mimāṃsā. This is the view of S'āṅkarāchārya as regards अधिकार.

Bhāskara¹ and Rāmānuja² both maintain धर्मानन्तर्य, and reject the आनन्तर्य of the above-mentioned four requirements.

It appears that the Sūtrakāra has in his mind neither of the two views. The 'अथ' suggests neither this nor that. 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' is the first Sūtra of the Brahmamimāṃsā introducing the reader to the S'āstra. S'āṅkarāchārya rejects धर्मानन्तर्य on the grounds that ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा may precede धर्मजिज्ञासा of one who has studied Vedānta, and that there is nothing to establish the custom that धर्ममीमांसा must be studied before ब्रह्ममीमांसा. By similar arguments Vallabha³ also comes to the same conclusion. To add to this, Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini are opposed in their views on this point, and as Prof. A. B. Dhruva remarked in his recent University lectures, a reader cannot be expected to study the works of the opponent before he studies his own, so a student of ब्रह्ममीमांसा does not necessarily need study धर्ममीमांसा before ब्रह्ममीमांसा. It is not disputed that some of the पूर्वमीमांसान्यायस are referred to here, but that does not compel us to come to the conclusion that a knowledge of धर्ममीमांसा is a condition precedent. Bhāskara accepts ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चय, and says that this is the view of Bādarāyaṇa expressed in 'सर्वपिक्षा च यहादि

1. 'नित्यानिरूपविवेकादयः भन्धकारणवर्मा. पूर्वप्राप्तकृताः स्वज्ञानेन चानिर्दिष्टाः कथमिव सूत्रकारस्य विवक्षिता इति प्रतिपत्तुं शक्यते' मा. मा. p. 4.

2. 'अपि च नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकादयः मीमांसाश्रवणमन्तरेण न संभवन्ते, कलत्रकरणेति कर्तव्यताधिकारिविशेषनिश्चयादेव कर्मस्वरूपतत्त्वकारिरित्येवार्थवत्त्वान्नित्यत्वादीनां दुरवरोधात्' श्रीभाष्य. p. 18.

3. 'न तावद्धर्मानन्तर्यम्, विपर्ययसंभवात्, न च पाठतो नियमः, तत्रापि तथा, न च भाष्याराद्व्यवस्था, तथापि अनियमसंभवात्, प्रत्यवायाश्रयणत्वात्' A. B. pp. 26-27.

Brahman seem to be *sine qua non* to the study of ब्रह्ममीमांसा. A Nimbārka writer comes very near this view when he says:—‘किं तद्वस्तु यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा विधीयते इत्यपेक्षायां मुमुक्षेति तत्सहकारीणि च श्रद्धोपपत्तिपूर्वकगुरुत्ववत्त्वादीर्नास्ति’ (परमश्रमिरिवत्र p. 18). Hence if the आनन्तर्यार्थ is insisted upon, we cannot go further than the suggestion made above. Vallabha seems to be driving at the truth when he accepts अधिकारार्थ after examining and rejecting the आनन्तर्यार्थ, saying that it is full of objections ‘अतोऽनेकदोषदुष्टत्वादधिकारार्थ एव श्रेयान्’ (अ. भा. B. S. S. p. 33.).

The Veda.

The method of composition adopted by Bādarāyaṇa leads one to suppose that the Sūtrahāra had a double object in view, viz. to remove doubts, and at the same time to summarise the teachings of the Upanishads. It is therefore necessary to consider in what light he views the Vedas. After undertaking an inquiry of Brahman in ‘अयातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’ 1-1-1, and giving the definition of Brahman in ‘जन्माद्यस्य यत्’, he goes on to say that Brahman is revealed from the S’āstra i. e. Veda. He means thereby to say that his conception of Brahman is based on Veda alone. Śaṅkara says in शास्त्रयोनित्वात् 1-1-3, that this Sūtra has been written with a view to emphasize the omniscience of Brahman, which has been suggested in the definition of Brahman in ‘जन्माद्यस्य यत्.’ This may be as Śaṅkara says, or may not be as Jayatīrtha says. It is clear that when once Brahman is defined to be one from which origination, existence and absorption take place, when it is said to be कर्तृ the creator of the universe, its omniscience is established, and no further Sūtra is needed to repeat it. Whatever it may be, this Sūtra ‘शास्त्रयोनित्वात्’ gives us an opportunity

to consider the attitude of the Sūtrakāra and S'ankara towards the Veda. By declaring the शास्त्रयोनित्व of Brahman, the Sūtrakāra declares that his conception of Brahman is entirely based on Veda. He further on declares that तर्क is अप्रतिष्ठ. Independent reasoning has nothing to do with his conception of Brahman. All contradictions are removed by taking shelter in the word of the धृति. Sankara's attitude on the whole is undetermined. Once he says आगममात्रसमधिगम्य एव त्वयमर्थं धर्मवत्. 2 1 6 B S but on good many occasions he departs from this rule. In 'धृतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2 1 27, we have a very clear instance. Bīdarīyaṇa removes the difficulty raised by Sāṅkhya in his usual way, viz taking shelter in the text of the धृति, but Śāṅkara goes further and says 'अनु शब्देनापि न शक्यते विरुद्धं कार्यं प्रतिपत्तुम्' Sankara's shelter is अविद्या (अविद्याकल्पितमेदान्धुपणमात्). Throughout the whole of the Brahma mīmāṃsa the Sūtrakāra never resorts to any other authority except प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान which respectively mean धृति and स्मृति which is धृत्यनुसारिणी. Independent ratiocination has no place in his system. S'ankara fails very badly in representing the view of the Sūtrakāra in not submitting himself to the ideal of the Sūtrakāra. Even if Sankara's attitude may be justified on philosophical grounds independent of धृति, the fact remains that, that is not the way in which the Sūtrakāra would look at it, and so long as he would not, it is useless to discuss that question here. To the Sūtrakāra, any reasoning, not in strict harmony with the letter of the Veda, is useless (तर्कप्रतिष्ठानादन्यन्यानुमेयमिति चेदेवमपि अविमोक्षप्रसङ्ग 12 1 11). To the Sūtrakāra, Veda is eternal (अत एव न नित्यत्वम् 1 3 29). From the words of the Sūtra we do not learn much further than this, but it is quite clear that the attitude of the Sūtrakāra is very devout. Like S'ankara he has no courage to say — 'अविषयत्वे ब्रह्म शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्, न,

अविद्याकल्पितमेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य, न हि शास्त्रं इदं तथा विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयति, किं तर्हि, प्रत्यगात्मत्वेन अविषयतया प्रतिपादयदविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितुवेदनादिभेदमप-
नयति' 1-1-4. V. S. From the very undertaking of investi-
gation and definition of Brahman by the Sūtrakāra, it is
quite clear that S'āṅkara is not justified in making the
above remark. Bādarāyaṇa's whole system is entirely
based on the words of श्रुति, so the duty of his commentator
is not to modify or correct his statements, but simply to
put them in their true light. The aim of the S'āstra is not
merely the removal of अविद्याकल्पितमेद but the realisation of
Brahman. Except श्रुति, and तदनुसारिस्मृति, the Sūtrakāra does
not take the aid of any other प्रमाण in support of his system.
S'āṅkara also does not say that he accept any more प्रमाण.
The later S'āṅkara writers accept six Pramāṇas, but with
that we are not concerned. If S'āṅkara had maintained
the position as declared¹ by him in ह्यस्ते तुः (2-1-6)
throughout, we should have seen him entirely at one
with the Sūtrakāra. Looking at S'āṅkara's Bhāṣhya as a
whole, one sees a sort of contradiction running through-
out, so far as his attitude to the S'āstra is concerned,
While meeting the Mīmāṃsakas, he draws a distinction²
between पुरुषतत्त्व and वस्तुतत्त्व. धर्म is पुरुषतत्त्व, and as such
does not admit of any reasoning independent of Veda,
while Brahman is वस्तुतत्त्व, and as such, admits the claims of
reasoning. But when the Sākhya opposes him, he declares,
as is said above, that the conception of Brahman like
धर्म is based on Scripture alone, and does not admit of any
प्रमाण independent of Veda (2-1-6). If S'āṅkara had

1. 'यत्तुक्तं परिनिष्पन्नत्वाद् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि . समवेदयितुं, तदपि मनोरेखमात्रम्,
रूपायमावाद् हि नार्य अर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः, लिंगव्यावाच्य नानुमानादीनाम्, आगममात्र-
समधिगम्य एव तु अवमयो धर्मवत् ××× अत्यनुपरोक्त एव ह्यत्र तर्कोऽनुमाराकलेन
आश्रीयते ।' 2--1. 6.

2. अतो न पुरुषव्यापारतया ब्रह्मविद्या, किं तर्हि, प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयवस्तुज्ञानवत् वस्तुतन्त्रा
एव । 1-1-4-8. B. ।

avoided this contradiction, and adhered to the view expressed in 2-1-6, his faithfulness to the Sūtrakāra would have been greatly enhanced.

Bādarāyaṇa's attitude towards his opponents, though queer, is justified on the ground that it is consistent. When difficulties are raised against his system by a Sāṅkhya or a Vaiśeṣika, he says his system is based on *युति* alone, and as such has nothing to do with reasoning, 2-1-29. But his opponents, as they accept *तर्क*, cannot take advantage of this position. As they resort to *तर्क*, he challenges their position by *तर्क*. S'āṅkara fitly remarks on this point thus:—‘अपि च आगमवलेन प्रज्ञावादी कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतीति नावश्यं तस्य यथादृष्टमेव सर्वमन्युपगन्तव्यमिति नियमोऽस्ति, परस्य तु दृष्टान्तवलेन कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतो यथादृष्टमेव सर्वमन्युपगन्तव्यमित्यस्त्यतिशयः 2-2-38. This is a very faithful way of expressing the Sūtrakāra's view, and had S'āṅkara followed the same, he would not have embodied two contradictory interpretations as in 1-1-11-18, 2-1-27, 2-1-29, etc. etc.

Brahman.

Brahman is the centre round which the whole philosophy and theology of the Upanishads turn. In the first Sūtra, ‘अथातो ब्रह्मनिष्ठासा’, the Sūtrakāra undertakes an investigation of Brahman, and then immediately in the next Sūtra gives the definition of Brahman, ‘जन्ममृत्यु यतः’, as that in which the world has origination, existence and absorption. It is worthy of note that the Sūtrakāra, instead of defining Brahman as ‘उत्पत्त्यं हानं अनन्तं ब्रह्म’ ‘सत्यं हानं आनन्दं ब्रह्म,’ instead of giving *स्वरूपलक्षण*, gives *कार्यलक्षण*, by declaring that the Brahman of which he has undertaken investigation, is the creator of the Universe. In ‘शान्त्रयोनिर्वाह’, he declares further that his definition of Brahman is

entirely based on Scripture. Brahman is शास्त्रैकतमधिगम्य. The Sûtra 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' is very important. S'ankara also says that it gives the definition of Brahman. This लक्षण must be referred to the Brahman whose जिज्ञासा has been undertaken in the first Sûtra. Instead of defining Brahman as 'सच्चिदानन्द', Bâdarayana declares Brahman as that which creates, sustains and absorbs the universe, the reason for this being that the Sûtrakâra has not in his mind only the summary of the leading tenets of the Upanishads, but a desire to clear every Vedic passage of importance of any doubt or difficulty by giving its interpretation. To the mind of the Sûtrakâra, the tenets of the Sâṅkhyas were most prominent. This fact can be inferred from the boundless zeal with which he refutes the principal dogmas of the Sâṅkhyas. On every occasion, he makes a polemic remark against the Sâṅkhya. Now these Sâṅkhyas attributed activity not to Brahman or more correctly to Purusha, but to *jada* प्रकृति, while the *सुख* was *chetana* but निष्क्रिय etc., Many of the Vedic thinkers themselves were under the spell of the Sâṅkhyas. Thus, this was the crucial point, on which it was essential for the Sûtrakâra, interpreter as he was of the Upanishads, to pronounce a very definite opinion, and this the Sûtrakâra has done by declaring that Brahman is that which creates, sustains, and resolves the world in itself, thereby tacitly rejecting the Sâṅkhya doctrines of *सुख*'s being निष्क्रिय and *प्रकृति*'s being कर्त्री. Similarly, by writing the Sûtra 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्', he boldly declares that his definition of Brahman is entirely based on scripture, meaning thereby that the S'âstra teaches the कर्तृत्व of Brahman and not of प्रकृति. Thus it appears that the learned Sûtrakâra at one stroke achieves two objects, viz. he sets aside the doubts of the Vedic passages, and then with it pronounces a definite view that, Brahman, the

highest entity of the Upanishads, is possessed of activity, and therefore of knowledge also. Thus in "ब्रह्माद्यस्य यत्," Brahman as *sad* is shown to be the cause. In ईक्षत्यधिकरण, Brahman, as *chetana*, is shown to be the cause of the universe. In आनन्दमयाधिकरण, the same Brahman, as *Anāṇḍa-maya*, is declared to be the cause. In ब्रह्माधिकरण Brahman as *sad*, in ईक्षत्यधिकरण as *chetana*, and in आनन्दमयाधिकरण as *ananda*, is declared to be the cause of the universe. *Ikshati* and *kāma* being the attributes of *chetana* something, the causality of the non-intelligent *prakṛity* etc., is out of question. Similarly 'नेतरोनुसतेः' sets aside the causality of the human soul, though he is *chetana*. Thus, the learned Sūtrakāra, while setting aside the doubt as to कर्तृत्व and कारणत्व of the universe, suggests and establishes that the same *Kartṛi* and *Kāraṇa* Brahman is सच्चिदानन्द. In other words, सच्चिदानन्द Brahman as सत्, चित् and आनन्द is the material and efficient cause of the universe, and not *jada Prakṛity* nor *chetana jīva*. Thus by showing the causality of Brahman alone, and suggesting thereby Brahman's unfettered activity, the Sūtrakāra has established that the same Brahman is सच्चिदानन्द. After once declaring in brief his conception of Brahman, the Sūtrakāra proceeds to show that, words bearing other senses elsewhere, refer to Brahman alone in the Upanishads, and even while doing so, he does bring out some essential characteristics of Brahman. With this double end in view, he seems to arrange his latter portion of the first chapter. Hence, आनन्दमय, अन्तर आदित्य, आकाश, प्राण, परो दिवो ज्योतिः, प्राण, मनोमय प्राणशरीर, अत्ता, अन्तर, अन्तर्यामिन् अदृश्य, वैश्वानर, सुम्वाशायतन, सूक्ष्म, अक्षर, दहर, जगत्प्रमात्र, प्राण, ज्योतिः, आकाश and विश्वानमय are all Brahman. 'गृहां प्रविष्टौ' refers to Brahman and *jīvātman*, *Samprasāda* refers to Brahman. One clearly sees here that the aim of the Sūtrakāra is not only to say that these words refer to Brahman, but that they do

individually bring out a certain attribute of Brahman. The Sūtrakāra, by following this method, develops, and perfects his conception of Brahman, the investigation of which he has proposed to undertake in 'अथातो ब्रह्मनिहासा,' and whose definition he has given in 'जन्माद्यस्य यत'.

S'ankara in 'जन्माद्यस्य यत' 1-1-2, observes as follows — 'यत इति कारणनिर्देश, अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याहृतस्य अनेकवर्तुभोक्तृमयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तमित्याफलाधयरय मनसाप्यचित्स्थरचनात्मस्य जन्मस्थितिमज्ञ यत सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्ते कारणाद् भवति तद् अग्रेति वाच्यतेप'. From this it can be seen that Brahman which is being investigated by the Sūtrakāra is *sarvajña, sarvaśaktimat*, and, therefore, *laṭtri* also according to his view as interpreted by S'ankara here. The Sūtrakāra's *jyñāśā* thus refers to Brahman which is सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत्, वर्तु etc., and शास्त्रसमन्वय, established in the following Sūtras, refers to the same Brahman; while according to S'ankara, the जिज्ञासा and the समन्वय both refer to निर्विशेष Brahman. In 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (1-1-4), S'ankara observes — 'इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कृतस्य नित्यं व्योमवत् सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियादहित नित्यमृत निरवयव स्वयंज्योतिस्वभाव ××× अतस्तद् ब्रह्म यस्य जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता'. In 'तदनन्यत्वमारभणशब्दादिभ्य' (2 1-14), S'ankara labours to show that, in adopting the ideal of अत्यन्त निर्विशेष Brahman, he does not violate the *pratijñā* of the Sūtrakāra expressed in 'जन्माद्यस्य यत' 1-1-2. The fact that throughout the latter portion of the Brahmanimānsā, Brahman is described as possessed of some attributes, confirms the view that the Sūtrakāra has not in his mind the जिज्ञासा and शास्त्रसमन्वय that S'ankara wants to impose upon him in the समन्वयसूत्र, 1-1-4. Vallabha also says, 'न च येन रूपेण समन्वयो मतान्तरस्थे विचारितः तथाये सूत्रेषु निर्णयोऽस्ति,' 1-1-4 p. 115 Kes'ava Bhatta Kāś'mirīn, after showing the contradiction between the views of the Sūtrakāra and S'ankara, observes that, according to the reasoning of S'ankara, there can neither be anything like जिज्ञास्यब्रह्मन्, nor even शास्त्रारम्भ 'परमते तु जिज्ञास्यो दुरुपाद ××× परमते तु

विषयस्य दुर्निरूपत्वेन शास्त्रारभोऽयम् एव × × विख्यातसहत्वत्' etc , 111, ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्ति, pp. 22, 23, निम्नार्कमाप्य Thus the ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा of the Sūtrakāra, and that of S'ankara are different. S'ankara's ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा does not refer to Sūtrakāra's Brahman strictly speaking S'ankara tries to bridge over this difficulty by splitting the Sūtrakāra's conception of one Brahman into twofold S'ankara's introduction to आनन्दमयाधिकरण gives a very clear insight into his view of two Brahman. According to S'ankara's own statement, the first ten Sūtras of Bīḍarīyana refer to Brahman which is सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत्, ईश्वर and जन्मस्थितिलयकारण of जगत्, and that it is *chetana*, and not *jada prakṛti*. The scope of the Vedānta sūtras then following is thus explained by him — 'द्विरूप हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते, नामरूपविचारभेदोपाधिविशिष्ट, तद्विपरीतं च सर्वोपाधिविवर्जित × × × एवमेकमपि ब्रह्म अपेक्षितोपाधिसंबद्ध निरस्तोपाधिसंबद्ध चोपास्यत्वेन ज्ञेयत्वेन च वेदान्तेषूपदिश्यते इति प्रदर्शयितुं परो ग्रन्थ आरभ्यते. Again in the next *adhikarana*—'अन्तस्तदमोपदेशात्, he says — अपि च यत्र तु निरस्तसर्वविशेष पारमेश्वर रूप उपदिश्यते भवति तत्र शास्त्रम्, 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययमित्यादि, सर्वकारणत्वात् विकारधर्मैरपि वैधित्वविशिष्ट परमेश्वर उपास्यत्वेन निर्दिश्यते सर्वकर्मा सर्वकाम सर्वगन्ध सर्वरस इत्यादिना. This is how S'ankara draws a distinction between निर्गुण ब्रह्मन् and सगुण ब्रह्मन्. So far ■ his निर्विशेष ब्रह्मन् is concerned, the lakṣaṇa of Brāhmaṇ, given by the Sūtrakāra in 'जन्माद्यस्य यत्,' has no bearing whatever. In आरम्भाधिकरण, S'ankara says that जन्माद्यस्य यत्' etc , has been written by the Sūtrakāra to refute the Sāṅkhyas and others, but that definition has only reference to the सगुण Brahman. Its ईश्वरत्व सर्वज्ञत्व, सर्वशक्तिमत्त्व etc , are not to be attributed to Brahman in the highest sense (परमार्थतः) Brahman is called ईश्वर, सर्वज्ञ सर्वशक्तिमत्, so far as there ■ अविद्यात्मकोपाधिरिच्छेद 'तदेव अविद्यात्मकोपाधिरिच्छेदापेक्षमेवेश्वर स्वेश्वरत्व सर्वज्ञत्व सर्वशक्तिमत्त्व च, न परमार्थतो विद्ययापास्तसर्वोपाधिरूपे आत्मनि ईशित्रीशितन्यसर्वज्ञत्वादिन्यवहार उपपद्यते' 2.1-14. Thus according to S'ankara's view, the Brahman, whose definition ■ given by the Sūtrakāra, refers only to the सगुण ब्रह्मन्, and the

concluding Sūtra, 'अनादितिः शब्दात् अनादितिः शब्दात्,' teaching the non-return of those who have reached Brahman, would, by a parity of reasoning, refer to the lower or *saguna* Brahman, a creature of *avidyā*. We fail to trace this view to any Sūtra, neither does Śaṅkara support it by any Sūtra, hence, in the absence of any convincing proof, we cannot take this to be the view of the Sūtrakāra. Looking at the Vedānta Mīmāṃsā as a whole, one sees that, in 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा', the Sūtrakāra undertakes the investigation of the Brahman, in जन्माद्यस्य यतः, etc., declares that जगत्कारणत्वं is Brahman's असाधारणलक्षण, in Sūtras like 'ईक्षतेनाशब्दम्', 'कामाद्य नादुमानापेक्षा,' he removes the प्रकृतिकारणता of जगत्, and in Sūtras like 'नेतरोऽप्युपसर्ते,' he removes the कर्तृत्व of jīvātman; in the second chapter, the Sūtrakāra declares that even though Brahman Jīvātman are *ananya*, still Brahman is *adhika*, this being the reason why unlike Brahman he does sometimes *ahita* to himself; that Jīvātman is the *aṅśa* of Brahman, that his Brahmanhood, omnipresence, etc., are through his relation with Brahman, that the Jīvātman is a *kartri* under the control and guidance of *para* Brahman; in the third chapter, the Sūtrakāra teaches how निष्कामकर्मसु secure a body fit for the acquirement of ब्रह्मज्ञान, and in the fourth chapter, this Jīvātman, by the aid of सत्साधन ब्रह्मज्ञान, reaches Brahman by अर्चितादिमार्ग from where he does not return; vide Anubhāshya 2-3-29. Dr. Deussen, in his 'System of the Vedānta', on pp. 98-99, thus summarises the teachings of 'the Brahmasūtras:--The first part contains, in Adhyāya I, the theology, which, on the basis of seven times four passages of the Upanishads, discusses the essence of the Brahman, its relation to the world as creator, ruler, destroyer, its relation to the soul, and its various names and attributes. This is followed, in Adhyāya II, by cosmology which is concerned with the relation of the

world to the Brahman as cause, its gradual evolution from and reabsorption in it, and, from II-3-15 on, the psychology, in which are thoroughly discussed the nature of the soul and its organs, its relation to God, to the body, and to its own deeds. In Adhyaya III, comes first the doctrine of transmigration, then a supplement to psychology (III, 2, 1-10), another to the theology (III, 2, 11-41); the rest of the Adhyāya contains a miscellaneous assemblage of discussions, for the most part exegetic in character, as the chief content of which we can, in any case, with Śaṅkara, consider the teaching of the means (साधन) to attain the higher and lower doctrine, that is the knowledge and worship of the Brahman. For the most part these discussions deal with the strange question whether certain passages of the Veda are to be comprehended in one Vidyā or to be separated, a question which has a meaning only for the lower doctrine, with its aim of worship. Finally, the conclusion of the work, Adhyāya IV contains eschatology; it sketches in detail the departure of the soul after death, and how some souls follow the way of the Fathers (पितृयान) to a new incarnation, while, on the contrary, others, the worshippers of the Brahman, are led along the way of gods (देवयान) higher and higher upwards to the Brahman, 'whence there is no return' according to the Upanishads.

After thus summarising the system, he goes on to say 'but not without further conditions, according to the reasoning of our (Śaṅkara's) system, for this Brahman is only the 'lower' Brahman, that is, as considered as possessing attributes 'guṇa', it is the object of worship, and not of 'perfect knowledge' 'सम्यग्दर्शनम्'; only after this latter, that is, the esoteric doctrine is imparted to the pious in the world of Brahman, is he also liberated; until then, although he is in the world of Brahman, and a partaker of

Lordship 'ऐश्वर्यम्' 'his darkness is not yet driven away', 'his ignorance not yet destroyed', that is, he possesses only the lower doctrine 'अपरा विद्या', whose content consists of all that has hitherto been mentioned, not the opposed higher doctrine, the परा विद्या or सम्यग्दर्शनम्, that is, the pure philosophic, esoteric doctrine, which, in every part of this picture of the world with its empiric colouring, crops up in contradiction with it, and whose results, according to the metaphysical standpoint which we occupy, we may find strange, or admirable.' Thus Dr. Deussen says that there is a contradiction between the system which is deduced from the express Sûtras of Bâdarâyana, and the esoteric doctrine of Śankara, and then proceeds thus to explain Śankara's esoteric doctrine:—'In the department of Theology it teaches that the Brahman is not thus or thus, but altogether without attributes 'गुण,' distinctions 'विशेष' and limitations 'अपधि,' and therefore in no way capable of being defined or conceived. And this Brahman, devoid of all limitations, is only being, outside which nothing is; therefore in the department of cosmology, there can be as little question of the origin of the world as of its existence, but only of there being neither anything different "नाना" from the Brahman, nor any plurality of things 'वस्तु', and that the world extended in names and forms is non-existent 'अस्तु', is only a glamour 'माया' which Brahman of course 'सगुण', as master-magician 'मायाविन्, projects 'प्रसारयति,' as the dreamer projects dream-forms. In the same way all further Psychology falls away after the saying 'तु त्वम् असि', 'that thou art' is comprehended, according to which the soul of each human being is not an emanation, not a part of the Brahman, but fully and completely the Brahman. For him who knows this, there is no more migration for the soul, nor even liberation; for he is already liberated; the con-

tinued existence of the world and of his own body appears to him only as an illusion, the appearance of which he cannot remove, but which cannot further deceive him, till the time when, after the decease of the body, he wanders not forth, as the others but remains where he is and what he is and eternally was the first principle of all things, 'the originally eternal pure, free, Brahman'

This is a very fairly accurate view of S'ankara as laid down by Dr Deussen Śāṅkara's views about cosmology, psychology and eschatology are examined in the sections of Jagat, Jivātman and Moksha respectively, and have been shown not to flow naturally from the Sūtras of Bādarāyana as they stand at present. Here we are concerned with the consideration of Brahman, so we shall examine here his view as to whether Śāṅkara's distinction of higher and lower Brahman can naturally be worked out from the Sūtras of Bādarāyana. It has been suggested above that so far as our casual survey of the Brahmasūtras is concerned, Śāṅkara's distinction, between the higher निर्विशेष निर्गुण निष्पाथि and the lower, सविशेष सगुण सौपाधिक Brahman, is not found to be countenanced by the Sūtras of Bādarāyana.

The most important Sūtras, on this point, are to be found in the second pāda of the third *Adhyāya*. The adhikarana, beginning with न स्थानतोऽपि पात्य उभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि, and ending with the sūtra 'दर्शनाच्च (3 2 11 21)' deals with the question, whether Brahman is सविशेष or निर्विशेष or both. The next adhikarana, beginning with प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ऋचीति च युज्यते and ending with the Sūtra प्रतिषेधाच्च (3 2 23 30), deals with the question of निषेध which refers to the रूपाद्य of Brahman, and not to Brahman itself, or in the words of Deussen, deals with the question of the possibility of knowing the निर्विशेष Brahman or esoteric Brahman. This is the scope of these sūtras as stated by Śāṅkara.

At the outset, it may be remarked that it is rather somewhat strange to find these Sûtras (3-2, 11-30) in the third chapter, which, as its very name suggests, purports to deal with the question of sâdhanas. But as none of the Vedânta doctors have questioned their legitimacy, we shall deal with them as they are to be seen at present. These Sûtras seem to be rather obscure, and this seems to account for the vast divergence to be noticed in the existing Bhâshyas regarding the sense of these Sûtras, as well as the arrangement of them into the adhikaranas.

From the first adhikarana (3-2 11-21), Śaṅkara thus works out the निर्विशेषत्व of his Brahman. According to Śaṅkara, the human soul, when freed from all उपाधिस, becomes identical with Brahman in stages like dreamless sleep. In his Bhâshya on the Uhhândogya also, Śaṅkara says that by the word 'ए' the धृति suggests the identity of the jivâtman and Brahman. The Swarûpa of this Brahman is being investigated in this section by the aid of the Vedic passages. Concerning Brahman, says S'ankara, there are Vedic passages of two kinds. One set of Vedic passages like 'सर्वकर्मा, सर्वकाम, सर्वगन्ध, सर्वरसः' teaches that Brahman is सविशेष, while another set of Vedic passages like 'अत्यूलमनन्तहृत्स्वमदीर्घम्' teaches the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman. Now the Brahman in itself, continues S'ankara, cannot be both, for it is not possible that one and the same thing in itself should be सविशेष and निर्विशेष. It is true that we might think that Brahman in itself is निर्विशेष, and becomes सविशेष by उपाधिस. But one thing cannot become another by the fact that it appears to be connected with limitations (उपाधिस); the crystal remains clear even when it has अलङ्कारुपाधियोग; as it is an error to take it red in itself, so in case of Brahman also, the सविशेषत्व is due to limitations etc., and rests only on Ignorance (उपाधीनामविद्याकल्पितत्वाद्). Therefore S'ankara concludes that Brahman is free from

all differences and perfectly unchangeable, and not the contrary, 'अतथान्यतरस्त्रिपरीतदेऽपि समस्तविशेषहित निर्विशेषमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तव्यं न तद्विपरीतम्,' the reason being that in all the passages like 'अनादम्' etc., where the svarūpa of Brahman is taught, it is declared to be devoid of all limitations etc., 'अनास्तसमस्तविशेषः' Having worked out the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman thus, in the next Sūtra, 'न भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वय-नात्' 3-2-12, S'ankara further elaborates the same by declaring that Brahman is निराकारः. How does it happen then that in many passages of scripture, manifold forms are attributed to Brahman? Should we not admit that by such passages a difference of form is actually brought out? 'तस्मात् सविशेषत्वमपि ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यम्' For otherwise what is the purpose of the passages of scripture which attribute 'भेद' differentiation to Brahman? To this it is replied that in every passage where limitations appear, it is further said that Brahman is not affected by them, 'प्रत्यु पाधिभेद इत्येदमेव ब्रह्म बोधयति शास्त्रम्' Having thus emphasised the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman, Sankara remarks, 'अतथ न भिन्नाकार-योगो ब्रह्मण शास्त्रीय इति शक्यते वक्तुम्, भेदस्योपासनार्थत्वादभेदे तात्पर्यात्.' The next Sūtra, 'अपि चैवमेवे,' has been written to teach the cognition of *abheda* which is preceded by a censure of the perception of *bheda*. How is it that only the अनाकारः Brahman is insisted upon when the Vedic passages describe Brahman as both? To this question, an answer is furnished by 'अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात्' 3 2 14 Brahman is not रूपादिमत्, because Vedic passages like असूक्ष्मम् etc., expressly declare that निर्विशेषः Brahman is प्रधानः. Then what about the Vedic passages teaching Brahman as आकारवद्? To this an answer is given in 'प्रकाशवत्तद्वैयर्थ्यात्' 2 3 15. As the light of the sun and the moon, when it falls on the finger, shares in the finger's limitations, and in conformity with it, seems crooked, when it is crooked, straight, when it is straight, so also Brahman, when it is united with दृष्ट्याद्युपाधि

assumes its forms. Such an 'आकारविशेषोपदेश' is not विद्, for it is taught for the purpose of उपायना. It is therefore by no means purposeless. All the words of the Upanishads have a purpose, and are authoritative, but this does not prevent this view of Brahman's निर्विकल्पकत्व etc., from resting on Ignorance all the same, for on inborn Ignorance depends worldly action as well as those prescribed by the Veda. The Sūtra, 'आह च तन्माद्यन्' 3-2-16, also teaches the निर्विकल्पकत्व of Brahman. The Sūtra 'दर्शयति वायोऽपि स्वर्यते' 3-2-17, emphasises the निर्विकल्पकत्व of Brahman by quotations from श्रुति and स्मृति. After explaining the Sūtras, 'अत एव चोपमा गृह्यकादिना', and 'अभ्युदयप्रदृशानु न तयात्वम् 3-2-18-19, in the same strain, Śaṅkara remarks in 'इद्विहायभाक्तुमन्तर्मा-काक्तुमयतामनस्यादेवम्' 3-2-20 :—Just as the जलगतसूर्यप्रतिबिम्ब increases with the increase of water, moves with its motion, is जलरमानुविषायि, in the same way, the one अविकृतमद् Brahman assumes the धर्मा of उपाधि. In the last Sūtra, 'दर्शनाय' 3-2-21, Śaṅkara concludes again emphasising the same view on the authority of certain passages of the Veda. In the end, Śaṅkara gives it as his opinion that Brahman is निर्विकल्पक. 'तस्मात् निर्विकल्पकैकलिङ्गमेव मया न उभयलिङ्गं, न विपरीतलिङ्गं चेति सिद्धम्' 3-2-21.

The interpretation of these Sūtras by Śaṅkara cannot be taken to be convincing, because it is not consistent with what the Sūtrakāra has said before, and even if we do not mind this inconsistency with the previous Sūtras, the interpretation of the Sūtras and Vedic passages cannot be denied to be very forced. In 'न स्थानतोऽपि परस्वोमयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि,' Śaṅkara explains the words 'सर्वत्र हि' by 'वद्भस्वस्व-प्रतिपादनपरेषु अक्षरमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययमित्यादिषु निर्विशेषस्यैवोपदेशात्.' The wording of the Sūtra does not in the least suggest this meaning, nor is it to be found in this third chapter, nor in the whole of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra. The word *Sarvatra* is

once found before in 'सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् 1-2-1, and there also, no suggestion is to be found in favour of S'ankara's interpretation. Hence that explanation owes its existence to S'ankara's zeal for the *Nirviśeṣha* Brahman. Even the latter halves of the sentences, quoted by S'ankara in support of *Nirviśeṣha* Brahman, do not support his view, but go against him. The first sentence quoted is this— 'अशब्दमरूपमस्मत्प्रमव्ययं तथाऽस्मिन् नित्यमानन्दवच्च यत् । अनाद्यनन्तं महत् परं ध्रुव निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात् प्रमुच्यते कठ० 3-15. In this passage the same Brahman which is *Asabdam* etc. is described to be *Anādyananta*, *mahatah para* and *dhrūva*, which, in their turn, imply the *saṁviśeṣatva* of Brahman. Moreover, when it is established here, that Brahman is *Nirviśeṣha*, the following Sūtra, 'अरूपवत् तत्प्रधानत्वात्,' becomes redundant. To consider that this doctrine, which is to be proved there, is proved here, is also rather incongruous. Again, the interpretation of the Sūtra, 'अरूपवत् तत्प्रधानत्वात्' does not appear to be supported by the very texts, which S'ankara, quotes in his support. The first text, quoted by S'ankara, is 'अक्षुब्धमनसु' etc., बृह० 3 8 8. This sentence has been spoken by the sage Yājñavalkya to explain to Gārgi the nature of Brahman, so first he says *Asthūlam* etc., and then at once teaches the *prāsāsitva*, *ambāntadhāakatva*, beginning with *drashitva*, and ending with *ākāśopādānatva*. Hence to lay unnecessary stress on the negative words like *asthūlam* etc., and to say that the *nirviśeṣha* Brahman alone is taught, and to disregard completely the context teaching divine attributes of Brahman like *prāsāsitva* etc., is not fair. *Asthūlam* etc., can be reconciled by saying that the *nishedha*, there referred to, is only the negation of what is to be found in the world of *prākṛiti*, it is only a *nishedha* of *prākṛita* or *laukika* things, and not a wholesale negation of everything including even attribute divine like *prāsāsitva* etc. The second *Lāthaka*

sentence 'अक्षरमस्पर्शम्' etc., does not, as already shown above, support S'ankara's contention that Brahman is absolutely devoid of any attributes, 'केवलनिर्विशेषाग्रह'. The third quotation is from the Chhândogya, 'आकाशो वै नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ग्राह' 8-14-1. This sentence is very clear. It distinctly teaches that the revelation of names and forms is an (नामरूपनिर्वाहकत्व) attribute of Brahman. It teaches Brahman as possessed of attributes, *saviśeṣha*, and it is rather strange to find Śankara quoting it in his support. The fourth is quoted from Mundaka 'दिश्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः स बाह्यान्धन्तरतो ह्यग्र' (2-1-12). That also cannot be taken to teach the out and out *nirviśeṣhatva* of Brahman. By calling the *puruṣha amūrta*, it does not deny *mūrti* absolutely, it may be *iyatā-parimāna*, for it, at the same time, says that *puruṣha* Brahman is *divine-divya*, बाह्यान्धन्तरसाहित्य or बाह्यान्धन्तररूप. But the passage quoted goes further, and declares that the *puruṣha* is greater than the great *alshara* Brahman, 'अक्षरात्परा परः'. Thus this passage also goes against the *nirviśeṣhatva* of Brahman. The last sentence quoted by S'ankara is from the Brihadāranyaka 'तदेतद्ब्रह्म अपूर्वमनपरमन्तरमग्राह्यमयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभू' 2-5-19. Even when we consider this sentence without any reference to the context, the very word *sarvānubhūh* suggests an inference against S'ankara's absolute negation of any attributes in Brahman. If there was no *sarva*, how was Brahman to be *sarvānubhūh*? 'सर्वेतरवे एव सर्वानुभवितृत्वसम्भवात्'. Taken with the context it further goes against S'ankara's view. This quotation is at the end of the *Madhu-Brahmana*. In the beginning of the *Madhu vidya* 'अयमेव न योऽयमात्मेदममृतमिदं ब्रह्मेदं सर्वम्' is repeated fourteen times in order to teach the *sarvatva* of Brahman. Then there is further taught the 'सर्वमृताधिपतित्व', then as an explanation to 'रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव' is added 'अयं ह्ययोऽयं वै दश च सहस्राणि न बहूनि च

अनन्तानि' which directly declares not the absolute negation in Sankara's sense, but the *anantarāpatā* or *sarvatra* of Brahman. Hence the so-called prominence-*pradhānatā* of *nirviśeṣa* Brahman, according to Śankara, cannot be fairly worked out here. Śankara's very appropriate remark 'नहि वेदवाक्यानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं, प्रमाणत्वाविशेषात्' loses much of its force, when he says that the आकारविशेषोपदेश of Brahman is due to उपाधि, because according to him, what is due to उपाधि, cannot be said to belong to the thing itself, and also because all the उपाधिस are आविष्क, 'उपाधिनिमित्तस्य इत्तुधर्मत्वानुपपत्ते.' 'उपाधीनामाविष्कत्वात्,' Even Vedio passages like 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न विभेति कुतश्च' at best teach the वाचनसातीतत्व and Brahmadevid's भयाभाव and not its अलन्तनिर्विशेषत्व. The quotation from *Geeta* 'हेयं यत् तत्प्रवक्ष्यामि यं श्रुत्वाऽमृतमश्नुते, अनादिमत्परं ब्रह्म न सत्तत्सदुच्यते' 18-12, refers to व्याकृत and अव्याकृत stages of Brahman on the authority of 2-1-17-B. S. Moreover this conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the *Geeta* further describes Brahman as सर्वतः पाणिपादान्तम् etc. Attributes like 'सर्वतःपाणिपादान्तत्व' etc., cannot be *prākṛita laulika*, *heya*. The illustrations given in the 'बृहदारण्यक' Sūtra 3-2-20, can be explained by the fact that there is no difference in the प्रतिविम् either in less or more water. भाष्यप्रकाश. pp. 945-946. B. S. S.

Thus it has been shown that so far as the Sūtras and the texts of the Upanishads are concerned, Śankara's effort to work out the absolute निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman in this अधिकरण (3-2-11-21) cannot be justified. Now in the next अधिकरण (3-2-22-30) he works out his interpretation in the same strain, and concludes:—'तस्माद् ब्रह्मावसानोऽयं प्रतिषेधः, न अभाववसान इत्यध्यवस्थायः' (3-2-22). The Sūtra 'प्रकृतौ तावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च मयः' 3-2-23 is thus explained by Śankara. The विषयवाक्य 'नेति नेति' etc., here chosen, is from the बृहदारण्यक.

In the passage in question, 'नेति नेति' follows a statement of the two rūpas of Brahman viz. मूर्त and अमूर्त. Both these forms, according to Śaṅkara, are denied of Brahman by 'नेति नेति.' It is by the aid of this Sūtra that Śaṅkara establishes his strict अद्वैतवाद. By denying everything except Brahman which is 'केवल चैतन्य,' he distinguishes his system from the शून्यवाद of the Bauddhas. Everything except the Brahman is to be denied, and the Brahman itself is to be, if at all, described by all negations. This is the essence of the Vedānta according to him. Thus his system should be very aptly called, not the 'अद्वैतवाद,' the doctrine of non-duality, but 'एकवाद' or 'singularism' in the words of Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar.

Thus there are two sorts of passages to be found in the Upanishads, one teaching the Brahman as सविशेष, and the other teaching it as निर्विशेष. Śaṅkara subordinates, nay rejects, the Vedic passages teaching Brahman as सविशेष, as shown above, calling them useful only in उपसर्गाः, which in their turn, are products of अविद्या; according to him. On what authority Śaṅkara bases this theory of his, we are unable to trace. No Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa can with certainty be taken as an authority for drawing this distinction. In doing so, he, it appears, departs from the lines of the Sūtrakāra. In (8-2-15), he remarks 'न हि वेदवाक्यानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं प्रमाणत्वाविशेषात्.' Thus according to the principle laid down by Śaṅkara himself (and this seems to be the view of the Sūtrakāra who, as a true Vaidika, has undertaken to set aside विशेष, and to work out harmony of the conflicting Vedic passages) the विशेष would not be set aside, if some passages are subordinated or deprived, as is done by him of their primary importance and significance. Being passages of the Veda, their authoritativeness is equal, and

they deserve to be equally respected. The difficulty of contradiction should have been set aside on the principle laid down by Bādarāyaṇa in 'युतेस्तु शब्दमूल्यात्,' 2-1-27. This seems to be a very strong piece of argument to refute S'āṅkara's theory of अत्यन्तनिर्विशेष Brahman. The argument that, because the 'एकवाक्यता' is to be worked out, S'āṅkara is justified in subordinating, or rather rejecting सर्विशेष Vedic passages to निर्विशेष ones, and thereby removing the विरोध between them, would not stand a moment's consideration; the hollowness of this argument is not difficult to be seen. The विरोध as such, can rightly be said to be reconciled, when both sorts of Vedic passages deserving of equal weight as they are, are given their due and equal weight and scope. S'āṅkara's way of looking at the युतिस, one must admit, not only subordinates the सर्विशेष युतिस, but renders them meaningless ultimately. What prevented S'āṅkara from an unqualified submission to the letter of the Veda, in complete disregard of the so-called युक्तिविरोध, as was done by the learned Sūtrakāra in 2-1-26-27, is a question, which cannot be satisfactorily solved. S'āṅkara ought to have accepted the principle, which he himself expresses so very tersely in 2-1-27. 'शब्दमूलं च गदा, शब्दप्रमाणकं, मेन्द्रियप्रमाणकं, तद् यथाशब्दमन्युपगन्तव्यम्, शब्दश्च उभयमपि ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादयति, अहत्सप्रतीतिं निरवयवत्वं च, सौकरिकानामपि मणिमन्त्रोपधि-प्रशस्तीनां देशकालनिमित्तविधित्रयवशात् शक्तयो विरुद्धानेकार्थविषया इदमन्ते, ता अपि तावन्नोपदेशमन्तरेण केवलेन तर्केणावगन्तुं शक्यन्ते, अस्य वस्तुन एतावत्स्य एतत्सहाया एतद्विषया एतत्प्रयोजनाच्च शक्य इति, विमुक्ताभिन्त्यस्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपं विना शब्देन न निरूप्येत, तथा बाहुः पौराणिकाः 'अचिन्त्याः सलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत्, प्रकृतिम्यः परं यच्च तदचिन्त्यस्य लक्षणम्' इति, तस्मात् शब्दमूल एव अतीन्द्रियार्थवाचात्म्याधिगमः' Thus Brahman's स्वस्य being अचिन्त्यस्वभावयुक्त there is no विरोध. What seems impossible to us becomes possible in the case of Brahman. Thus has the Sūtrakāra set aside कार्यकारणविरोध; so, follow-

This view, thus it appears, is in perfect harmony with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. Nimbârka and Râmânûja also favour this view. S'ankara's निर्विशेषग्रह does not seem to have any connection with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. This view is supported by the fact that none of the Vedânta writers accept S'ankara's view of निर्विशेष Brahman to be the view of the Sûtrakâra.

Thus, according to Bâdarâyana, the same Brahman is both निर्विशेष and सर्ववर्मेयुक्त. Sankara's theory of निर्गुण पर and सगुण अपर Brahman is further shaken off by Bâdarâyana in 3-2-21, and the Sûtras following. There the question is raised whether there is any पर greater Brahman than which has been described before. The answer given to this question in the following Sûtras is in the negative. Not only is this Brahman the highest, but another its equal is prohibited. Thus the same Brahman which is उभयलिङ्ग is the highest. 'परमः सेतून्मानसम्वन्धभेदव्यपदेशेन्य' × × सामान्यात् × × 'उपपत्तेश्च' 'तथान्यप्रतिषेधात्' 3-2-31, 32, 33, 34 35, 36. Dr. Thibaut¹ agrees with the view that S'ankara's theory of Saguna and Nirguna Brahman is not recognized by the Sûtrakâra, but he thinks that S'ankara by recognizing Saguna and Nirguna Brahman gives scope to all sorts of divergently conflicting युति texts. But this sounds rather strange. To say that S'ankara understood or harmonised the Upanishads better than Bâdarâyana is placing the cart before the horse. S'ankara's lower Brahman being a creature of nescience, a non-entity in the highest sense, the scope given to सविशेष युतिस is also illusive. Bâdarâyana does not even dream of such a method, a fact evidenced by the absence of any Sûtra quoted by S'ankara in support of this theory. If in

1. *Vide Vedanta Sûtra I. Introduction. p. 128. Sacred Books of the East.*

numerous places the Upanishads describe Brahman by contrary attributes, Bîdarîyana like a true Vaidic, with the great regard that he had for the letter of the Veda, without subjecting one set to another, or accepting one set and rejecting another, refers both the sets to the same Brahman, and says that it is the highest. When the *vitroṣ* is pressed against him, he falls back on the letter of the Veda as in 2-1 27, 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमुक्त्यात्,' saying that Brahman is to be learnt only from scriptures, and that independent reasoning as such has nothing to do with it. Thus it will be seen that Dr. Thibaut's claim for S'ankara that he gives scope to all the *yūctis* is very weak. Bîdarîyana decidedly has done better justice to all the *yūctis* by referring them to one and the same Brahman, while S'ankara's insistence on the *निर्विशेष* *yūctis* alone has rendered his conception of Brahman open to the charge that it owes its origin not to Veda or Sūtras of Bîdarîyana but to Buddhism (*Vide* Bhaskara's भाष्य p. 124)

Thus it will be seen that the investigation of the Sūtrakāra refers to Brahman which is सर्वसंयुक्त and सर्व-सच्युपेत and therefore कर्तृ, but not to निर्विशेष Brahman as S'ankara repeatedly says. Except Bhāskara, all the Bhāṣya-kāras are almost agreed with the view expressed above, and even Bhāskara's निर्विशेषवाद is very mild as compared to that of S'ankara. Vallabhi's commentator truly remarks - 'अतोऽन्यनिषेधो यो वर्तते स सर्वं ब्रह्मणोऽन्तर्निवेशयेत्तन्निषेधति, न तु सर्वं मिथ्याहृत्येति गुणमित्यपेक्षम्,' p. 953. And Bhāṣya Prākāśa B. ३ ८.

Bîdarîyana has established that Brahman whose investigation he has undertaken, and whose definition he has given in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' is possessed of wonderful powers, creates the universe etc., for its sport, is कर्तृ S'ankara wants to refer the कर्तृत्व not to Brahman but to अविद्या, the

reasons for this being विषमता and निर्गुणता. Here also he departs from the lines of the Sūtrakāra. The Sūtrakāra considers this question in 'वैषम्यनैर्गुण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात् तथाहि दर्शयति' 3 2 27. Bādāryana says that Brahman is not to be charged with partiality or cruelty, for it allots fruits according to धर्माधर्म, Brahman is कर्मसापेक्ष, Veda teaches so. Though here the Sūtrakāra gives धर्माधर्मसापेक्षत्व as the reason why Brahman is neither विषम nor निर्गुण, he feels conscious of the difficulty that if Brahman were to allot fruits according to धर्माधर्म its स्वातन्त्र्य would to that extent be controlled by it and so far its ईश्वरत्व 'सर्वस्य वशी, सवत्सेज्ञान' etc., would be limited. Hence to avoid this objection he says in फलमत उपपत्तेः that Brahman alone allots fruits and not धर्माधर्म. Giving fruits according to धर्माधर्मसः Brahman is not controlled by them. This seems to be the reasoning of Bādāryana. Of course he says जगत्प्रवाहः १३ अनादि, and hence it is possible for Brahman to allot fruits according to कर्मसः but then the difficulty arises— if the जगत्प्रवाहः १३ अनादि how is Brahman to create it? To this his reply is that श्रुति and स्मृति teach both. After removing this doubt, he cuts short the argument by the Sūtra सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेः meaning thereby that Brahman is possessed of all धर्मसः, and that is in fitness of things. श्रुति word is Bādāryana's shelter in case of difficulty, while S'ankara's is अविद्या. Sankara's interpretation of these Sūtras is correct, though according to the reasoning of Sankara's system the answer would be different. According to Sankara's reasoning there is no question of वैषम्य and नैर्गुण्य. Brahman's कर्तृत्व is आविद्यक hence its फलदातृत्व much more so, happiness and misery are आविद्यक, and the human soul is also a creature of nescience. How does Brahman become joined with अविद्या? Of this the Sūtras give no trace. Even Sankara does not give any reason for this, as is remarked by Dr Deussen—"In reality (परमार्थेन,) there is

nothing else besides Brahman alone. If we imagine we perceive a transformation (विकार) of Him into the world, a division (भेद) of Him into a plurality of individual souls, this depends on अविद्या. But how does this happen? How do we manage to deceive ourselves into seeing a transformation and a plurality, where in reality Brahman alone is? On this question our authors give us no information.¹ System of Vedanta p 302. Bādarāyana does not give any information on this point, because as shown above, he does not hold this view, and Śaṅkara does not give any reason because it is not possible to do so. Hence Dr. Deussen's remark 'But the system gives no real ground for this assumption' (S. V. p 303) can be applicable only to Śaṅkara's reasoning. When Jīva's सर्वत्व is due to Brahman (परतद्गुणधृते) when Brahman is itself the source from which all activities flow, how can Brahman be अकर्तृ? Since Brahman is unfettered by anything like अविद्या, माया, प्रकृति etc., it will it becomes कर्तृ or अकर्तृ. Hence Bādarāyana's system is not to be charged with अनिमोक्षप्रसङ्ग neither his Brahman is to be charged with partiality or cruelty, for Brahman = creation is आत्मसृष्टि आत्मकृति or लीलासृष्टि. One can not be unjust to one's self one cannot be said to be unjust or cruel, if one were to do anything for the sake of fun, लीला, similarly Brahman cannot be said to be unjust or cruel to wards its own creation created for the sake of लीला only.

Thus the Brahman whose investigation Bādarāyana has undertaken is—possessed of all धर्म¹ all wonderful powers,² it is independent door,³ attā,⁴ it is untouched⁵ by the short-comings of the Jīva ātman, it resides in the heart.⁶

1 सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च 2-1-37 2 सर्वोपमा च सर्वज्ञानम् 2-1-30 3 अस्मा
पश्य यतः 1-1 2 4 अस्मा चराचरपदभ्याम् 1 2 9 5 सर्वोपपत्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेषिका
1 2 21 6 गुदा प्रविष्टो मयमनौ हि तर्कान्तरम् 1 2 11

it is अदृश्यत्वादिगुणक,¹ it is रूपवत्;² it is अन्तर्यामिन्,³ it is मूमन्,⁴ it is अगुप्मान्,⁵ it is वैश्वानर,⁶ it is प्रादेशमान⁷ and व्यापक, it is दहर,⁸ it is सत्⁹ चिद्,¹⁰ आनन्द¹¹ It is everything¹² it is¹³ beyond प्रकृति, माया, अविद्या, शरीर, शक्ति, etc Gunas of प्रकृति,¹⁴ etc, have no सम्बन्ध with it, hence it is निर्गुण It is जगत्स्रपनकर्तृ,¹⁵ it is आनन्दमय,¹⁶ it is the support¹⁶ of heaven and earth, these attributes are divine The subject¹⁴ of negative धृतis has reference to attributes of प्रकृति etc The negative धृतis do not deny the divine attributes of Brahman spoken of in other Vedic passages.

This Brahman whose investigation Bîdarâyana has undertaken, and in whom harmony of all the Vedic passages (समन्वय¹⁷) has been worked out by him, for its own sport,¹⁸ develops¹⁹ itself into Jadajivîtmaka universe, without undergoing the least change,²⁰ and without ceasing to be निरवयव It alone shapes,²¹ and names the Jadajivîtmaka universe making it Nâmarupâtmake also Just as Brahman, by its mysterious powers, makes सदस and चिदस perceptible, while आनन्दास imperceptible, thus developing itself into जडजीवात्मकप्रपञ्च, similarly by making

1 अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्ते 1 2 21 2 रूपेण वासाच्च 1 2 23 3 अन्तर्यामि
न्यविदेवादिषु तद्वर्त्मन्यपदेशात् 1 2-18 4 मूमा सप्रसादाद्युपदेशात् 1 3 8 5 शब्दा
देव प्रमित 1 3 24 6 वैश्वानर साधारणशब्दविशेषात् 1 2 24 7 आनन्दन्ति
चैतनमस्मिन् 1 2 32 8 दहर उत्तोल्य 1 3 14 9 जगत्स्रपणं सत् 1 1 2 10 ईश
तेनांशन्दम् 1 1 5 11 आनन्दमयोऽव्यामत् 1 1 11 12 सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् 1 2-1
13 गीतश्रेष्ठामशब्दात् 1 1 7 14 प्रकृतेनावर्तव्यं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो मवीति च भूयः 3 2 22
15 वयम्नात् 1 3 39 16 सुखात्वायन स्वशब्दात् 1 1 1 In वैश्वानरा धरुण, वैश्वानर
is described as प्रादेशमान and अभिविवान according to scripture 1 2 32
This also goes to show that there is no मिश्र in Brahman if the
contradictions are sanctioned by Veda because the स्वरूप of Brahman
is शालोकसमर्थस्य Sankara's interpretation of these two words is forced
and consequently is rejected by Ramanuja Bhaskara Vallabha
Madhya Deussen and others 17 तत्तु समं स्यात् 1 1 4 18 लोकत्रु सीमा
कवेत्यम् 2 1 33 19 आनन्दकृते परिणामात् 1 4 26 20 शुनेषु शब्दमूल्यवात्
2 1 27 21 सज्जानूर्तिस्त्वस्मिन् निवृत्तौ उपदेशात् 2 4 20

imperceptible the सर्वरूपत्व and सर्वनामत्व, develops एकरूपत्व and एवनामत्व producing thus an infinite beautiful variety. Giving fruits to Jīvas according to their कर्म, Brahman is not controlled by them. In becoming ईश्वर, it does not become partial or cruel. Brahman is शब्दमूल. Ratiocination has nothing to do with it. On the strength of the letter of the Veda, this Brahman, all-pervading¹ as it is, is to be reached from whence there is no return. It is one and infinite. It is everything. S'ankara's theory negating everything in Brahman cannot be supported by any of the Sūtras of Bādarāyana. Bādarāyana's view seems to be to affirm that Brahman is everything, rather than to deny everything of Brahman.

HUMAN SOUL.

It has been shown that so far as the Sūtras of Bādarāyana are concerned, one fails to find any trace of the theory of 'निर्विशेष' higher Brahman and सविशेष lower सगुण Brahman, that all the passages of the Upanishada describing Brahman as 'नेति नेति' or 'सर्वकर्मा,' etc., refer to the same Brahman, and the विरोध between these two sets of Vedic passages, transforms itself into a विरोधाभास the moment तर्क as such is dismissed from our consideration, and the letter of the Veda is with implicit faith (भ्रष्टा) followed, without the least attempt to better or modify its natural significance, and thereby accepting Brahman to be possessed of wonderful powers विचित्र शक्तिस and all attributes 'सर्वधर्म's; or if one fails to see his way to अचिन्त्यै-श्वर्ययुक्त ब्रह्मन्, then he may set aside the विरोध by referring the negative Vedic passages to 'प्राकृत' or 'लौकिक' पदार्थ and the affirmative to 'दिव्य' divine ones, as is suggested by Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, or even by Vallabha in 'प्रकृतीतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिपेयमिति ततो ब्रवीति च शूय.' 3-2-22. V. S., thus giving equal

1. अनाश्रितः शब्दश्च अनाश्रितः शब्दश्च 4-1-22.

scope to both sets of Vedic passages without following Śaṅkara's method of subordinating the affirmative to the negative ones, a method which on its face is not justified by the fact that the Vaidikas like Bādarāyaṇa are always anxious to revere all the Vedic passages whether like नमि नमि or like 'गमि' with the same reverence.

Now let us take up the consideration of the human soul-Jivātman. The whole body of the Vedānta Sūtras dealing with the nature of the Jivātman, is to be found in the third pāda of the second chapter of the Brahmanamīmāṃsā (2-3-16-53). Bādarāyaṇa begins thus—In चत्वारं व्यपारधन्वुः स्यात् तद्व्यपदेशाभात् तद्भारमात्रित्वात् 2-3-16, it is said that birth, death etc., refer to the body of the human soul. In 'नात्माऽप्युद नित्यत्वाच्च तान्म्य', it is taught that Jivātman has no उत्पत्ति. Vedic passages deny the 'उत्पत्ति' of Jivātman, they on the contrary teach the नित्यत्व of Jīva. In 'होऽय एव' 2-3-18, it is taught that Jīva, though by nature चेतन, is a 'ज्ञाता,' on the authority of the Veda. Śaṅkara's insistence that Jīva is only 'चेतन्यस्वभाव' and not a knower goes directly against the wording of the Sūtra. In Sūtras 2-3-19-28, it is taught that Jivātman is of the size of an atom, because 'उत्क्रान्ति, गति and आगति' are spoken of him in the Veda even if उत्क्रान्ति be otherwise explained, the गति and आगति do refer to Jivātman as such, that श्रुति passages describing Jivātman as non-Anu describe him as such in his capacity of Brahman, where Jivātman's Brahmanhood is to be emphasized, there only he is described as non-anu विषु. Vedic passages do teach Anutva of Jivātman as well as suggest it, the objection that the चेतन्य of Jivātman as he is atomic cannot be 'सर्वशरीरव्यापि' pervading the whole body, does not stand. Just as चन्दन though applied to one part produces coolness in the whole body, similarly the चेतन्य of Jivātman, atomic as he is, spreads over the whole body, like chandana, Jivātman has his abode—in the heart, the Vedic passages

teach the same thing. On the analogy of the diamond or the lamp, also the Jivâtman's चैतन्य spreads over the whole body. These latter instances seem to be given because some one might urge that minute particles produce coolness in the case of chandana, and that the Jivâtman has no particles, hence just as the light of a diamond spreads over a wider space than is occupied by the diamond, in the same way even though the Jivâtman resides in the heart, his chaitanya spreads over the whole body. 'गुण cannot exist without शून्य, hence, if the Jivâtman resides in the heart, and is of the size of an atom, his chaitanya would not be सर्वशरीरव्यापि, this objection is set aside by Bâdarâyana on the analogy of गन्ध¹. Vedic passages also teach the anutva of the Jivâtman. The धृति passage, 'प्रज्ञा शरीर समस्तम्' teaches that by चैतन्यगुण the Jivâtman pervades the whole body. Hence the conclusion is that the Jivâtman is of the size of an atom. Why is the Jivâtman then said to be विष्णु, etc., if it is really anu? If the Jivâtman is really different from Brahman, why is तत्त्वमसि etc., taught by the Vedic passages? These questions the author of the Sûtras answers in 'तदुपमात्वात् तु तस्य देसः प्राज्ञवत्' 2 3-29. The Jivâtman is described as विष्णु Brahman, etc. because he derives these attributes from Brahman on the analogy of the प्राज्ञ. Just as the प्राज्ञ, though a सुसुप्तिमान्, is, in Brihadâraṇyaka, described as possessing the attributes like अपहृतपान्मत्वं, etc., which are Brahman's अमाधारणधर्मः, similarly when the ब्रह्मत्व of the Jivâtman is to be emphasised, he is described as विष्णु etc. This is the interpretation favoured by Nimbârka and Vallabha, and it is strengthened by the preceding Sûtra 'नाशुतच्छुदेरिति चैतस्य चिह्नरात' 2 3 23, where विष्णुत्व, etc., are said

1 Modern science may detect a flaw in this reasoning but Bâdarâyana's view is clear. He wants to say that the Jivâtman's residence in the heart, his anutva and his सर्वशरीरव्यापि चैतन्य are all possible.



to be attributed to the Jivâtman to declare his Brahmanhood. Hence, according to Bâdarâyana, the Jivâtman is *anu*, when in Brahmabhâva he experiences विमुक्त्य, etc., on account of his Brahmanhood Râmânuya, Madhva, Nimbârka and S'reekantha all accept the Jivâtman to be *anu*

S'ankara interprets the Sûtras 2 3-19-28 as belonging to पूर्वपक्ष, and 2-3 29—तदुपसारवात् तु त्वयदेश प्राज्ञवत् as a सिद्धान्त सूत्र refuting and rejecting the Jivâtman's *anuita* and accepting his विमुक्त्य. With some reservation, Bhîskara follows S'ankara and Vijnana Bhikshu, though breaking the adhikarana from त्वयदेशवात्, says that Jiva's *anuita* is due to उपाधि. S'ankara explains the Sûtra thus—the first 'तद्' of the Sûtra 2 3 29 refers to 'बुद्धि उपाधि,' etc., and the second 'तद्' to अणुत्व, etc., that the Jivâtman through the adjuncts of बुद्धि उपाधि, etc., is described as *anu*, just as the 'प्राज्ञ', the supreme soul, though devoid of any विशेष, is described as possessed of all धर्म, and called सर्वज्ञ सर्वशक्तिमान्, etc., which are ब्रह्मलिंग. S'ankara's interpretation has one advantage over that of Râmânuya Madhva, and S'reekantha in the fact that he explains the instance of 'प्राज्ञ' somehow, while the other writers fail to make out much of it. In fact, they seem to have lost sight of its importance. Dr Thibaut has also neglected to consider its importance. But Vallabha manages to interpret it, in an exactly opposite way, by showing the appropriateness of the instance. He says, just as प्राज्ञ who is merely a सुप्रतिपादित्, who is not Brahman, is attributed ब्रह्मधर्म on account of his Brahmanhood, so the Jivâtman on account of his Brahmanhood is described as विमुक्त्य etc., though he is अणु. Vallabha's explanation has this advantage that he has not to add words like बुद्धि or उपाधि which are never suggested in any of the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana either preceding or following this Sûtra. Bhîskara's reference to 'विज्ञानमनसी'

2 3 15, in support of his reference of first 'तद्' to उपाधि, does not improve the case by the absence of any reason for translating 'विज्ञानमनसी' not as इन्द्रियस but बुद्धि and उपाधि. The distance between the two Sūtras suggests an inference against Bhāskara.

But S'āṅkara's arguments in favour of विमुक्त्य deserve to be considered independently. He observes in 2 3 29, 'नैतदस्ति अश्रुतामेति, उत्पत्त्यध्वनात्, परस्यैव तु ब्रह्मण प्रवेशप्रवणत्वात्, तादात्म्योपदेशाच्च परमेव ब्रह्म जीव इत्युक्तम्, परमेव चेद् ब्रह्म जीवस्तस्माद् यावत्परं ब्रह्म, तावानेव जीवो भवितुमर्हति, परस्य च ब्रह्मण विमुक्त्यमाप्नातम्, तस्माद् विमुक्तो जीवः' S'āṅkara thus advances three arguments in favour of the Jivātman's विमुक्त्य, viz., (1) उत्पत्त्यध्वन, (2) परस्यैव ब्रह्मण प्रवेश, (3) तादात्म्योपदेश. It is worthy of note that none of these arguments find any support from the Sūtras of Bīdarāyana. The first argument, which S'āṅkara gives, in favour of the विमुक्त्य of the Jivātman, has been used by Bīdarāyana to establish the eternity of the human soul, hence it cannot be taken to be conclusive. The denial of उत्पत्ति does not conclusively prove that the Jivātman is विमुक्त. It cannot be said because Jivā's उत्पत्ति has been denied, it is Brahman, and hence विमुक्त. The very argument goes against S'āṅkara's view of अविद्या which he accepts to be without उत्पत्ति—अनादि. It cannot be said because अविद्या has no उत्पत्ति it is ब्रह्मन्. To this, it may be urged on behalf of S'āṅkara that the acceptance of any duality being opposed to the प्रतिष्ठा of 'एकविज्ञानेन सर्वं, विज्ञानम्, the निरुक्त्य suggested by the denial of उत्पत्ति, results in अमेद—ब्रह्मन्, while अनादित्व alone suggests मिथ्यात्व as in the case of अविद्या, that is, there cannot be two things eternal hence the निरुक्त्य of Jivā, taught by the Sūtrakāṇḍa, teaches that Jivā is Brahman, and hence विमुक्त while अविद्या though अनादि has an end, hence it is मिथ्या.

To this argument, an answer is furnished from the Sūtras of Bīdarāyana. Even accepting the Jivātman to

be निष्प्र and अणु there is no विरोध of the प्रतिज्ञा of 'एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्' This प्रतिज्ञा can be fulfilled by accepting the Jivâtman to be an अंश of Brahman, as taught by Bâdarâyana later on in अणो नानाव्यपदेशात्, etc., or by taking the human soul to be a शक्ति of Brahman as done by Nimbârka or प्रकार or विशेषण by Rîmânûja, and by taking the अंश jiva to be अनन्य with Brahman on the principle laid down by the Sûtrakîra in 'तदनन्यत्वमारभणशब्दादिन्य 2 1-14 The अंश according to Bâdarâyana, is अनन्य with अक्षिन् Brahman, the शक्ति is अनन्य with शक्तिमत् Brahman, the विशेषण is अनन्य with विशेष्य Brahman, hence the knowledge of अक्षिन् Brahman includes the knowledge of अंश Jivâtman The प्रतिज्ञा on the other hand goes radically against S'ankara's views because it can be possible of fulfilment only when there is 'one' and 'all', and that 'one' is 'all' The difficulty arising from the Vedic passages teaching the निरवयवत्व of Brahman can well be answered on the principle laid down by Bâdarâyana in ध्रुवेस्तु शब्दमूर्त्त्वात् 2 1 27 Thus the denial of the उत्पत्ति of the human soul cannot be worked out to prove that jiva is Brahman किञ्च It cannot be taken to be the view of the author of the Sâtras

The second argument of S'ankara is based on a passage from the छान्दोग्य (VI), अनेन जीवेन आत्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि Para Brahman's entrance is taught in this ध्रुति hence says S'ankara, that the Jivâtman is the same as Para Brahman—किञ्च According to the reasoning of S'ankara, in the first place, there can be no प्रवेश, the परब्रह्मन् being व्यापक Nor can we interpret प्रवेश in the sense of सयोग, for Brahman being व्यापक inside and outside the सृष्टि, even without the declaration of प्रवेश Brahman could have developed names and forms With this ध्रुति if we read 'द्वा सुपर्णा ध्रुति teaching co existence of Brahman and Jiva, the sense

that can be made out is this, that the Supreme enters with the Jivātman, and then develops names and forms. The difficulties, presented by the अद्वैतधुति and व्यापकत्वधुति, can be answered by Bādarīyana on the authority of 'धुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2.1.27. Hence the argument of Para Brahman's प्रवेशश्रवण is not conclusive on the point of Jiva's विभुत्व.

The third argument of Sankara is तादात्म्योपदेश. This argument is based on the passage of the छान्दोग्य which runs thus—'स एष अणिमा ऐतदात्म्यं इदं सर्वं, तत् सत्यं स आत्मा तत् त्वम् असि' It is taught by Uddālaka to his son Svetaketu. This argument is on the whole stronger than the two preceding ones. But even here one cannot say that this तादात्म्योपदेश is in the sense of Sankara. The तत् of तत् त्वमसि as¹ Ranga Ramānuja remarks, refers to ऐतदात्म्य. The Vedic passage has been spoken with a view to teach श्वेतकेतु 'the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one'. With this end in view Uddālaka teaches his son that इदं सर्वं—this whole visible universe is ऐतदात्म्य—प्रकार of सद्. It is सत्य because सद् is its आत्मा, श्वेतकेतु thou art that—ऐतदात्म्य—, a प्रकार of सद्, तत् being a pronoun refers to the noun ऐतदात्म्य. But apart from this, the fact remains that Jiva as such is not Brahman, then why does धुति say so? To the Vaidika the letter of the Veda is all in all. Its authoritativeness cannot be questioned by him.

According to Sankara 'तत् त्वम् असि' is possible thus तत् refers to Brahman, freed from अविद्या and its products i.e. omniscience, omnipotence etc., while त्वम् refers to the human soul, freed from अविद्या and its adjuncts अत्यन्त, अगुण्य अंशत्व इर्तृत्व, etc. Thus in both तत् and त्वम् a जगत्तत्त्व secondary sense is to be preferred in perfect disregard of the अभिधा—primary sense. Sankara's preference for secondary

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If the reasoning above adopted is correct, then S'ankara's remark, 'तस्माद् दुर्ज्ञानत्वाभिप्रायमिदमशुत्ववचनमुपाध्यभिप्राय वा द्रष्टव्यम्', has no bearing whatever so far as the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana are concerned. It also follows from what has been said above that S'ankara's interpretation of the next three Sûtras 23 30 31 32 does not seem to bring out the view of the Sâtrakâra. The Sâtrakâra nowhere suggests this बुद्धिर्द्वयोः or उपाधिसंयोग. The Sâtra, 'यावदात्म-भावित्वाच्च न दोषः सद्दर्शनम्,' is not very clear. The objection why low Jîva is said to be the highest Brahman is set aside by saying that once the Brahmanhood of the Jivâtman becomes manifest, he continues for ever to experience Brahma and with it विभुत्व also. It is well said —

‘व्यापकत्वमुक्तिस्तस्य भगवत्त्वेन युज्यते ।
आनन्दादाभिषेकौ तु तत्र ब्रह्माण्डकोटयः ।
प्रतीयेरन् परिच्छेदो व्यापकत्व च तस्य तत् ॥

Âru Bhâṣya 23 30.

The Brahmanhood—विभुत्व etc., before the Jivâtman experiences ब्रह्मभाव, is latent in him, in the state of ब्रह्मत्व, विभुत्व, etc., develop in him on the analogy that पुंस्त्व which is latent in a child develops in him when he attains puberty. 'पुंस्त्वादिवत् तु अस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोयात् 23 31. The next Sâtra confirms this view. Hence the Jivâtman according to Bâdarâyana is अणु and not व्यापक or विभु as S'ankara says, the Jivâtman is spoken of as Brahman in a secondary sense so long as he is in सत्तारदशा but when he is in सुखिदशा, when his ब्रह्मत्व becomes प्रकट—his ब्रह्मत्वव्यपदेश is मुख्य इति—in primary sense. Thus it appears that S'ankara has clearly misunderstood the Sûtra 23 29. Regarding this Dr. Chibaut also observes: 'Now, in the first place, nothing in context warrants the explanation of the first 'tu' by *buddhi*. And—which is more important—in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether according

to S'ankara's own system the qualities of the Buddhi such as pleasure, pain x x etc., can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the samsāra state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to S'ankara's system, is knowledge or intelligence, whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential, or, more strictly, unreal, false. (Vedānta Sūtra 1 page 55) Hence S'ankara is not right in turning the जीवाणुत्वबोधक Sūtras as belonging to पूर्वपक्ष.

The next adhikarana, consisting of Sūtras 38 to 39, establishes that the Jivātman is a kartā. In support of the Jivātman's *kartritva*, the Sūtrakāra gives the following reasons — (1) कालावयवत्व, (2) विहारोपदेश, (3) कर्णोपादान and (4) क्रियाव्यपदेश. The 'च' in the Sūtra 2-3-36, 'व्यपदेशाच्च क्रियाया न चेतिदेहाविपर्यय' ends the list of reasons given by the Sūtrakāra in support of the Jivātman's *kartritva*. The next three Sūtras deal with the question how it is that Jiva who is a kartā does sometimes good or bad to himself. The Sūtra says just as the eye sees pleasant as well as unpleasant objects, so the Jivātman does actions which are sometimes beneficial or harmful to himself, because his powers are crippled, and he has no समाधि which helps one to perceive what is हित or अहित 'उपलब्धिपदनियम', 'शक्तिविपर्ययात्', 'समाध्यभावाच्च', 2-3-37-38-39. The 'च' in the last Sūtra, 'समाध्यभावाच्च' ends the list of reasons given for हिताहितकरण. After once referring the Sūtra 'उपलब्धिपदनियम' to हिताहितकरण-दोष, S'ankara's referring the next Sūtra 'शक्तिविपर्ययात्' to refuto Buddhi's *kartritva*, and then again the last Sūtra 'समाध्यभावाच्च' to show that the Jivātman is a kartā, is rather forced. The propriety of 'च' comes in the way, and Bīḍarāyāna's reading 'समाध्यभावाच्च' instead of 'समाधिभावाच्च' is also a difficulty to meet which we have to strain ourselves to make out the sense.

The next Sûtra is 'यथा च तज्ज्ञेयया' 2 3 40 It is very important. The diversity in the interpretations of this Sûtra by different Bhâshyakâras has enhanced our interest in it. S'ankara in this Sûtra puts forth the view that the *kartritva* of the Jivâtman, established by Bâdarâyana in the previous adhikarana, is not Jivâtman's स्वाभाविक *kartritva* but उपाधिनिमित्त, the Jivâtman's *kartritva* is a product of nescience, as a matter of fact, the human soul is अवर्ता With this end in view, S'ankara proceeds to interpret the Sûtra thus —The 'च' in the Sûtra is used in the sense of 'g,' and thereby it refutes the view, put forth in the previous adhikarana that Jivatman is a स्वाभाविककर्ता The Jivâtman's कर्तृत्व, according to S'ankara, is not स्वाभाविक in the sense that heat is स्वाभाविक in fire, on the contrary as in the case of तक्ष who busies himself with the axe and other tools in his hands, and feels pain, but afterwards goes home, lays aside his axe and other tools, and in his natural state rejoicing and at ease feels pleasure, so too the soul as long as it is affected by the duality founded on ignorance, is busied in the state of dreaming and waking and feels pain, but when it enters into itself to throw off weariness into the highest self, it is freed from the complexity of the organs of work, is not an agent and feels pleasure in the state of deep sleep, it is the same in the state of liberation where it is केवल, reposes and is happy after gloom of ignorance is driven away by the torch of knowledge. The simile of the carpenter is to be taken as follows — the carpenter is, in respect of various kinds of work such as fitting, etc., and with regard to certain tools such as his axe, etc., an agent, but not an agent so far as his body goes, so too the soul in its exertions with regard to the organs, *manas*, etc., is an agent, but not an agent with regard to his own self. The soul, as opposed to the carpenter, has not like him, limbs with which it could take

up the organs, *manas*, etc., or lay them aside, as the carpenter with his hands takes up, and lays aside his tools.

Though this interpretation appears to have been worked out very ingeniously, it is nevertheless a forced one. How can it be for a moment supposed that Bâdarâyana uses the 'च' in the sense of 'ज्ञ'? How can one convince the opponent that 'च' is used in the sense of 'ज्ञ'? It is more than probable that S'ankara is trying here to put forward a view that seems to have been never thought of by the Sûtrakâra. It is certain that this is not the view of the Sûtrakâra, and one cannot seriously dispute that S'ankara here is reading his own individual opinion into the Sûtra of Bâdarâyana. This opinion is strengthened by Dr. Deussen who, in his 'System of Vedânta' page 319, referring to S'ankara's taking 'च' in the sense of 'ज्ञ,' says thus:—'a remark which possibly hints at fundamental differences between Bâdarâyana and S'ankara.'

It is better to take the Sûtra as Râmânûja does, as a supplement to what has been said before. If the human soul were a स्वामयिक कर्ता, as is taught in the preceding adhikarana, then, says the opponent, he would always remain as such-कर्ता-and hence he would never be free from action. To such an objection this Sûtra furnishes an answer:—Just as a तक्ष even having with him an axe, etc., works or does not work at will, so the Jivâtman even though possessed of organs of speech, etc., (वागदिकरणसंपन्न), at will works or does not work. Hence no अनिमोक्षप्रसंग.

Vallabha also considers this Sûtra to be a supplement to the theory of the Jivâtman's कर्तृत्व propounded in the preceding Sûtras. According to him, the Jivâtman is not only a Karta but a Bhokta also. It is not necessary, says V

does something, and enjoys it. Vallabha further says that कर्तृत्व by its very nature is not दुःखरूप—unpleasant; drinking milk, etc., is सुखरूप pleasant

In either case the view that the Jivâtman's कर्तृत्व is औपाधिक or आविश्यक, and that he is परमार्थतः an अकर्ता is not accepted. Whether one accepts Râmânûja's or Vallabha's rendering, it does not matter much, both seem to be more natural than that of S'ankara.

It has been shown that S'ankara's rendering of the Sûtra, 'यथा च तक्षोभयथा' 2-3 40, is forced. The Sûtra does not seem to consider the question whether the Jivâtman's कर्तृत्व is स्वाभाविक or औपाधिक, but as Râmânûja remarks, this Sûtra teaches the कर्तृत्व or अकर्तृत्व of the Jivâtman at will, just as a carpenter works or takes rest at will. S'ankara cannot quote any Sûtra to prove the कर्तृत्व of the Jivâtman to be औपाधिक or आविश्यक. This Sûtra cannot help him much. If the Jivâtman's स्वाभाविक कर्तृत्व is to be questioned at all, it can be referred to be due to परत्वं on the authority of the next Sûtra, 'पराशु तच्छृते' 2-3 41, rather than to बुद्धि or उपाधि. S'ankara has, however, independently of the Sûtrakâra, advanced the following arguments against the Jivâtman's स्वाभाविक कर्तृत्व: (1) If Jiva's कर्तृत्व is स्वाभाविक, then as अग्नि cannot be free from heat, so Jiva cannot be free from कर्तृत्व, hence अनिमोक्षप्रसम. (2) कर्तृत्व is दुःखरूप. (3) मोक्षसिद्धि is referred to नित्यबुद्धयुद्धमुख soul. (4) Some धृति passages teach Jiva's कर्तृत्व to be आविश्यक. For these reasons, says S'ankara, the Jivâtman is an अकर्ता.

The first objection can be met by taking the interpretation of the Sûtra like Râmânûja. On the other hand, if बुद्धि's कर्तृत्व is insisted upon, then as बुद्धि is अवेन, there can be no motive for भोगवाञ्छा, etc., hence कर्तृत्व would be नित्य. Vallabha also advances the same arguments in different words. He observes,—'न च सद्भक्तकर्तृत्वे

अनिर्माणः, पराधीनकर्तृत्वं एवैतदिति, सांख्यस्य तन्मतानुसारिणो वान्यस्य भ्रम एव, कर्तृत्वे न युक्तिरिति, अपुंसक एवमुच्येतेति बाह्यत्वं, निरिन्द्रियस्यैव समाधिरित्यपि, करणत्वेन बुद्धिवन्न केनापि दृष्यते, तस्मात् जीवस्य स्वाभाविकं कर्तृत्वम्, व्याप्यतीव तेषामतीवेत्यपि परधर्मानुकरणम् । अयमप्येको धर्मः, स्वाप्यदसं-
 पत्त्योर्द्रष्टव्यपदेशं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वविश्वं वदन् उपेक्ष्यः'. Again one fails to understand why S'ankara calls any sort of कर्तृत्व to be दुःखरूप. It depends on how one takes it. Considering कर्तृत्व to be दुःखरूप, imagining the existence of दुःख in आनन्दमय—all these go to suggest that S'ankara is influenced by deeply pessimistic leanings. When कर्तृत्व is taken in the light of the ब्रह्मविद्, when individual soul's कर्तृत्व is declared to be Brahman's, then there seems to be no valid objection. With great force does Vallabha observe in 1-1-1:—'न च ब्रह्मरूपात्मविज्ञाने देहाद्यध्यासाभावेन कर्तृत्वमावात् कर्मानधिकार इति वाच्यम्, निरध्यस्तीरेष देहादिभिः कर्मकरणसंभवात्, अत एव जीवन्मुक्तानां सर्वे व्यापाराः, तथाच स्मृतिः, 'नैव किञ्चित् करोमीति युक्तो मन्येत तत्त्ववित्, पश्यन् शृण्वन् स्पृशन् जिघ्रन् अश्नन् गच्छन् स्वपन् श्वसन्, प्रलपन् विसृजन् गृह्णन् उन्मियन् निमियन् अपि, इन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्थेषु वर्तन्ते इति धारयन्, ब्रह्मण्याधाय कर्माणि संगं त्यक्त्वा करोति यः, लिप्यते न स यापेन पद्मपत्रमिवाभसा'. 'ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्म हविः ब्रह्माग्नौ ब्रह्मणा हुतं, ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्रह्मकर्मसमाधिना'. These quotations from Geeta show how कर्म are to be performed. They do not say that Jiva is an अकर्ता, but that he has to be a कर्ता with ब्रह्म by his side. The misery is due to अभिमान and not to कर्तृत्व. Hence Bâdarâyana teaches that Jiva's कर्तृत्व is due to पर-ब्रह्म.

The युति passages can be explained otherwise. The quotation from छान्दोग्य does not teach कर्तृत्वाभाव, but that कर्तृत्व is due to आत्मन-ब्रह्म (7th प्रपाठक). Bâdarâyana teaches the same in पराशर तन्त्रोक्तेः 2-3-41. To add to all this, the Sûtrakîra never suggests any of S'ankara's arguments, but boldly goes on declaring Jiva's कर्तृत्व. Hence the most skillful advocate of S'ankara would fail on this point. Thus the Jivâtman's कर्तृत्व is स्वाभाविक.

If we follow S'ankara's reasoning, this दूषण of वैषम्य-
 नैर्घृण्य goes away. But then we have to cast aside the
 purport of all the S'ûtras. Hence Bâdarâyana must have
 in his mind a view, which refutes this objection of वैषम्य,
 etc., and at the same time, is thoroughly consistent. The
 difficulty can be solved in two ways—viz, (1) by refer-
 ring this contradiction to Brahman's अवित्तीयत्वं and the
 letter of the Veda, the Veda teaches that Brahman
 gives fruits, it may be according to कर्म, or may not be,
 though giving fruits according to कर्म, Brahman is inde-
 pendent of कर्म, when Brahman gives fruits according to
 His sweet will, even then He is not liable to वैषम्य, etc.,
 for Veda teaches so, (2) by taking the कृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष not as
 जीवकृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष as all the आचार्यस have done, but as पर—(महा)
 कृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष. The advantage of taking the S'ûtra this way is
 clear. We have not to bring in the word जीव from the drift
 of the प्रकरण, but from the Sutra just preceding. Accord-
 ing to this view, the whole सृष्टि becomes मत्प्रयत्न. In आत्मकृते
 परिणामात् 1 4 26, it is taught that the सृष्टि is आत्मसृष्टि and
 आत्मकृति, in 2 1 33 'लोकवत्तु लीला वैकल्पम्, it is taught that this
 आत्मसृष्टि आत्मकृति is लीलावैकल्पम्, in 2 3-43 'अशो नानाव्यपदेशात्, etc.,
 it is taught that the Jivatman is an अश of मद्भक्त, in पराभिध्यानात्
 तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य कल्पविपर्ययो 3 2 8, it is taught that the Jivat-
 man's Brahmanhood is तिरोहित—has become latent—by the
 अभिध्यान of Brahman, and to Brahman we are due bondage, etc.
 Hence it appears that Brahman, for His own sport alone,
 out of His sweet will, develops Himself into Jada Jiva,
 and still remaining transcendent, determines that a parti-
 cular Jivatman will do a particular action, and He will
 give him a particular fruit. So according to फलदानेच्छा,
 Brahman rules His अस्य, Jivas. As अस्य they are अनन्य
 with मद्भक्त. The human soul's position can be compared to
 an actor. He has to play the part allotted to him in

ब्रह्मलील; the happiness and misery trouble him so far as he forgets that his कर्तृत्व is Brahman's and not his own; in fact, happiness and misery are both creatures of Brahman, and cannot be said to be the criterions of deciding Brahman's partiality and cruelty; the moment the human soul realises that Brahman for His sport guides him to do this or that, he ceases to be miserable; his limited ideas of प्रियत्व vanish; he experiences 'साधूनां समुपैव कुटुम्बकम्'. Forgetting his own कर्तृत्व, and remembering Brahman's कर्तृत्व, the human soul ceases to be responsible for his so-called actions; he feels buoyant. Like Brahman, he sees in the लीला of Brahman आनन्द. The कर्तृत्व becomes thus a source of pleasure, आनन्द—and not a source of misery as S'ankara says. Brahman makes Jīva work according to His अभिव्यक्ति and लीलायुक्तप्रयत्न, otherwise His विहित and प्रतिषिद्ध would be purportless. The part allotted to Jīva by Brahman to play would be jeopardised. Thus this Jada-jīvātmaka—Nāmarūpātmaka—Śrīṣṭi being आत्मपरिणाम-आत्मकृति, being Brahman's केवललीला, Brahman is not liable to the shortcomings of partiality and cruelty. The wording of the Sūtra, विहित. प्रतिषिद्ध—instead of विधिनिषेध—also helps us. In this way also, we have to deny in Jīva his अभिमान in कर्तृत्व, and emphasise that he is a creature guided by Brahman's will in all his actions. This seems to be the view of Bādarāyaṇa suggested from the Sūtras. With S'ankara we can deny Jīva's अभिमान in कर्तृत्व, but unlike him we prefer to refer all human activity to Brahman as source, and not to उपाधि बुद्धि, etc.

The section, consisting of Sūtras 2-3-43-53, deals with the question of the relationship of the soul to Brahman. According to Bādarāyaṇa, the Jīvātmā is the अंश of Brahman; Brahman is अक्षिन्, while the Jīvātmā is अक्ष. Like master and servant, the human soul is not different from Brahman, but like spark and fire, he is अनन्य with Brahman.

The Vedic mantra, पादोऽस्य सर्वा सूतानि, and the Gita passage, 'ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवमृत. सनातनः,' teach that the Jivātman is the अंश of Brahman. This is the view of the Sâtrākāra. However, S'ankara does not like to accept this view. Accordingly, S'ankara changes 'अंशः' into 'अंश इव'. To take अंश in the sense of 'अंश इव' is clearly modifying the view of Bâdarâyana. Even though certain passages of the Upanishads declare Brahman to be निर्वच्य, that does not justify us in rejecting the texts which teach the अंशत्व of the Jivātman. Adopting the reasoning which Bâdarâyana has worked out in 2-1-26-27—'इत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निर्वच्यवत्त्वशब्दकोपो वा,' 'ध्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्,' the difficulty can be removed by accepting Brahman's svarūpa to be निर्वच्य, and at the same time having अंश. In a शब्दप्रमाणस्ताल like this, reasoning as such has very little scope.

This view is not singular. In this view, Vallabha is with us when he observes - 'ननु ब्रह्मणो निर्वच्यवत्त्वात् कथं जीवस्यासत्त्वमिति वाच्यम्, नहि ब्रह्म निरंशं साक्षमिति वा इच्छिद् लोकं सिद्धम्, वेदैरपमधिगम्यत्वात्, सा च धृति यथोपपद्यते तथा तदनुष्ठेनेन वेदार्थविज्ञानार्थं युक्तिर्वक्तव्या, × × तत्रैवा युक्तिः—

विस्फुलिगा इवाग्नेर्हि जडजीवा विनिर्गता ।
सर्वतः पाणिपादान्तात् सर्वतोऽक्षिशिरोमुखात् ॥
निरिन्द्रियात् स्वरूपेण तादृशादिति निधय ।
सदंशेन जडा. पूर्व विदंशेनेतरे अपि ॥
अन्यधर्मितोभावाभ्युल्लेखतोऽस्वतंत्रिणः ।

ब्रह्मवादे अंशपक्ष एव' 2-3-43. This seems to be a very fair view of interpreting Bâdarâyana's Sûtras. But in spite of what Bâdarâyana and Vallabha might say, the fact remains that this difficulty has been fruitful in producing numerous theories as regards the relation of the human soul with Brahman. The very word अंश, though clearly meaning an अवयव, has been subjected to yield senses which, if not wrong, cannot be accepted to be correct, or at least cannot be supposed to represent the true view of Bâdarâyana.

S'ankara has been honest in saying that he does not accept the theory that the Jivâtman is अश of Brahman, when he says that 'अश' should be taken in the sense of 'अश इव'. But other Âchâryas have worked, from the word 'अश', a sense suitable to their views. It need not be remarked that, according to Bâdarâyana, अश means a 'part'. The Vedic Mantra using the word 'पाद' also suggests the same thing. Let us see what Bhâskara says. He remarks, 'अशशब्द कारणवाची, यथा पटस्याश तन्तुरिति', but this sense is not acceptable to him, and he remarks, 'तयोरिदं प्रहणं न भवति, किन्तुपाप्यवहितस्यानन्यभूतस्य वाक्योऽयमशशब्द प्रयुक्तो यथात्रेर्विस्फुल्लिगस्य'. Thus, according to Bhâskara, अश means उपान्यवहित अनन्यभूत निरवयव Brahman has अश, the जीव, because the Vedic passage, 'यथात्रे ध्रुवा विस्फुलिगा', teaches so. This अश is मित्राभिन्न with Brahman, his अभिन्नत्व is स्वाभाविक, while मित्रत्व is औपाधिक. Bhâskara is right in remarking that the Jivâtman is अश of Brahman as spark is of fire, and that he is मित्राभिन्न because धृति and सूत्र support it, but he is wrong in saying that मित्रत्व is औपाधिक, for the धृति passage quoted does not support it.

Râmânuya takes the word अश in the sense of विशिष्ट-वस्तुवेदश, and so does S reekantha. The relation between Brahman and the Jivâtman is that of विज्ञेय and विशेषण.

Nimbârka¹ takes अश to mean शक्ति. The Jivâtman is a शक्ति of Brahman. Hence, according to him the relation between the Jivâtman and Brahman is that of शक्ति and शक्तिमत, S reekantha² also accepts this view.

According to Madhva, अश³ are different like sons and others, or non different like hands, feet, etc. To the

1 अशो ऽ शक्तिरूपो यः 2 3 42 वेदान्तोक्तम् of Sreenivâsa Nimbarka

2 Sir R. Bhandarkar's *Vaishnavism* p. 161

3 *Vide* Râmânuya's and S reekantha's Bhashyas on this Sutra and Madhva's Bhashya

formed कर्म actions. To them the कर्मरूप was neither वयरूप nor दुरूप nor आविरूप, but a परकर्म—ब्रह्मकर्म. They had a manifestation of ब्रह्म in कर्म 'कर्मसु ब्रह्माभिव्यक्तिः'. This seems to be the proper view of looking at the connection between the two Mīmāṃsā's, and it appears that Śāṅkara is perhaps driving at the same thing when he observes in 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' 1-1-4, 'न हि घनिनो गृहस्थस्य घनाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव घनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं भवति, न च कुण्डलिनः कुण्डलित्वाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव कुण्डलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं भवति'—'मिथ्याभिमानस्तु प्रत्यक्षं सन्वहेतुः'. So it follows, from what Bādarīyaṇa and Śāṅkara say, that देहाध्यासकृतृत्व is a cause of misery, but then the कृतृत्व without देहाध्यास—देहसन्ध is not to be referred to अविज्ञा, बुद्धि or उपाधि as Śāṅkara says, but to Brahman—पर as Bādarīyaṇa says. Thus the performance of karmas, without देहाध्यास देहाभिमान, as ब्रह्मकर्म, produces in one ब्रह्माभिव्यक्ति in कर्म, and ब्रह्मज्ञान produces ब्रह्माभिव्यक्ति in ज्ञान. The two Mīmāṃsā's thus help each other, and suggest the ideal of Brahman as ज्ञानविराजित, the विद्या referring to सत्प, ज्ञान to चित्रप and the two together to आनन्दरूप, thus giving the full conception of सच्चिदानन्द ब्रह्म. This seems to be the view of Bādarīyaṇa, and we are unable to reconcile Śāṅkara's reasoning in 'तत्तु समन्वयात्', and the second interpretation of आनन्दमयाधिकारण with the Sūtras of Bādarīyaṇa. According to Bādarīyaṇa, the human soul can be free from misery, etc., only when he realises that he does not do anything, but Brahman Para does it—or makes him do it. *Āndyā* as such has no place in the system of Bādarīyaṇa.

Then comes the Sūtra, 'आभास एव च'. This is read by Bhāṣkara as 'आभासा एव च'. He rejects the reading of Śāṅkara with this remark—'आभासस्यावस्तुत्वाभ्युपगमादवस्तुन दाराविपाण्डल्पस्याचेतनस्य कृतो वयो मोक्षो वा कर्माधिरासो वा । न च परमात्मन ससारित्वमस्तीत्युक्तं पुरस्तादत्रो नार्थः पाठ इति'. Rāmānuja wants to favour Bhāṣkara's reading, and renders it by हेत्वाभास. It matters little whether the Sūtra is read as 'आभास' or 'आभासा'. From what has been said above, it is not possi-

ble that Bīdarāyaṇa could have meant 'आभास' to refer to the Jivātman's being a मिथ्या आभास of Brahman. Vallabha drives at the same thing, when he observes, 'ननु सच्चिदानन्दस्य ब्रह्मणोऽसौ सच्चिदानन्द एव भवेदत एव प्रवाहे प्रवेशो भगवतश्च सर्वकार्याणि तत्राह, आभास एव जीवः, आनन्दाशस्य तितोऽद्वैतत्वात् × × न तु सर्वथा प्रतिविम्बवन्मिथ्यात्वं × × अतो ॥ मिथ्यात्वस्य आभासोऽत्र विवक्षितः'.

Before concluding the जीवविचारणा, the Sūtra 1422 may be considered S'ankara adopts the view of काशकृत्स्न — 'दर्शित ॥ पुरस्तात् काशकृत्स्नीयस्य पक्षस्य धुतिमत्त्वम् × × काशकृत्स्नस्याचार्यस्यावि कृत परमेश्वरो जीवो नान्य इति मतम्, आत्मरम्यस्य ॥ यद्यपि जीवस्य परमात्मन्यत्वमभिप्रेतं तथापि प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेरिति सापेक्षत्वाभिधानात् कार्यकारणभावः कियानपि अभिप्रेत इति गम्यते, औडुलोमिपक्षे पुन स्पष्टमेवावस्थान्तरापेक्षो भेदाभेदौ गम्येते, तत्र काशकृत्स्नीयं मतं धुत्यधुसारीति गम्यते, प्रतिष्ठादयिष्ठितार्थानुसारात् 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादिधुतिन्य' S'ankara interprets काशकृत्स्नमतं thus— 'अस्यैव परमात्मनोऽनेनापि विज्ञानात्मभावेनावस्थानादुपपन्नमिदमभेदेनोपक्रमणम्'. Rāmāṇuja also takes काशकृत्स्न's view as सिद्धान्त view, and explains thus — 'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् आत्मनोऽन्तर' इत्यादिना जीवात्मनि परमात्मन आत्मतया अवस्थिते Vallabha explains it thus — 'भगवत एवावस्था जीवः', but he takes काशकृत्स्न's view to be different from that of Bīdarāyaṇa—'अवस्थया व्यवसायात् सिद्धान्ताद्विशेषः' What ever may be said as regards the view of काशकृत्स्न it is certain that we cannot say with perfect confidence that it is the view of the Sūtrākara Bīdarāyaṇa distinctly says that the Jīva ॥ अज्ञ and hence to take काशकृत्स्न's view as that of Bīdarāyaṇa, and to take it either in S'ankara's sense or Rāmāṇuja's sense is certainly a strain on the Sūtra. When the scope of the वाक्यान्वयाधिकरण is considered, one sees that after establishing the ब्रह्मवाक्यत्व of मैत्रेयीब्राह्मण, Bīdarāyaṇa quotes the opinions of these writers, viz., आत्मरम्य, औडुलोमि and काशकृत्स्न, to show that according to their views also the ब्रह्मत्वप्रतिपादकत्व मैत्रेयी-ब्राह्मण is not बाधित. Therefore it is not proper to work out Bīdarāyaṇa's view that अविकृतब्रह्म is the same as जीव freed from अविद्या, etc., from काशकृत्स्न's view.

Hence the conclusion is that 'ब्रह्मैव अविशान्नान्त जीव' is not the view of the Sūtrakāra, neither is the human soul a प्रतिविम्ब nor an आभास of ब्रह्म in S'ankara's sense. According to the Sūtrakāra, the Jivātman is अंश of Brahman as a spark of fire, it is अनन्य with Brahman, as अंश is with the अग्निः, still Brahman is अधिक, greater than the Jivātman. The Jivātman is a कर्ता inheriting his कर्तृत्व from Brahman. He is नित्य. He is अणु, but in the stage of ब्रह्मावस्था, he experiences विभुत्व, etc., which ever remain permanent, on the analogy that the crown prince becomes the king. It appears thus that Bīdarāyana accepts 'भेदसहित्युभेद', and not S'ankara's absolute 'भेदसहित्युभेद'. This conclusion is strengthened by the remark of Sir R. Bhandarkar that S'ankara's system should be more fitly called 'Singularity', rather than Monism or Advaitism. *Ide Vaishnavism*, p. 159

JAGAT.

The second Sūtra of Bīdarāyana gives the definition of Brahman. From this definition of Brahman we know that according to Bīdarāyana this universe is Brahman's कृति and परिणाम. Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. It is important to note here that the definition of Brahman given by Bīdarāyana must be of the same Brahman whose investigation he has proposed to undertake in the first Sūtra 'अथातो ब्रह्मविज्ञानात्', that is, Brahman alone, pure and simple, whose investigation Bīdarāyana has undertaken, is the material as well as the efficient cause of this universe. Bīdarāyana again reverts to this question in 1-4-23-27. While refuting the Sāṅkhya's प्रकृतिराजवाद, he elaborates his doctrine which he has expressed in brief before. The Sūtra 'प्रकृतिव्यतिरिक्तज्ञानात्प्रसोषात्' 1-4-23 declares against the Sāṅkhya that Brahman is उपादान as well as

निमित्तकारण of the universe. The प्रतिज्ञा and स्रष्टा of Uddā-
laka naturally yield the same sense To support Brahman's
कर्तृत्व and प्रकृतित्व, Bādarāyana cites ब्रह्मन् अभिध्या Brahman's
ईशा, काम and बहुमन् support Brahman's उभयविधकारणत्व The
धृति and स्मृति both teach that the universe has its प्रभव and
प्रलय in Brahman This is also a reason why Brahman is
both the material as well as the efficient cause of the uni-
verse The next Sūtra, 'आत्मकृते परिणामात् 1-4 26, throws much
light on the system of Bādarāyana Whether one takes
'आत्मकृते परिणामात्' as one Sūtra, or 'आत्मकृते' and 'परिणामात्' as
two distinct Sūtras, the result is almost the same The
Sūtra is based on a passage from the तैत्तिरीय 2 7. 'तदात्मान
स्वयमकुर्वत्' This passage suggests the कर्मत्व and कर्तृत्व of
Brahman, 'आत्मानमिति कर्मत्व स्वयमकुर्वतेति कर्तृत्वम्' How can the
'पूर्वसिद्ध' *sat* Brahman be कर्तृ and कर्म? The answer to this
objection is 'परिणामात्' The पूर्वसिद्ध *sat* आत्मा ब्रह्मन् developed
itself into the universe Brahman is योनि Thus Brahman's
प्रकृतित्व is प्रसिद्ध एव ब्रह्मण प्रकृतित्व प्रसिद्धम् 1 4 27. Though
Brahman is the material cause, it does not require a
separate निमित्त as in the case of an earthen pot and a potter.
In the world, one sees that the उपादान and निमित्त are always
separate, but this rule has no bearing whatever here.
The svarūpa of Brahman is to be learnt from Veda alone,
and since Veda teaches that Brahman itself becomes the
उपादान and निमित्त it should be accepted as such यत्पुनरिदमुक्तं
मीक्षापूर्वक कर्तृत्व निमित्तकारणेषु एव कुलालादिषु लोके दृष्ट नोपादानेष्वादि,
तत्प्रत्युच्यते न लोकवदिह भवितव्यम्, न ह्ययमनुमानाभ्योऽर्थः, शब्दपन्थत्वात्
स्वार्थस्य यथाशब्दमिह भवितव्यम् शब्दवैसितुरीश्वरस्य प्रकृतित्वं प्रतिपादयतीत्यवो-
चाम्' This is what S'ankara observes on 1 4 27. The inter-
pretation of S'ankara here is exactly in the spirit of
Bādarāyana Brahman with its ईशा develops itself into
the universe and still remains transcendent Though the
interpretation of S'ankara on these Sūtras (1 4 23 27) is
correct as it stands, the qualification which he has in his

mind and which he suggests by the use of the word 'ईश्वर' instead of Brahman, cannot be justified as legitimate. A Nimbārka writer Keśavabhāṭṭa Kāśmīrin thus criticises S'ankara:—‘प्रमते तु तावं दुषेदं, कार्यस्य कल्पितत्वांगीकारेण कुलाज्जदुपादान-गोचरप्रयत्नचिन्तीर्पादिमत्त्वासम्भवात् × × दृष्टान्तसंभवादिति संक्षेपः. N. B. pp. 351-352. The same writer then criticises Rāmānuja, ‘केचित्तु चिदचिद्विशिष्टं जगोपादानम् etc., pp. 352-353 N. B. Thus in order to emphasize अविवृतत्व of Brahman, Rāmānuja and S'reekantha accepted चिदचिद्विशिष्टब्रह्मन् as उपादान, Bhāskara and Nimbārka accepted ब्रह्मन्'s शक्ति as उपादान, Madhva accepted प्रकृति to be the उपादान, Vijñānabhikṣu also accepted प्रकृति to be the उपादान, the difference being that his प्रकृति is अविवक्त with Brahman, and that it becomes the उपादान under the उपपन्न of Brahman, while ब्रह्मन् is only a साक्षिन्. Here it is quite clear that all these writers, though modifying the दृष्ट ब्रह्मन्'s उपादानता, do not reject it altogether. Now remain the two writers S'ankara and Vallabha. Their views are entirely opposed. S'ankara by delegating Brahman's उपादानता to the sphere of अविवक्त rejects it, while Vallabha like Bādarāyaṇa, following strictly the letter of the Veda, accepts it out and out. In rejecting Brahman's उपादानता, S'ankara has to subject the whole body of the Vedānta Sūtras to a secondary sense. युति teaches ब्रह्मपरिणाम and at the same time its अविवृतत्व. Bādarāyaṇa does not care for the objections based on तर्क if the letter of the युति is strictly followed. This view is followed by Vallabha, who, like Bādarāyaṇa, gives greater weight to the word of the युति than to pure reason शुद्ध तर्क, when they appear opposed to each other. Other Achāryas have tried to follow Bādarāyaṇa with slight changes to satisfy reasons. It is only S'ankara who in rejecting ‘सम्बन्धेन विरोधविहार.’ has chalked out lines of reasoning which run in an entirely opposite direction. Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar says the same in his recent book Vaishnavism etc., pp. 158-159, 160-161.

Drawing a distinction between Spinoza's Pantheism and Upanishad Pantheism he says—'Brahman is not exhausted in the world, but it exists separately also. But the objection to this view is that Brahman, being of the nature of spirit, is not like the body divisible into parts, so that one may become developed into the world and another remain outside, ×× This inconsistency is removed by Bâdarâyana in Brahmasûtras (2-1-26-27). The argument is that though the Upanishads state that the constituent cause of the world is Brahman, they at the same time affirm the existence of Brahman separately from the world. (Ch. U. III, 12 6 and VI, 3, 2) The two are inconsistent on the theory that Brahman is a spirit and not discernible into parts. Though they are thus inconsistent, they must both be accepted on the authority of the sacred texts, since the true nature of Brahman and the world is beyond the reach of human intellect. This solution of the difficulty is inadmissible to non-believers in the sacred texts, but it shows that Bâdarâyana does not agree with the latter part of Spinoza's definition of Pantheism, i. e., according to him the sacred texts do not affirm that "God exists only as realised in the cosmos the cosmos exists only as a manifestation of God." The inconsistency pointed out by him is based on the impossible conception of Brahman's being divisible into parts. But it will not arise if, instead of bringing in this conception, we suppose that in one aspect Brahman is the material or constituent cause of the world or realised in the world, and from another point of view it remains pure and becomes the object of contemplation and devotion. Whatever it may be, Bâdarâyana's view appears to me to be correct, and the Pantheism of the Upanishads is not exactly the same as that formulated by Spinoza × × = =

We have noticed above the manner in which Bâda

of the universe. Madhva, not accepting this, has failed to make out anything of the Brahma Sûtras. Sir R. Bhandârkar most accurately remarks, 'He denies his (Brahman's) being the material cause of the world. All the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana which set forth that doctrine have been interpreted by him in an entirely different way. Probably he would have set aside the Brahma Sûtras altogether, but he could not do so, since the work had acquired an uncontested authoritativeness as regards religious truth before his time. He had therefore to show that his system did not go against the Brahma Sûtras and therefore accepted them and interpreted them in almost a fantastic manner. Texts from the Upanishads, too, which do not agree with his doctrines he treats similarly.' *Vaishnavism S'aivism.* ¶ 58.

To a certain extent this remark of Sir R. Bhandârkar applies to Vijnâna Bhikshu also. The difference between Madhva and Bhikshu is this — Madhva wants to emphasize मत्तुत्पादकब्रह्माहान्य, while Bhikshu is anxious to work out an अविरोध between the साध्य, वैशेषिक, योग and Vedanta etc., an effort though praiseworthy, cannot be justified. But the most important reason which led all the writers to modify the ब्रह्मकारणता of Bâdarâyana, is the fear of विकृति. If Brahman were taken to be the material cause, it would undergo change, and consequently it would be अनित्य and cease to be Brahman, निराश्रयबुद्धयुक्त. To avoid this difficulty S'ankara delegated Brahman's causality to अविद्या 'अविद्या-कल्पितेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकेन तत्कालावस्थामनिर्वचनीयेन ब्रह्म परिणामादिसर्वव्यवहारस्यैव प्रतिपद्यते' 2 1 27 Râmânujâ for the same reason did not accept the ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणाम, and substituted विद्विद्विद्विद्वत्तरीर instead of pure Brahman of Bâdarâyana 'मत्तुवर्णादिवद् ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणामस्तु नैवाम्युपगम्यते, अविकारत्वनिरूपत्वादियुते' 2 1-13. R. B Anand Press II 23 Similar is the reasoning of S'reekantha. Nimbârka and Bhâskara

for the same reason substitute ब्रह्मशक्ति instead of Brahman, 'ब्रह्म स्वशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकार आत्मान परिणामयति' N. B 347-57 परिणामो द्विविधः, स्वरूपपरिणाम शक्तिविक्षेपलक्षणपरिणामश्च, ×× श्रीपुरुषोत्तम स्वात्मक-स्वाधिष्ठितनिजशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकार स्वात्मान परिणामयति 'केशवभट्टा-काशमीरिन् & 'परिणामाद् परिणामोऽन शक्तिविक्षेपरूपो, न तु स्वरूपपरिणामस्तस्मान् विकारसभावना एकाश इति' परपक्षगिरिवज्र p 369 Thus according to Nimbārka writers, परिणाम is not Brahman s but its शक्ति s, the modification owing its existence to the fear of विकार. Similarly Bhāskara writes 'शक्तिविक्षेप कृतवान् 1-4-25, p 85 Bhāskara Bhāshya

'अप्रच्युतस्वरूपस्य शक्तिविक्षेपलक्षण ।

परिणामो यथा तन्तुनाभस्य पटतन्तुवत् ॥ 2 1 14.

'स हि स्वेच्छया स्वात्मान लोकहितार्थं परिणामयन् स्वशक्त्यनुसारेण परिणामयति' भास्करभाष्य 2 1 14 Thus Bhāskara also does not accept ब्रह्मपरिणाम Vynānabhikshu for the same reason rejects Brahman's उपादानकारणता and substitutes अधिष्ठानकारणता of Brahman 'ब्रह्मणश्च स्वाविभक्तप्रकृत्यानुपपद्यते साक्षितामात्रमेति जगत्कारणत्वेऽपि न ब्रह्मणो विकारित्वं' भिष्टुभाष्य p 32 1 12 Madhva also for the same reason refuses to accept Brahman's उपादानकारणता Vallabha only is an exception to this rule He accepts like Bādarāyana that Brahman alone is the उपादानकारण Thus he accepts ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणाम In this he seems to be following Bādarāyana as remarked by Śrī R. Bhandārkar on pp 160 161, in Vaishnavism etc It has been shown above that according to Bādarāyana, Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, in other words, this Jagat is ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम To this the Sāṅkhya raises an objection in 2 1 36 'कृत्स्नप्रशक्तिर्निरवयवत्व शब्दकोपो वा' If Brahman were the material cause, then either there would be कृत्स्नप्रशक्ति, and hence मूलोच्छेद or the निरवयवत्व प्रतिपादक Vedic passages would have to be strained To this the answer furnished by the Sūtrākāra is very significant The Sūtrākāra says 'ध्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वाद्' 2 1 27 As ध्रुति

of the universe Madhva, not accepting this, has failed to make out anything of the Brahma Sūtras Sir R Bhandarkar most accurately remarks, 'He denies his (Brahman's) being the material cause of the world All the Sūtras of Bādarāyana which set forth that doctrine have been interpreted by him in an entirely different way Probably he would have set aside the Brahma Sūtras altogether, but he could not do so, since the work had acquired an uncontested authoritativeness as regards religious truth before his time He had therefore to show that his system did not go against the Brahma Sūtras and therefore accepted them and interpreted them in almost a fantastic manner Texts from the Upanishads, too, which do not agree with his doctrines he treats similarly' *Vaiṣṇavism Saivism* p 58

To a certain extent this remark of Sir R Bhandarkar applies to Vijnāna Bhikṣu also The difference between Madhva and Bhikṣu is this — Madhva wants to emphasize भक्त्युत्पादकप्रज्ञमाहात्म्य, while Bhikṣu is anxious to work out an अवितोष between the सांख्य, वैशेषिक योग and Vedānta etc, an effort though praiseworthy, cannot be justified But the most important reason which led all the writers to modify the प्रज्ञाकरण of Bādarāyana, is the fear of विहृति If Brahman were taken to be the material cause, it would undergo change, and consequently it would be अनित्य and cease to be Brahman नित्यमुत्सुदमुक्त To avoid this difficulty Śaṅkara delegated Brahman's causality to अविरा 'अविरा कपितेन च नामरूप' इत्येन रूपभेदेन व्याख्या व्याख्यात्मकन तत्त्वतस्तत्त्वाम्यामनिर्गुनी येन प्रज्ञ परिणामादित्यव्यवहारात्पदच प्रतिपद्यत 2127 Rāmānuja for the same reason did not accept the प्रज्ञस्वरूपपरिणाम, and substituted चिद्विद्विगिष्ठातीर instead of pure Brahman of Bādarāyana 'मृत्पुष्पादिबद् प्रज्ञस्वरूपपरिणामस्तु नैवाम्युपगम्यते, अविरा त्वनिर्दोषत्वादियुते' 2113 I. B Anand Press II 23 Similar is the reasoning of Śreekantha Nimbārka and Bhāskara

for the same reason substitute ब्रह्मशक्ति instead of Brahman, 'ब्रह्म स्वशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकार आत्मान परिणामयति' N II 347-57 परिणामो द्विविध स्वरूपपरिणाम शक्तिविक्षेपलक्षणपरिणाम-च x x धीपुत्रोत्तम स्वात्मक-स्वाधिष्ठितनिजशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकार स्वात्मान परिणामयति केशवभट्टाशमीरिन् ९ 'परिणामात् परिणामोऽत्र शक्तिविक्षेपस्यो, न तु स्वरूपपरिणामस्तस्मान् विकासभावना वकाश इति' परपक्षगिरिवज्र p 369 Thus according to Nimbārka writers, परिणाम is not Brahman's but its शक्ति's the modification owing its existence to the fear of विकार Similarly Bhāskara writes 'शक्तिविक्षेप कृतवान् 1-4 25 p 85 Bhāskara Bhāshya

अप्रच्युतस्वरूपस्य शक्तिविक्षेपकम् ।

परिणामो यथा तन्तुतामस्य पतन्तुवन् ॥ 2 1 14.

'स हि स्वेच्छया स्वात्मान लोकादित्यर्थं परिणामयन् स्वशक्त्यनुसारेण परिणामयति भास्करभाष्य 2 1 14 Thus Bhāskara also does not accept मय्यपरिणाम Vijnānabhikṣhu for the same reason rejects Brahman's उपादानकारणता and substitutes अधिष्ठानकारणता of Brahman मय्यगद्य स्वाधिभक्तप्रकृत्यायुषष्टभक्त्य साक्षितामानयेति जगत्कारणत्वेऽपि न ब्रह्मणो विकारित्वं भिक्षुभाष्य p 32 1 1 2 Madhva also for the same reason refuses to accept Brahman's उपादानकारणता Vallabha only is an exception to this rule He accepts like Bādarāyaṇa that Brahman alone is the उपादानकारण Thus he accepts ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणाम In this he seems to be following Bādarāyaṇa is remarked by Sir R Bhandārkar on pp 160 161, in Vaishnavism etc It has been shown above that according to Bādarāyaṇa Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, in other words, this Jagat is ब्रह्मशक्ति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम To this the Sāṅkhya raises an objection in 2 1 26 कृत्वप्रशक्तिर्निर्णयवत्त्व शब्दकोपो ॥ If Brahman were the material cause, then either there would be कृत्वप्रशक्ति and hence मूलोच्छेद or the निवृत्त्यवत्त्व प्रतिपादक Vedic passages would have to be strained To this the answer furnished by the Sūtrakāra is very significant The Sūtrakāra says 'ध्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् ॥ 1 27 As ध्रुति

for the same reason substitute ब्रह्मशक्ति instead of Brahman, 'ब्रह्म स्वशक्तिविशेषेण जगदाकार आत्मान परिणामयति' N. B. 347-57 परिणामो द्विविधः, स्वरूपपरिणाम शक्तिविशेषपक्षपरिणामश्च, × × श्रीपुरुषोत्तम स्वात्मक-स्वाधिष्ठितनिजशक्तिविशेषेण जगदाकार स्वात्मान परिणामयति' केचनभट्टास्मीरिन् & 'परिणामात् परिणामोऽत्र शक्तिविशेषरूपो, न तु स्वस्वपरिणामस्तस्मात् विकारमभावना-वशाद्वा इति' परपक्षगिरिवज्र p. 369. Thus according to Nimbārka's writers, परिणाम is not Brahman's but its शक्ति's, the modification owing its existence to the fear of विकार. Similarly Bhāṣkara writes 'शक्तिविशेष इववान्' 1-4-25, p. 85 Bhāṣkara-Bhāṣhya

‘अप्रच्युतस्वरूपस्य शक्तिविशेषपक्षेण ।

परिणामो यथा तन्तुनाभस्य पटतन्तुवत् ॥’ 2-1-14.

‘स हि स्वेच्छया स्वात्मान लोकहितार्थं परिणामयन् स्वशक्त्यनुसारेण परिणामयति’ भास्करभाष्य 2 1 14 Thus Bhāṣkara also does not accept ब्रह्मपरिणाम Vijnānabhikṣu for the same reason rejects Brahman's उपादानकारणता and substitutes अधिष्ठानकारणता of Brahman ‘ब्रह्मणश्च स्वाविभक्तप्रकृत्याद्युपपन्नत्वं साक्षितामादेवेति जगत्कारणत्वे-ऽपि न ब्रह्मणो विकारित्वं’ मिथुभाष्य p 32 1 1 2 Madhva also for the same reason refuses to accept Brahman's उपादानकारणता. Vallabha only is an exception to this rule. He accepts like Bādarāyana that Brahman alone is the उपादानकारण. Thus he accepts ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणाम. In this he seems to be following Bādarāyana as remarked by Sir R. Bhandārkar on pp 160 161, in Vaishnavism etc. It has been shown above that according to Bādarāyana, Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, in other words, this Jagat is ब्रह्मशक्ति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम. To this the Sāṅkhya raises an objection in 2 1-26 ‘इत्थं प्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वं शब्दकोपो वा’ If Brahman were the material cause, then either there would be इत्थं प्रसक्ति, and hence मूलोच्छेद, or the निरवयवत्व-प्रतिपादक Vedic passages would have to be strained. To this the answer furnished by the Sūtrakāra is very significant. The Sūtrakāra says ‘ध्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्’ 2 1-27. As ध्रुति

not think, he would have proceeded to qualify the sense of the Sūtras after once explaining them accurately. And where S'ankara does not expressly qualify the sense of the Sūtra, his commentator does so. See भावती and गोविन्दानन्द on प्रकृत्यविवरण. The Sāṅkhya³ begins by saying that as a rule cause and effect are similar, but since there is a dissimilarity between the cause Brahman which is चेतन, and the effect Jagat which is jada, Brahman cannot be the material cause of Jagat. To this Bādarāyana replies that we do see an effect dissimilar to the cause, hence the objection does not stand. But here too we notice Bādarāyana's tendency to reject independent reasoning and falling back upon the words of the युति 'वर्तप्रतिष्ठानात्' etc, 2-1-11.

The Sūtra 2-1-18 also is important. It deals with the question that even though the cause Brahman is the

1. अथ ह्ये परिणामसुखं कार्यमावर्ण, न तु सावकाशपरिणामस्य, 'उदन्तत्वात्' इति दिवर्तवात्स्य बद्धमाणात्वात् । रत्नमाला pp. 341, 342 N. S. edition.

2. इयं चोपादानपरिणामादिभाषा न विकासमिमांशेणापि तु यथा सर्वव्योशदानं रज्जुरेवं सदा जगदुपादानं दृष्टव्यम् etc, भावती pp. 342 343 N. S. edition.

3. In 2. 1. 4 'न विकल्पसादृश्यं तथात्वं च दृश्यते' S'ankara quotes a view of some one whom Govindānand calls एकदेशी thus — 'योऽपि कश्चिदाचक्षीत ध्रुवा जगत्क्षेत्रज्ञवस्तुतिकां तद्वत्तेनैव समस्तं जगदेवमवयमविवक्षति, प्रकृतिलवत्यविकारे भावसादृश्यात्, अविभाजनं चैकन्यस्य परिणामविशेषात् अभिप्रेति, यथा एतच्चेतनामात्मन्यप्येतां स्वात्ममूर्च्छावदवयवस्य चैकन्यस्य विभाज्ये, ध्वं वातकोष्ठदीनामपि चेतन्यं न विभावयिष्येत, एतस्मादेव च विभाजिताविभाजितवस्तुना देशेषादूपादिभाषाभाषायां च कार्यकारणानामात्मनां च चेतनत्वाविशेषेऽपि सुखमपानमयो न विगतरन्ते, तथा च पार्वतलवविशेषेऽपि मातृसुप्तौ दानादीनां प्राक् भवति नो विशेषश्च पारम्योक्त इति भवत्येवमिह पि अभिप्रेते, अविभाज्यमिदं तत्त्वं एव न विरोत्य इति । तेनपि कश्चिद्येतेन चेतनत्वं लक्षणं निरुद्धात्वं परिहरेत्, सुखमपि सुखलक्षणत्वं नैव परिकल्प्यते'. In the 2 1 6, 'दृश्यते तु', S'ankara remarks on this view thus — योऽपि चेतनकारणप्रवणत्वेनैव समस्तस्य जगत्क्षेत्रज्ञनामुपेक्षेने तस्यपि 'विज्ञानं चादिशते च' इति चेतनाचेतनविभागसंज्ञा विभावनाविषयनायां चैकन्यस्य दृश्यत्वं एव योजयेत्तुम्'. Thus S'ankara supports the view of the एकदेशी. Who is this एकदेशी? Can this view be referred to Sir R. Bhandarkar's view about Vallabha 'The mysterious power which causes the differences by rendering certain qualities imperceptible.' Vaishnavism etc, p. 161.

same, and the भोक्ता and भोग्य are अनन्य with Brahman, the भोक्ता does not become भोग्य nor भोग्य भोक्ता.† This is a fact evidenced by our everyday experiences. फेन, वीची, तरंग etc., though अनन्य with the समुद्र, there is no इतरेतमावापत्ति. A ring, a necklace, though as gold ornaments are अनन्य with gold, the ring does not become the necklace, nor the necklace the ring. S'ankara, after once explaining the Sûtra accurately, adds 'यद्यपि भोक्ता न ब्रह्मणो विकारः, 'तत्सृष्ट्या तदेवानुप्राविशत्' इति स्रष्टुरेवाविहृतस्य कार्यानुप्रवेशेन भोक्तृत्वप्रवणात्, तथापि कार्यमनुप्रविष्टस्यास्त्युपाधि-निमित्तो विभाग आकाशस्येव घटानुपाधिनिमित्त इत्यतः परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणोनन्यत्वेऽपि उपपद्यते भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणो विभागः समुद्रतरंगादिन्यायेनेत्युक्तम्.' The instance of समुद्रतरंग is approved of by Bhâskara and others, but this latter addition is strongly criticised by Râmânuja. The wording of the Sûtra does not favour S'ankara's addition. Again, S'ankara wants to refer this Sûtra to व्यवहार, while the latter Sûtra refers to परमार्थ stage according to him. This distinction of व्यवहार and परमार्थ is not accepted by any other Âchârya, nor is it referred to by the Sûtrakâra. The wording of the Sûtra cannot unquestionably be taken to suggest S'ankara's distinction. The words 'स्यान्नोक्तवत्' merely refer to the everyday experience. The experience is so very common that the Sûtrakâra does not consider it even desirable to point to any particular instance to support his view. The view expressed by S'ankara that भोक्ता Jivâtman is the same as Brahman, the difference being caused by उपाधि, has been shown to be not countenanced by the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. In a sense, the Jivâtman is no विकार of Brahman,‡ but an अंश. But the Sûtrakâra here wants to point out only this much, that though the Jada Jagat and the Chetana Jivâtman, both of them have their source in Brahman, still the Jada does not become Chetana, nor Chetana Jada. Hence the ब्रह्मकारणता is not open to any objection.

Then we come to the Sūtra 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14. This is one of the most important Sūtras in the *Brahmamimāṃsā*. Except Madhva, all the Āchāryas are unanimous in their referring this Sūtra to a passage from the 6th prapāthaka of the *Chhândogya*. Bhāskara says he has written a Bhāshya on the *Chhândogya*, but it is not available, hence we shall have to satisfy ourselves with what he has observed on the question in his *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāshya* 2-1-14. When we look at the Sūtras of Bādarāyana as a whole, it appears clear that they fulfil a double function, viz., removing doubts that might arise through the aberrant genius of several Vedic thinkers, and at the same time summarising the principal teachings of the Upanishads. Thus the Sūtra 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14 has been written to set aside the doubt caused by words like आरंभ, नामधेय etc. Accordingly, the Sūtrakāra says that these words mean that cause and effect are अनन्य. It is to be noticed that the Sūtrakāra does not say that the effect is the same as the cause, but that they are अनन्य. From the word 'अनन्यत्वम्' one fails to work out the sense that विकार has no existence. 'न तु वस्तुशतेन विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति'. Neither the श्रुति passage referred to, nor the wording of Sūtra lends support to what Sankara observes here:—'तत्माद्यपि घटकारकाद्याकाशानां महाकाशानन्यत्वं, यथा च मृगतृप्णिकोदकादीनामूषरादिभ्योऽनन्यत्वं दृष्टमस्वरूपत्वात्, स्वरूपेणानुपाख्यत्वात्, एवमस्य भोग्यभोक्त्रादिप्रपञ्चातस्य प्रज्ञाव्यतिरेकेणाभाव इति द्रष्टव्यम्' 2-1-14. This absolute negation of the existence of the प्रपञ्च as such is very seriously criticised by Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Vijnānabhikṣhu, Keśava Bhatta Kashmirin and Vallabha. The text of the *Chhândogya* here referred to is this:—'यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं सूक्ष्मं विज्ञातं स्याद्वत्वारंभं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्'. The meaning that naturally suggests itself from the text is this:—The knowledge of one ball of earth gives knowledge of all that is made of earth, though there is a different name and also form

विकार-रूप (as Rangarāmānuja takes it), or though there is a difference of name and form, still all the things made of earth are earth, and as earth they are सत्य. The passage cannot certainly be taken to mean that effects like pot etc. do not exist at all like the mirage, but that they exist in cause, they have no independent existence, the difference in name does not create a new object independent of the cause. Rightly does Vallabha observe—'वाच्यारम्भ विकारो नामधेयं सृष्टिकेत्येव सत्यमिति, सत्र विकारो वाङ्मात्रेणैवारम्भ्यते न वस्तुत इत्यर्थे प्रतिभाति, तथा च सति कस्य ब्रह्म कारण भवेत्? अत ध्रुतिवाक्यस्यार्थमाह, आरम्भ-शब्दादिभ्यः तदनन्यत्व प्रतीयते, कार्यस्य कारणानन्यत्व, न मिथ्यात्वम् ।' The sage Uddālaka wants to teach his son S'vetaketu 'the knowledge of all by the knowledge of one' 'Now the knowledge of 'all' is possible only when 'all' has existence and is अनन्य with one, then only the knowledge of 'one' can produce the knowledge of 'all'.' To explain this, the sage Uddālaka gave three instances, from all of which the relation of cause and effect is suggested—that is—Uddālaka means to say that the relation between the world and Brahman is the same that exists between the earthen pot and earth, Brahman is the cause and the world is the effect, the knowledge of cause Brahman produces the knowledge of effect the world, the reason being that they are अनन्य, as effect is अनन्य with the cause. From this it is impossible to concede that the cause Brahman exists while the world is non-existent, like mirage. The fact that the Upanishad gives three instances of earth, gold, and iron teaching the relation of cause and effect, and nowhere mentions, any of the instances viz रज्जुसर्पे, शुक्तिरजत etc., which S'ankara so very zealously puts side by side with the above-mentioned ones, in his Bhāṣhya on the Chhândogya, as well as here, suggests a very strong inference against Sankara that the Sūtrakāra has in his mind not the doctrine of विवर्त of S'ankara, but the doctrine of परिणाम of Brahman alone,

and that the world is not an effect of illusion, but that of Brahman, the world is not a dream on a grand scale, but a real positive something which has its origination, existence and absorption in Brahman. True that in the Sûtra 'मायामात्र ॥ कात्स्न्येनानभिन्नकस्वरूपत्वाद्' 3 2 3, the Sûtrakâra distinctly says that the स्वप्नसृष्टि is मायामात्र, and whether we take 'माया' in the Bhâskara's sense of अर्थप्रत्ययसून्यत्व, or in Nimbârka's and Râmânuja's sense of आध्यात्मिकत्व, or in Vallabha's sense of सर्वभूतसामर्थ्य, or in S'ankara's sense of सृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्व or अनिर्वचनीयत्व, the fact remains that according to the Sûtrakâra, the world is विषयि, from स्वप्न 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवद्', that the स्वप्नसृष्टि may be मायामात्र, but the सृष्टिसृष्टि is not so, it is not मायामात्र but सद्गुरुत्व and सद्गुणत्व. Bhâskara well observes in 3 2 3—'ये पुनर्जागरितावस्थापि मायामात्रमित्यापोषयन्ति ते सूत्रकाराभिप्रायं नाशयन्त धोऽप्रियजन मोहयन्ति'. Again in 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवद्' 2-2 29 he observes to the same effect—'ये तु बौद्धमतं बलविनो मायावादिनस्तोष्यनेन न्यादेन सूत्रकारणैव निरस्तं वेदितव्यं, यदि बाह्योऽर्थो नाभिप्रेतः स्यात् विमर्शमिदं यतते सूत्रकारः?' etc. The Sûtra 'नाभाव उपलब्धे' (2 2 28) also suggests that according to the Sûtrakâra the world is not a nonentity. Thus though the world is not a nonentity, it does not follow that the Sûtrakâra takes it to be a separate entity from Brahman and independent of it. This is what he drives at, in the आरम्भपाधिच्छेदः. The धृति passage also reads 'सृष्टिर्वा इति एव सत्यम्' and not 'सृष्टिरेव सत्या', and the Sûtrakâra also words the Sûtra as 'तदनव्यक्तत्वं' and not 'तन्निष्कृतत्वं' or 'तदेकत्वं'. These facts also go against S'ankara's view of जगन्निष्कृतत्वं, or जगन्मायिकत्व.

From this, it follows that the view of the Sûtrakâra is exactly similar to, if not actually the same, as S'ankara tries to refute in 2 1 14—'नन्वनश्वरस्य सद्गुरु, यथा दृशानवस्था एवमनश्वरस्य प्रशान्तियुक्तं सद्गुरु अत एवम्भे नानात्वं चाभयमपि सत्यमेव, यथा दृश इन्द्रियत्वं द्वाका इति नानात्वं, तथा च समुद्रात्मनोऽनन्तत्वं पेननश्वरादभेदा नानात्वं, यथा च मृदात्मनोऽनन्तत्वं पृथक्तावादात्पेनान्न नानात्वं, धर्मकत्वाच्चान्न शान्त्योऽन-

व्यवहार सेत्स्यति नानात्वादेन तु कर्मकाण्डाप्रयौ लौकिकवैदिक्यवहारौ सेत्स्यत इति, एव मृदादिदृष्टान्ता अनुसूता भविष्यन्तीति' + + + 'ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्तप्रणयनात् परिणामवद् ब्रह्म शास्त्राभिमतमिति गम्यते, परिणामिनो हि मृदादयोर्वा लोके समधिगता इति' The view expressed in these lines seems to be more in harmony with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana, than S'ankara's own view given in refutation of the same. His objection 'न हि एकस्य ब्रह्मण परिणामधर्मत्वं कदाचित् च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तु, etc' is also groundless in face of 'ध्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2-1-27. His other objections are met at length by Bhâskara, Râmânûja, Keśava Bhatta and Nimbârka, but space at our disposal forbids us from entering into the full discussion of the same here. The ध्रुति 'यत्र तु जस्य सर्वमात्मा एव अमृतं सदैव किं पश्येत्' also teaches not 'सर्वभाव' but 'आत्मनः सर्वभाव'. In the stage of ब्रह्मभाव the सर्व does not cease to exist, but the consciousness that सर्व is a different entity from Brahman vanishes and the consciousness that Brahman alone is सर्व is generated. Against S'ankara's 'जगन्निष्पत्त्यात् Vijnâna-Bhikshu advances a queer but not unreasonable argument thus - 'प्रपञ्चस्यालम्बनभावे यत्प्रमाणान्तरभणक्तत्वादिकं तत् सन्न वा, आद्ये वाच्यं, अन्त्ये हेत्वसिद्धिः, तन्मात्रं सदसत्त्वविकल्पपराहृतैरारभणशब्दादिभिः प्रमाणैः प्रपञ्चात्पन्थमभावो न सूत्रकारेणाशुन्नेतेन साधयितुं शक्यते' p 281 मिश्रभाष्य Ch. 10 Bhâskara also observes in 2-1-14 thus 'न हि सूत्रकार इच्छिनायाशब्दं प्रायुक्तं, यत्र स्वप्रज्ञानान्मायामात्रं तु कात्स्न्येन अनभिध्यक्तस्वरूपत्वारिति हि यत्रोक्तं वैश्वमूर्ताश्च न स्वप्रादिवदिति वैयर्थ्यमुक्तम्, ईक्षतेनाशब्दमिति चारम्य प्रत्यधिकरणं स्मृतिमन्त्रेण बोधययते सूत्रकारस्य, स्मृत्यनवकाशदोष इत्यारम्य साध्यानुद्भावविषयदूषणोद्धारार्थं प्रत्यधिकरणं प्रयातोन्वर्थकं स्यात्, मायामात्रत्वे 'न विद्यद्युते'रिति चारम्य मूढननु-स्पत्यादिविचारोन्वर्थकं स्यात्' x x x अपि च मायाशब्दमात्रेण कृत्स्नो ब्रह्म सुप्रज्ञेय स्वर्गापवर्गलक्षणं यथा मृतं प्रत्याययत्यप्रमाणमसत्यमिति वा कृत्यायितुमिति हाननं प्रवर्त्तये वेदार्थं यथा नद्वेषुमशक्या यथा प्रवर्त्तन्तामिति' मा मा pp 99 100. One cannot but concede that the above-mentioned arguments of Bhâskara have much force. Keśava Bhatta Kashmîrî, Râmânûja and Purushottama have also said much against S'ankara. All the writers on the Vedânta Sûtras, in some form or other, accept the परिणामवाद and जगन्निष्पत्त्यं, and this

fact by itself is an almost certain indication that the Sūtrakāra has neither in his mind the doctrine of *विवर्त* nor *मिथ्यात्व* of the world. In his zeal for *मायावाद* S'ankara forgets to what he is being drifted when he remarks 'तदेव-
नविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्षमेवैश्वरस्येश्वरत्व सर्वज्ञत्व सर्वशक्तिमत्त्व, न परमार्थत' etc. He himself feels conscious that Bādarīyaṇa's *प्रविवर्त-प्रतिज्ञा* and 'जन्माद्ययं यत्' are being put to a strain. The Sūtras following in this *अधिरण* also confirm the view expressed above. The Sūtra 2 1-15, S'ankara reads also as 'भावाद्यापश्ये'. The explanation which follows this Sūtra reading, according to S'ankara himself, confirms the view that the world is only an *अवस्थान्तर* of *ब्रह्मन्* as *पट* of *तन्तु*, and as *पट* is *अनन्य* with *तन्तु*s, so is the world with Brahman. From this it is quite clear that according to the view of the Sūtrakāra as interpreted by S'ankara here, the 'अनन्यत्व' does not mean *मिथ्यात्व* of *जगत्*, but merely an *अवस्थान्तरत्व*. The next Sūtra 'सत्त्वाद्यावरस्य' also teaching the *सद्रूपत्व* of Jagat, confirms the *अनन्यत्व* existing between a cause and an effect. The Sūtras 2-1-19 and 20 also confirm the view of *अनन्यत्व* expressed above. Difference in *रूप* and *क्रिया* does not produce a new substance, *पट* may be in a different form from the *तन्तु*s, *प्राण*s may perform different functions but still the *पट* is *अनन्य* with *तन्तु*s, and *उदान*, etc. are *अनन्य* with *प्राणवायु* 'ज्ञानक्रियाभेदात्सूक्ष्मद्वयम्' A. B

The Sūtras 'उपसंहारदक्षनामेति चेन्न क्षीरवदि' and 'देवादिष्वपि लोके' 2 1-24 25 deal with the question that Brahman does not need any external *साधन*. By its own natural powers like gods it develops the universe out of itself. The Sūtras 2 1-26-27 declare that as Veda teaches the *अस्तित्व* of *अविद्वृतब्रह्मन्* and *ब्रह्मपरिणाम*, there is no *कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति* or *निरवयवत्वशब्दस्य*. The *सृष्टि* is in itself, its powers are wonderful. 'आत्मनि चैव विचित्राश्च दि'. The Sūtras 2 1 30 31 take up another similar question. 'सर्वोपेता च तदज्ञानात्' 'विवरणत्वादिति चेन्न तदुक्तम्'. Brahman is possess-

ed of all powers, and even though it has no organs, it creates the universe etc., the Veda teaches so. S'ankara's remark on सूत्र 'प्रतिपिदसर्वविशेषस्यापि ब्रह्मण सर्वशक्तियोगः सम्भवतीत्येतदप्यविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदोपन्यासेनोक्तमेव' is quite out of place. The Sūtra kara declares the सर्वशक्तियोग of ब्रह्म as based on दर्शन, Veda, while S'ankara wants to refer it to अविव्या

Why should self-satisfied Brahman create this world when it has no प्रयोजन to fulfil? To this question an answer is furnished by 'लोकवतु लील कवलयम्' 2-1-33 S'ankara very beautifully explains the Sūtra thus — यद्यपि अस्माकमियं जगद्विस्मयना गुरुतरसंस्मेवाभाति, तथापि परमेश्वरस्य लीलैव केवलं य, अपरिमित-शक्तित्वाद् । यदि नाम लोके लीलस्त्वपि किञ्चित् सूक्ष्म प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्ष्येत तथापि नैवान किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितुं शक्यते, आप्तकामधुते, नाप्यप्रशुतिरुन्मत्तप्रशुतिर्वा, सृष्टि ध्रुते सर्वश्रुतेष्व । This is quite in the strain of the Sūtra kara and we cannot understand why after this beautiful explanation, he thinks it necessary, practically against the Sūtrakāra, to add 'न चेत् परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुति, अविविद्याकल्पित-नामरूपव्यवहारगोचरत्वाद् ब्रह्मात्मभाषप्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्चेत्येतदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यम्

The learned Sūtrakāra has dealt with the question that Brahman is the उपादान कारण, and though it is उपादान कारण it is without any sort of विकार, the विरोध being set aside by an implicit faith in the words of the texts of the Veda. Now in 2-1-34-35-36, he deals with the question that even though ¹ Brahman is the efficient cause, even though it is शक्ति, it is not liable to the faults of partiality and cruelty as Brahman allots fruits according to the Karmas of the individual souls. The ज्यत्प्रवाद is अनादि, hence this is possible

In the last Sūtra Bādarāyaṇa removes all contradictions by remarking that Brahman is सर्ववर्त्मबुक् । In the previous अधिकरण, he said that ज्यत्प्रवाद is अनादि, hence it was possible for Brahman to allot fruits according to कर्म of

1 This question is dealt at length in बीवविचारण

the individual souls, but this directly goes against the श्रुति passage 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्' which distinctly teaches the एकत्व and अद्वितीयत्व of Brahman To such a difficulty Bâdarâyana's answer is on the same principles which he has laid down in 2-1 27. The svarûpa of Brahman is such The प्रवाह may be अनादि, still ब्रह्म is एक and अद्वितीय, Brahman though giving fruits according to कर्मे is independent of it In short, it is possessed of all कर्मे, there is no contradiction as such

According to the reasoning of S'ankara, the explanation given by the Sûtrakâra in refutation of the वैषम्य नैर्घृण्य is quite out of place According to him the विषमता and निर्घृणता, the वर्तुत्व of Jivâtman and Paramâtman are all creatures of अविद्या and with the removal of अविद्या, they vanish into nothingness

To conclude, the Sûtrakâra holds that this world is an effect of Brahman, is real Brahman has, for its लीला केवल, without any other प्रयोजन, and without any organs or any external means, by the natural powers of itself, developed itself into the universe without itself undergoing any change The world is अनन्य with Brahman in all its three stages It has no existence independent of Brahman, but at the same time it is neither मिथ्या nor an absolute non entity. It is not a विवर्त of Brahman, but a real wilful परिणाम of Brahman It is आत्मकृति and आत्मपरिणाम or ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम क्षरीर, शक्ति, प्रकृति, परमाणु अविद्या, माया and others, have nothing to do with it so far as its primary cause is being investigated

LIBERATION.

The fourth chapter of the Brahma Sûtras deals with the question of liberation The first pâda deals with the question of जीवमुक्ति or liberation in life of the Brahmayid. The knowledge of Brahman puts an end to कर्मे good

and bad which have not begun to be enjoyed, 4 1 13 14 15 After the knowledge of Brahman is acquired, the कर्म's, which are then performed, do not touch the ब्रह्मविद्. The body¹ of the ब्रह्मविद् continues to live so long as his आरव्यकर्म's are not ended, 4-1-19. When the body² falls away, he becomes joined with Brahman. ³Agnihotras etc., which are नित्यकर्म's, are to be performed by the ब्रह्मविद्, for they are useful in the requirement of ब्रह्मज्ञान. This is the general reasoning of the Sūtrākāra, but this reasoning directly goes against that of S'ankara. According to S'ankara कर्म, शरीर, everything is the creature of nescience. By the ब्रह्मज्ञान, the अविद्या is destroyed, and when the अविद्या is destroyed, its effects viz., कर्म, शरीर etc., must also vanish, on the principle that effect and cause are अनन्य, and that in the absence of cause, the effect cannot exist. So there comes in the impossibility of जीवन्मुक्ति, for, with the rise of विद्या the अविद्या with its effect शरीर etc., is destroyed, and the ब्रह्मविद् becomes Brahman at once. If this position is not accepted as being contradicted by our experience, then two alternatives come in, viz., either the ब्रह्मज्ञान is not thoroughly obtained, in which case there is no जीवन्मुक्ति, or if ब्रह्मज्ञान is obtained, then body etc., which continue to exist after the दाश of अविद्या are not creatures of अविद्या. From this it appears that the body etc., continue to exist even after the acquirement of ब्रह्मज्ञान, the difference being that, after ब्रह्मज्ञान, कर्म and its products शरीर etc., do not touch him (ब्रह्मविद्). The ब्रह्मविद् performs कर्म's, but these कर्म's are ब्रह्मकर्म's, and not his own. It is worthy of note that the Sūtrākāra says 'अशेष,' meaning thereby that कर्म's do not touch the ब्रह्मविद्. He becomes अदंग. Thus though the ब्रह्मविद् is living and doing every-

1. तदधिगम उत्तपूर्वाधयोऽशेषेन विनाशो तदयमन्वयः 4 1 13 इतरस्याथेवमशेषे पाठे तु 4 1 14 अनारम्भकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवशे 4 1 15

2. भोगेन स्थिते दुष्येति वाच्यं संप्रत्यये 4 1 19

3. अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कर्मण्येव तद्दर्शनात् 4 1 11

thing, he is untouched by good or bad actions. His existence is for the enjoyment of कर्मसु begun to be enjoyed. This seems to be the view of the Sūtrakāra about जीवन्मुक्ति. S'āṅkara himself remarks that this has reference to सगुणविद्या, in निर्गुणविद्या there is no need of mentioning this. 'सगुणास्तु तावद्विद्यासु विद्यत एव विधानम् । तासु च वाक्यशेष ऐश्वर्यप्राप्तिं यापयति विद्यावत् उच्यते । तयोश्चाविवक्षाकारणं नास्तीत्यतः पाप्मप्रहाणपूर्वकैश्वर्यप्राप्तिस्तस्या फलमिति निश्चीयते । निर्गुणाया तु विद्याया यद्यपि विधानं नास्ति, तथाप्यकर्मात्मनोऽपि कर्मप्रदाहसिद्धिः । 4-1-13

When the प्रारब्धकर्मसु are ended by enjoyment by the body, that body of the Brahmanvid falls away. The second पाद describes the process by which the body is dissolved. The उत्क्रान्ति of विद्वान् and अविद्वान् is common to a certain extent, of नाडीप्रवेश. The विद्वान् then passes by शताधिका, 4-2-16. In 4-2-13, 'स्यो हेकेयाम्' S'āṅkara remarks - तस्मादविद्वद्विषये प्राप्तयो गत्युत्क्रान्त्यो विद्वद्विषये प्रतिषेध इत्येवमेव व्याख्येय, व्यपदेशार्थं वत्साय । न च ब्रह्मविद सर्वगतब्रह्मात्मभूतस्य प्रक्षीणकर्मण उत्क्रान्तिर्गतिर्विपर्ययते, निमित्ताभावात् । 'अत्र ब्रह्म समधुते' इति चैवजातीयका धृतयो गत्युत्क्रान्त्योरभेदं सूचयन्ति ।'. The उत्क्रान्ति here spoken of by the Sūtrakāra is quite consistent with his arrangement. In the first पाद the Sūtrakāra describes the state of ब्रह्मविद् in life, in the second उत्क्रान्ति, in the third how and by which path he reaches Brahman (गति), and in the fourth the फल the ब्रह्मविद् enjoys after reaching Brahman. In this general arrangement the Sūtrakāra nowhere expressly says that the उत्क्रान्ति and गति have no reference to the ब्रह्मविद्. The question of सयोमुक्ति is altogether different, which is possible only through the singular grace of Brahman. In the case of the favoured ब्रह्मविद्, there is no detention even for enjoying आरब्धकर्मसु. His दायकर्मसु are taken away by his sons, good कर्मसु by his friends and bad ones by his enemies. 'इस्य पुत्रा दायमुपयन्ति मुहुरासाप्तुह्यन्ति द्विषन्ति पापहन्ताम्. Bādarāyaṇa suggests this in 'अतोऽन्यापि शेषेपासुभयो' 4-1-17.

Thus through the grace of Brahman, the कर्मs are ended, and the ब्रह्मविद् at once enjoys Brahman. This is only a suggestion which is not possible to carry further than this. All the आचार्यs refer to Jaimini and Bâdarâyana by the word उभय, and refer the युति passage to काम्यकर्मs. But the objection to this view as is pointed out by Vallabha is that Jaimini is not spoken of either before or after in this पाद 4-1, and that परब्रह्म cannot be काम्यविषय. Whatever it may be, it seems almost impossible that Bâdarâyana views the गतिश्रुति as belonging to अब्रह्मविषय. In the third pāda of the fourth chapter after describing the stations through which the soul of the ब्रह्मविद् passes by the path of देवयान, Bâdarâyana says that the ब्रह्मविद् reaches Brahman from where there is no return. In the same pāda Bâdarâyana mentions two views—of ¹Bâdara who holds that the final goal to which the Brahman reaches is said to reach is कार्य, and of ²Jaimini who holds that the final goal to which the Brahman reaches is परब्रह्म, and not अनित्यकार्य. S'ankara accepts the view of Bâdara and rejects that of Jaimini. In 'न च कार्ये प्रतिप्रत्ययमिति' 4-3-14, S'ankara takes great pains to show that the गतिश्रुति is not to be accepted in their primary sense, but as referring to lower Brahman, they are to be finally rejected. The principal reasons which led S'ankara to reject the गतिश्रुति in their primary sense are expressed by him thus:—
 अस्तस्यैव सत्त्वे मुख्यस्यैवार्थस्य ग्रहणमिति कथिदाज्ञापयिता विद्यते। परविद्याप्रकरणेऽपि च तत्स्तुत्यर्थं विद्यान्तराश्रयगत्यनुकीर्तनमुपपद्यते, 'विष्णु-या उत्क्रमणे भवन्ति इतिवत्। 'प्रजापते सम्रा वेदम प्रपद्ये' इति तु पूर्ववाक्यविच्छेदेन कार्येऽपि प्रतिप्रत्ययमित्यधिन विरुध्यते। सगुणेऽपि च ब्रह्मणि सर्वात्मत्वस्यकीर्तनं 'सर्वकामां सर्वकाम' इत्यादिवदवकल्पते। तस्मादपरब्रह्मविषया गतिश्रुत्यः।' 4 3 14. S. B. N. S p 497. From this one sees that S'ankara's main difficulty consisted in the 'असम्यक्' or 'द्विषेय' between the गतिश्रुति and the व्यापकत्व of Brahman. In the absence of सम्यक्,

says he, there is no reason why the गतिश्रुति should be accepted in their primary sense. His other explanations viz., 'कार्येण प्रतिश्रयमिदं विवक्ष्यते' and 'समुद्येपि द्रव्यं × × असत्यते', are questions of plausibilities which stand or fail with the main argument. From what has been stated above it is important to note that S'ankara does not adduce any Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa in support of his theory, and therefore the sustained reasoning that he has worked out for rejecting the गतिश्रुति loses all its force. Before we examine his argument in favour of the rejection of the गतिश्रुति, and insistence of the निर्दिशेयश्रुति, let us advert to the question of the सर्वम्. It is admitted on all hands, that the गतिश्रुति, as they stand, do present a contradiction with the व्यासत्वं of Brahman. But on this ground alone, it would not be proper to reject the गतिश्रुति. With this we have to bear in mind what the learned Sūtrakāra has said about Brahman and the letter of the Veda. As a faithful interpreter of the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, one has to abide by his reasoning and conclusion. The position would be the same which he assumed in 2-1-26-27, 'युक्तेषु शब्दमूलत्वाद्'. The difficulty put forth by S'ankara arises only when unlike the Sūtrakāra one fails to put an implicit faith in the letter of the Veda. In the शब्दप्रमाणशास्त्र as is written by the Sūtrakāra, one is surprised, why S'ankara tries to modify and correct not only the clear sense of the श्रुति, but that of the Sūtras also. The result of this is often unpleasant when one sees that S'ankara's modified interpretation not only goes against the wording of the Sūtras, but directly contradicts what he himself has just said ¹before. In this connection, Bhāskara rightly defines the position of the Sūtrakāra in

* 1. Second interpretation of शब्दमूलत्वादिश्रुति. Second interpretations in 2-1-27, 2-1-29, are instances out of many.

his Bhāṣya on page 238, 4-3-13, thus:—‘उभयात्मकं तद्वस्तु + न चास्माकमर्थवादत्वं कल्पना, यथाश्रुतार्थग्रहणे किं नामानुपपन्नम्. Thus Bhāṣkara sees no difficulty in accepting गतिश्रुति in their primary sense and व्यापकत्व of Brahman. Vallabha's position is also similar. According to him the गतिश्रुति has no contradiction with the व्यापकत्व of Brahman, for both are taught by the Vedas, and that Brahman's svarūpa is such as would admit the possibility of both the alternatives. Vallabha's commentator also observes on page 1368:—‘किञ्च, तैरपि कचिद् गौणः शब्दो दृष्ट इति नैतावता शब्दप्रमाणकेयं गौणी कल्पना न्याय्या ।’ (अ. भा. प्रकाश B. S. S.). On the question of गतिश्रुति Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhya, Vallabha, S'reekantha and Bhāṣkara are all at one, and this seems to be a strong ground to hold that the Sūtrakāra had never in his mind the difficulty of ‘असंभव’ between the गतिश्रुति and the व्यापकत्व. The Sūtrakāra's attitude is the one declared by Vallabha in 1-1-4, ‘विद्वत्सर्वधर्माभयत्वं तु ब्रह्मणो मूल्याय’. It follows therefore, that S'āṅkara's interpretation of the गतिश्रुति in the लक्षणिक sense is not viewed by any other commentator with favour, and we cannot but think that here also S'āṅkara is not faithful to the Sūtrakāra.

S'āṅkara has however paid very serious attention to this question. The following are the arguments advanced by him in 4-3-14-S. B. N. S. pp. 497-502:—

- (1) Brahman is व्यापक.
- (2) Brahman is निर्विशेष.
- (3) Jiva is अविशोपाधिपरिच्छिन्न.
- (4) गतिश्रुति refer to अपरब्रह्मन्.
- (5) No गति is spoken of in परविज्ञा.
- (6) The distinction between पर and अपर ब्रह्मन् is based on the श्रुति passages.
- (7) तमन is due to बुद्ध्युपाधि.
- (8) Jaimini's view is mentioned by the Sūtrakāra later for the development of intellect (प्रज्ञाविकास).

The first objection is met by Bhāskara and Vallabha by showing the possibility of गमन as being due to भोगजनक प्रारब्ध. 'इदं गमनमिति संप्रत्ययनिमित्तमिति निमित्तप्रसङ्गेत्यदोषः' says Bhāskara in 4-3-13. 'न च व्यापकत्वं गन्तव्यत्वे बाधकं, प्रारब्धमोगं विना संप्रत्ययमभवात्, यदा यत्र तद्भोगसमाप्तिस्तदा तत्र तद्भोगनिमित्तत्वत्वात्' says Vallabha in 4-3-14.

The second and third objections are answered by what has been said before in reference to Brahman and the human Soul.

It has been shown that the Sūtrakāra does not hold the distinction between पर and अपरब्रह्म, hence the fourth and sixth objections are answered. This question has been exhaustively treated by Vallabha's commentator on pages 1362 to 1365. A. B. P. D. S. S., and by Bhāskara in 4-3-13; and but for want of space we should have quoted the same in full here.

The fifth objection is dealt with by Bhāskara thus:— 'न चात्माभिरियं गतिः कल्पिता, धृतयोत्र प्रमाणम्, परविद्यां गतयो दृश्यन्ते'. 4-3-13. Then he quotes from छान्दोग्य, प्रश्न, कठक्री, ऐतरेय, गीता, पुराण and याज्ञवल्क्य, to support his view that there is गमन in परविद्या.

The tendency of the Sūtrakāra is to accept the धृति always in their primary sense, hence गमन is in the primary sense, and not in a secondary sense, as due to उपाधि. Thus the 7th objection is answered.

The last objection is certainly very weak. One does not understand why the Sūtrakāra should put his doctrine in the mouth of Bādarī, why he should place the सिद्धान्त view first and पूर्वपक्ष view after it. S'āṅkara says that it is done with a view to develop intellect प्रज्ञा. True, but since this is a solitary unusual circumstance, one must be thoroughly convinced before he accepts S'āṅkara's

view. It appears that S'ankara's interpretation though fairly correct so far the Sûtras are concerned, becomes altogether opposed to the view of the Sûtrakâra the moment S'ankara's interpretation is viewed in the light of his 'Esoteric doctrine' in the words of Dr. Deussen. Once it is shown that there is real ब्रह्मगमन, the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana become quite consistent. The holy words 'अनादृतिः शब्दात् अनादृतिः शब्दात्', teaching the non-return of those who have reached Brahman, cannot with justice be referred to a secondary hypothetical sense, for an ultimate rejection. That Bâdarâyana should begin and end with Sûtras which can on no account be reconciled with S'ankara's reasoning, leads one to suppose that there is a flaw in S'ankara's reasoning so far as his faithfulness to the Sûtrakâra is concerned. Râmânûja and Nimbârka have clearly an advantage over S'ankara in this, that their views evolve from the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana with less difficulty. When the Sûtras and S'ankara's commentary dealing with his एत विद्या are compared, one cannot but honestly admit that there is a clear contradiction between the two. Sûtras, viewed in the light of S'ankara's esoteric doctrine, lose all their force in their criticisms of Sâṅkhya, Kânâda and other systems. Thus, it is not right with S'ankara to deprive the अविमर्श of their primary significance, for, it is a view not favoured by Bâdarâyana, or at least we are not in a position to support it from the Sûtras.

Having established in the third पद that the Brahman reaches Brahman, or rather is ¹led there, the fourth पद describes the mode of his enjoyment there. After reaching Brahman, the Brahman reaches gets ²अविमर्श, but all the same ³he is अविमर्श with Brahman. For the sake of enjoyment, he becomes manifest in a new form which, though अविमर्श

1. अग्रोक्तार्थेनाश्रयतीति शब्दप्रमाणं तत्रैव शब्दोक्तं 4-3-15. 2. सम्पदाविमर्शः एतेन शब्दोक्तं 4-4-1. 3. अविमर्शेन दृष्टत्वात् 4-4-4.

with Brahman, is ¹ब्रह्म according to Jaimini, ²चिद् according to Audulomī, while उभयरूप according to ³Bādarāyana; there is no विरोध between Jaimini's and Audulomī's views, as both are possible according to Bādarāyana. Being अविकृत with Brahman the Brahmanvid derives everything by Brahman's ⁴संकल्प. Like Brahman he is ⁵अनन्याधिपति. There is a difference of opinion between the views of Bādari and Jaimini, the ⁶former believes in the absence of शरीर etc., of the ब्रह्मविद्, while the ⁷latter believes in the presence of शरीर etc., on the authority of Cbh. U. 7-26-2, ⁸while Bādarāyana believes in both the views, (उभयविधम्). With these शरीर etc., the Brahmanvid enjoys भोग. The ⁹absence of भोग spoken of in धृति has reference to स्वप्न्यय, and धृति's teaching भोग refer to संपत्ति. The ¹⁰देख्ये of the Brahmanvid is limited to the extent that he cannot like Brahman create Jagat. His ¹¹देख्ये is eternal. With ¹²Brahman the Brahmanvid by ब्रह्म form enjoys eternally. He ¹³does not return to Sansāra.

This seems to be the general outline of the mode in which the Brahmanvid enjoys in the Brahmaloṅka. The Brahmaloṅka is eternal. In this there is a general agreement among Rāmaṅja, Nimbārka and Vallabha. The Sūtras of Bādarāyana stand naturally reconciled with the above view. There is no suggestion in these Sūtras of the ideal of Moksha which S'āṅkara mentions in 1-1-4.

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1. ब्रह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः 4-4-5. 2. चिति उ-मात्रेण तदारभ्यवशादित्यौदुकोभिः 4-4-9. 3. एवमुपन्यासात्पूर्वभावादविरोधं वादरायणः 4-4-7. 4. संवत्सरादेव तु तत्तुष्टेः 4-4-8. 5. अत एव आनन्याधिपतिः 4-4-9. 6. अभाव वादीराह छेवम् 4-4-10. 7. मातृ जैमिनिर्विकल्पात्मनाम् 4-4-11. 8. इदमिदमवदुभयविधं वादरायणोऽनः 4-4-12. 9. स्वप्न्ययसंस्मरणोन्मत्ततामिहमात्रिष्टुतं हि 4-4-16. 10. अग्न्यायावत्तं प्रकरणादसतिरेकवाच 4-4-17. 11. विकारवर्ति च तथाहि स्थितिमाह 4-4-19. 12. भोगमात्रसाम्य-लिपाच्च 4-4-21. 13. अनावृत्तिः नृणां च नृणां हि. नृणां च 4-4-22.

‘इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थानित्यं, व्योमवत्सर्वव्यापि, सर्वविक्रियारहितं, नित्यतृप्तं, निरवयवं, स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावम्, यत्र धर्माधर्मौ सह कार्येण कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तते, तदेतदशरीरत्वं मोक्षाख्यम्’.

“As may be seen from this passage, the conception of Liberation contains the same characteristics as serve, as a rule, to define Brahman; and indeed, Brahman and the state of liberation are identical terms; for liberation is nothing else than the becoming one with Brahman, or rather, since the identity of the Soul with Brahman has always subsisted and has only been hidden from it by an illusion, liberation is nothing else but the awakening of the consciousness that our own self is identical with Brahman. Accordingly, in liberation there is no question of becoming which does not already exist, but only of the attainment of the knowledge of what has existed from all eternity. It is because of this, that liberation is not accomplished through any sort of work, nor through moral improvement, but by knowledge alone.” *System of Vedānta*. p. 401. It is absolutely clear that this reasoning cannot be traced to any Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa. S’āṅkara’s conception of Liberation has much in common with that of the Sāṅkhya. The highest aim of the Sāṅkhya¹ is to free himself from the प्रकृति, so the greatest aim of a S’āṅkara is to free himself from the जगद्विद्या. With the destruction of जगद्विद्या, its creatures viz., his Jivatva, his अज्ञप्रसि, everything vanishes, and he remains what he was, viz., Brahman, the subject of all negations except existence. That this view is foreign to the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa can be seen from the summary of the Sūtras given above. S’āṅkara’s attempts to force up his doctrines in औदुलोमि and Bādari suggest his departure from the lines of the Sūtrakāra. His attempt to reconcile Audulomi’s view with that of Jaimini on the authority

1. *Vide* S’āṅkhya Kārika 62-68. and Vāchaspatimis’ra’s उत्कल्लुग्री.
11-12

of Bādarāyaṇa in 4-4-7, 'एवमुपन्यासात्पूर्वभावादविरोधम् वादरायणः' results in a contradiction. He says:—'एवमपि पारमार्थिकचेतन्य-मात्रस्वरूपान्मुपगमेऽपि व्यवहारापेक्षया पूर्वस्यापि उपन्यासादिभ्योऽङ्गतस्य त्राद्वि-श्वरूपस्याप्रत्याख्यानादविरोधं वादरायण आचार्यो मन्यते'. The contradic- tion arises from the fact that there come in ऐश्वर्ये, etc., creatures of Ignorance after the Ignorance is destroyed. Govindānanda thus puts it 'अखण्डचिन्मात्रज्ञानान्मुक्तस्याज्ञानाभावात् कृत आज्ञानिकथनयोग इति'. *Vide* also अणुभाष्यप्रकाश pp. 1396-1401. The liberation in the sense of Bādarāyaṇa is not merely the end of miseries, but also the attainment of ever-lasting bliss.

CONCLUSION.

From what has been said before, it follows that the Sūtrakāra's conception of Brahman is at great variance with that of S'āṅkara. As Dr. Thibaut observes:— 'They do not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman, that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and Jīvara in S'āṅkara's sense.' *Vedānta Sūtras*. I. p. 100. According to the Sūtrakāra, the Brahman is possessed of all attributes, and all wonderful powers. By its very swarūpa, it is possessed of all contradictory attributes. The negative vedic passages like 'नेतिनेति' deny in Brahman all the earthly attributes, while those like 'सर्वकामः' etc., affirm in Brahman all divine attributes. Thus Brahman is उभयर्लिङ्ग as is accepted by Vallabha and Nimbārka. The absolute negation of all attributes, and describing Brahman as निषेधरूप, is a view which does not find any expres- sion in the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. The subject of nega- tion in negative Vedic passages has reference to what is non-Brahman as is remarked by the author of Bhāṣhya-Prakāśa. B. S. S. p. 953. 'अतोऽन्यनिषेधो यो वर्तते स सर्वं महणोऽ- न्तर्निवेश्येतरं निषेधति, न तु सर्वं मिम्याहृत्येति शुधीभित्तयेयम्'. Neither is Brahman devoid of all attributes. 'अतो विद्वेषाणां नास्तनापि तु

निर्विशेषमात्राभ्युपगन्तूणामेवास्तवेति बोध्यम्'. *Anu. B. P.* p. 948. This Brahman which is spoken of in the Upanishads as 'नेति नेति' or as 'सर्वकाम' is an independent कर्तृ. It is Sad-Chid-Ânanda. For the sake of sport alone it develops itself into the universe, but unlike the Pantheism of Spinoza, as is shown by Sir Râmakrishna Bhandârkar, it is not exhausted into the universe, but remains transcendent. Residing in the heart, it becomes अन्तर्यामिन्, and existing outside, though 'agamyâ', becomes 'gamyâ' by meditation and devotion, when it likes. It is the fountain-source from which all activity, all intelligence, all joy proceed. It is Brahman which evolves names and forms, and makes अव्याकृत व्याकृत. The universe with its immense diversity has its source in Brahman. The human souls have their source in Brahman. The Brahman of the Sûtras is not only a personal God, but it is one of its phases. Brahman is *avyakta* when one tries to find Him by means of intellect alone, but becomes व्यक्त through meditation and devotion. The innermost soul of the human souls is Brahman, hence it is to be meditated upon as the आत्मन्. 4-1-3. The infinite² variety is united in the Brahman. Sages like Vâmadeva, in the stage of Brahma-Bhâva, have experienced this *Sarvatva*. Brahman is अनुस्यूत in the universe by Sad, Chid, and Ânanda. It follows from this, that the author of the Sûtras follows a process quite opposite to that of S'ankara's, in working out his Pantheism. He does not deny everything of Brahman, but unlike S'ankara, affirms everything of Brahman.

In the case of the human soul also, the view of the Sûtrakâra is opposed to that of S'ankara. As-Dr. Thibaut puts it, the Sûtras 'do not, with S'ankara, proclaim the abso-

1. आत्मोति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च । 2 क्व सर्वेषां सर्वमात्रे सर्वानन्त्यसर्वान् सर्विकमेवेति वक्तव्यम् । *Anu Bhâshya II. S. S.* p. 262. 1-1-29.

lute identity of the individual and the highest Self.' Introduction to Vedānta Sūtra I, p. 100. According to the Sūtrakāra, the human soul springs out of Brahman as spark out of fire. It is atomic. It is part-अंश of Brahman, and as the अंश of अक्षिन् Brahman, it is अनन्य with it. It is Kairī and Bhoktrī, but its activity has its source in Brahman. In the stage of Brahmabhāra it experiences विभुत्व, etc., with its Aṇutva. It is neither an आभास nor a प्रतिविम्ब of Brahman. It is not a creature of nescience, nor is it the same as Brahman differentiated by अविद्या. It is not a non-entity but a real entity.

As regards the universe also, Bādarāyaṇa and S'āṅkara are opposed. As Dr. Thibaut puts it:—'They do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world.' According to the Sūtrakāra, the universe has for its material and efficient cause Brahman alone. Though Brahman alone is the material cause, it does not undergo any change while developing itself into the universe. As efficient cause Brahman is neither cruel nor unjust. The world is अनन्य with Brahman, in the sense that the effect is अनन्य with the cause. As the effect exists in the cause in all the three stages of origination, existence and absorption, similarly the universe, in all its three stages, exists in Brahman, and is अनन्य with it. It is a real development of Avikṛita Brahman. The Sūtrakāra does not, like S'āṅkara maintain that the universe is a dream on a grand scale. He does not hold that the universe is a figment of nescience. The universe has for its cause Brahman, still there is an infinite variety in effects. The creation of the universe is a Kevala Līlā of Brahman and not a Māyā.

From the description given of the path leading to Brahman, and the mode of enjoyment of देव्य in the

fourth Adhyāya, the conception of Moksha, according to the Sūtrakāra, is different from that of S'āṅkara. It is a stage attained by a gradual course of spiritual development, and not a stage which has existed at all times, but which is concealed through अविद्या, and which is revealed by the destruction of अविद्या.

From the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa like 'आत्मकृते परिणामाद्', we distinctly understand that the Sūtrakāra favours the परिणामवाद and not the विवर्तवाद of S'āṅkara. In this respect, as is shown before by a quotation from Sir R. Bhandārkar's *Vaiṣṇavism* etc., Vallabha's अक्षरपरिणाम is the one approved of by the Sūtrakāra. It should not be supposed that thereby either of them accepts the proposition that Brahman thereby undergoes any विकार. According to both of them, Brahman's causality and transcendency are both possible. In all the instances given by the Sūtrakāra, and in the older Upanishads, nowhere do we find any instance given, which S'āṅkara so very often quotes to support his doctrine of विवर्त. This fact suggests a very strong inference against him. Where the द्युति gives the instance of मृद् and पद्म, S'āṅkara tries to incorporate द्युक्ति and रजत. *Vide* छान्दोग्यभाष्य. VI.

There is again a distinction to be drawn as to the attitude of the Sūtrakāra and S'āṅkara towards other systems. S'āṅkara's attitude to the पूर्वमीमांसा seems to be very hostile, while Rāmānuja and Bhāskara look upon both the Mīmāṃsās as forming one S'āstra. Upavarsha, whose view, Bhāskara follows, is said to have written one Bhāṣya on the two Mīmāṃsās. *Vide* मास्त्रभाष्य p. 6. and अष्टभाष्यप्रकाश. p. 47. According to S'āṅkara, nothing remains to be done in the stage of मङ्गलवाक्यगति. 'तस्माज्ज्ञानमेकं सुकृत्वा कियाया मन्त्रमात्रस्याप्यनुपवेश इह नोपपद्यते'. S. B. 1-1-4. p. 18. This absolute rejection of कर्म cannot be traced to any

Sûtra of Bâdarâyana. In 4-1-16, the नित्यकर्म like अग्निहोत्र etc., are to be performed by the Brahmanavid. This would go to show that the Brahmanavid has not to reject the performance of कर्म, but the mode of performance is different. Again in 3-4-26, 'सर्वविद्या च यज्ञादिभ्युत्पद्यते', the absolute disregard of कर्म is not accepted. It cannot be taken that the two Mimânsâs form one S'ûtra, but the mutual helpfulness cannot be denied. *Vide* Anu Bhâshya p. 42, and pp. 110 to 114. *Vide* also 3-3-1-25 Sûtras.

While meeting the Sâṅkhyas, Kāṇâdas, and the Bauddhas, S'ankara follows the Sûtrakâra in maintaining the strict reality of the universe, and the causality of Brahman; but once that is done, he rejects the same view, consigning it to अविद्या. S'ankara has been rightly and repeatedly charged with these contradictions by his opponents.

From what has been said above, we come to the conclusion that S'ankara's esoteric doctrine, viz., the Mâyâ-vâda is the development of the Sâṅkhyas and Buddhistic tenets, blended with misinterpretations of the passage of the Brihadâranyaka Upanishad, referring to the creation of the dreaming soul on the lines of Gaudapâda, and it has nothing to do with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. After showing numerous contradictions in the system of S'ankara from his Bhâshya, Col. Jacob remarks:—'To me, therefore, it seems impossible to come to any other conclusion than that the विदिष्टाद्वैतादिन्याs, or some similar school, were in possession of the field in S'ankara's time, and that his own mind was so saturated with their doctrines as to be unable to shake them off even when propounding an antagonistic system.' Vedânta-Sâra. Intro. p. 9. This suggestion of Col. Jacob is as original as it is true. If we take S'ankara's Bhâshya, and do away with those portions which superim-

pose his doctrine of अविवेक, from what is left of his commentary, a general system, representing Bâdarâyana's view, can fairly be worked out Vallabh's Anu Bhâshya seems to answer the above description When we read Col Jacob's remark with the observations of Sir R Bhandârkar, pp 160-161 Vaishnavism etc, the inevitable conclusion one comes to is this, that Bâdarâyana represents in his Sûtras a system which corresponds with one which Vallabh propounds in his Bhâshya, viz, 'The development of Purushottama into the world and at the same time his transcendency' p 161 Vaishnavism That S ankara himself was conscious of such a doctrine can be seen from his Bhâshya in passages like ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्त प्रयत्नान् परिणामवद् भ्रष्टं द्वात्रिंशत्याभिमतम् 2 1 14 मूलक स्वरूपोपमर्दमन्तरेण कस्यचित्कूटस्थस्य वस्तुन कारणत्वात्तुल्यतेरभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्भेदितुमर्हतीति तद् दुष्कम्, स्थिरस्वभावानामेव मुक्तादीनां प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानानां स्वकादिकायकारणभावदर्शनात्' 2 2 26 p. 246 Thus while dealing with Sâṅkhya, Bauddha and others, he puts forth Bâdarâyana's doctrine, but that being done, he rejects Bâdarâyana's view, and puts forth his own Hence the conclusion is that Bâdarâyana and S ankara both hold different if not opposed, views Rao Bahâdur Rangâcharya has published a book, called सर्वसिद्धान्तसंग्रह of S ankaraçharya This book is different from that of Madhava's The noteworthy feature of Rangacharya's book is that fourteen *matas* are mentioned there, the last two of which refer to Vedavyâsa and Vedânta And though this view of Vedavyâsa purports to be based on the Mahâbhârata, there is a significant fact that S ankaraçhârya, the author of the book, drew a distinction between the two views Other writers also refer to two views of Vedânta which go to show that Bâdarâyana and S ankara hold different views In the Tâtparyâ Tika of the न्यायसूत्रs, 4 1 19, a reference to the two views is thus made — मा मृदयं नामरूपमपच न्यूनतोपादान ,

अपि तु ब्रह्मोपादानो भविष्यति, ब्रह्मैव प्रपञ्जरूपेण परिणमते मृत्तिकेव षटशरावोदंच-
नादिभावेन, न च एवं नित्यत्वव्यापातः, परिणामेऽपि तत्त्वानपायात् तद्व्यतिरिक्तत्वाच्च
नित्यतायाः, यदाह यस्मिन् तत्त्वं न विहन्यते, तदपि नित्यमित्येकं दर्शनम्, 'अपरं
च ब्रह्मैव अनाद्यवियोपधानामेदात् नामरूपप्रपञ्चमेदेन विवर्तते मुखमिव एकमनेकमणि,
कृपाणादर्शभेदाद्वैकविधं प्रतिविम्बमेदेनेति, तत् एतद् दर्शनद्वयम्'. It is quite
clear from this quotation that even Naiyāyikas had to draw a distinction between the ब्रह्मपरिणाम of Bādarāyaṇa
and विवर्तवाद of S'āṅkara. Moreover, S'āṅkara's preference for the views of Bādari, Kāśakrītsna and Audulomi, sug-
gests the inference that S'āṅkara had in his mind a system different from that of the Sūtrakāra. To add to this,
S'āṅkara's own statement, at the close of the introduction of his अध्यासभाष्य, suggests the same conclusion, as is pointed
out by R. B. Raṅgāchārya, 'that the aim of S'āṅkarā-
chārya was to try to evolve what he himself took to be the teachings of the Upanishads out of the Vedānta
Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa—that is, to put into the Sūtras what he himself understood to be the teachings of the Upa-
nishads,' and not what Bādarāyaṇa understood them to be. 'यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां
प्रदर्शयिष्यामः'. 'Even orthodox Advaitins seem to accept this view in a general sort of way, and there is a stanza
attributed to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī which gives a notably clever expression to it. The stanza is:—

॥ ह्येति तं व्यासमशेषमर्थं सम्यग् न सुतरपि यो वदन् ॥

विनापि ते. संप्रथितारित्यर्थं तं शंकरं नोमि मुखशरार्थम् ॥

It is evident from this that it is granted by some Advaitins themselves, that the Vedānta Sūtras of Vyāsa are not responsible for the whole philosophy of S'āṅkarā-
chārya: and one need not therefore be surprised when one sees them occasionally making a distinction between the
Sūtrakāra mata and the Bhāṣyakāra mata. The distinction between a Vyāsa mata and a Vedānta mata as

brought out in the *Sarva-Siddhānta-Sangraha* clearly confirms the position of Dr Thibaut as to what kind of Vedānta it is, that is really represented by the *Vedānta Sūtras* ' Introduction to S S of Rāṅgāchārya pp 16-17. From this it appears that so far as the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana are concerned, S'āṅkara's claim to be the faithful expositor is very weak

The question as to whether Bādarāyana's or S'āṅkara's teachings stand nearer to the *Upanishads*, though to the orthodox it appears at the first sight absurd, is rather very interesting. Gough, Deussen and Thibaut have declared in S'āṅkara's favour. Our subject forbids us from entering into this question, but certainly we cannot concede that the question is settled. The views of Gough and Deussen are not entitled to as much weight as that of Thibaut, since the former two do not seem to have looked to anything except S'āṅkara's interpretations, while the latter had the advantage of being familiar with a powerful critic of S'āṅkara viz, Rāmānuja. Hence let us hear what he says on p 124 of his *Introduction to Vedānta Sūtras* I. 'S'āṅkara's method (of higher and lower Brahman) thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to different stages of historical developments, to recognize clearly existing differences which other systematisers are intent on obliterating. And there has yet to be made a further and even more important admission in favour of his system. It is not only more pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the *Upanishads* than those of the other Vedantic systems. Above we were unable to allow that the distinction made by S'āṅkara between Brahman and Īśvara is known to the *Upanishads*, but

we must now admit that if, for the purpose of determining the nature of the highest being, a choice had to be made between those texts which represent Brahman as nirguna and those which ascribe to it personal attributes, S'ankara is right in giving preference to texts of the former kind. x x x The older Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little stress upon personal attributes of the Highest Being, and hence, S'ankara is right in so far as he assigns to his hypostatized personal Isvara a lower place than to his absolute Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads' x x 'If so, the philosophy of S'ankara would on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana.' p 126. This may be or may not be, much can be said on both sides, but there is one thing which needs be pointed out here, and it this. For the purpose of determining the Highest Being, Bâdarâyana or any Vaidika Âchârya would not like to make a choice between the two

1 Compare Jayagopala's introduction to his तैत्तिरीयभाष्य — तत्र तावदुपनिषदोनेदविधा, काश्चन केवलपूर्णपुरषोत्तमत्वमसिसाधनप्रतिपादिका, काश्चन केवल पुरषोत्तमस्वरूपप्रतिपादिका, यथा गोपाकृत्यापिनीतृणोपनिषदादयः । काश्चन पूर्णपुरषोत्तमस्वरूपप्रतिपादियोगसाधन्यादककारणज्ञानविषयीभूतज्ञानस्वरूपस्य पुरषोत्तमस्वरूपस्य पुरषोत्तमेन सह सर्वज्ञानभोगरूपफलस्य च प्रतिपादिका, यथा तैत्तिरीयोपनिषदगुणदीपनपदादयः । काश्चन केवलविभूतिप्रतिपादनप्रतिपादिका, यथा वासुदेवोपनिषत्प्राप्त्युपनिषदादयः । काश्चन केवलाक्षररूपप्रतिपादनप्रतिपादिका, यथा बृहदारण्यकछान्दोग्योपनिषदादयः । काश्चन मुक्तिमाधर्तभूतमविज्ञानाज्ञास्यसर्वव्यवयोगसत्त्वादिप्रतिपादिका, यथा सप्तसोपनिषदरुणेयोपनिषत्कण्टपुरुषोपनिषदमोपनिषदनेतारुषोपनिषदलान्तानुपनिषदष्टवेन्दुपनिषदेनोद्दिशन्निपयोगादि-सोपनिषदयोगसत्त्वोपनिषदादयः । काश्चन अविज्ञानसाधनमवगणनप्रतिपादनशरीरशरीरमादिभेदि-काप्यात्मिकाभेदेवैक्यपुरुषद्वैतकारकसाधनप्रतिपादिका, यथा गुरुषोपनिषदादयः । Fide also Sir R. Bhandarkar's remark — The opinion expressed by some eminent scholars that the burden of the Upanishad teaching is the illusive character of the world and the reality of the one soul only is manifestly wrong and I may even say, is indicative of an uncritical judgment. As stated in the text the Upanishads from the very nature of the compilations cannot but be expected to teach not one, but many systems of doctrine. Vaisnavism p 2, note 2

sorts of Vedic passages, but he would refer them both to Brahman, or, in the words of Vallabha, the Sūtrakāra's position would be this — “तथा चास्युक्तदिगुणयुक्त एवाविक्रियमाण एवात्मान इतोतीति वेदान्तार्थं सगतो भवति, विरुद्धसर्वधर्माश्रयत्वं तु ब्रह्मणो भूषणाय A. B p 121. If Bīdarāyaṇa were to accept a position like this, his Brahman would be capable of amalgamating more heterogeneous material than S'ankara's higher and lower Brahman put together. Preference and giving prominence to one sort of Vedic passages results in rejection and ignoring of others, and to believers in the infallible wisdom and eternity of the Vedas, such a one sided preference would be fatal to his claim to be called a Vaidika. The duty of the Vaidika is to interpret the sense of Veda and not to subordinate one to the other ‘आत्रातस्यार्थं प्रतिपत्तु प्रभवामो नात्रात पर्यनुयोक्तुम्’ 1 4 3 p 150. S B (text N S P). ‘नहि वेदान्त्यानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं, प्रमाणत्वा विदोषात् । 3 2 15 p p. 357. S H text. Thus according to S'ankara also, the authoritativeness of Saguna and Nirguna Vedic passages is equal, and so far as the learned Sūtra Lāra accepts both sorts of *yūktis* and refers them both to his Highest Being, Brahman, his interpretation must with justice be preferred to that of either S'ankara who gives prominence to Nirguna *yūktis*, or Rāmānuja, Madhva, and others, who put forth only Saguna *yūktis*. In this respect Bīdarāyaṇa is followed by Vallabha alone. Hence, except in reference to Vallabha, Dr Thibaut would not be quite wrong in saying that S'ankara by accepting two Brahmanas

Thibaut's claim that S'ankara's system would stand nearer to the Upanishads than that of Bīdarāyaṇa cannot be accepted as unchallenged, since Bīdarāyaṇa's mode of interpretation and harmonising the conflicting Vedic

passages is better than that of S'ankara, since Bâdarîyana unlike S'ankara bears in mind the प्रमाणविशेषत्व of different Vedic passages as shown above, and does not prefer the one to the other, but accepts them all as carrying equal authority and deserving equal prominence.

Thus disagreeing with Thibaut in accepting that S'ankara is a better exponent of the Upanishads than Bâdarâyana, we must admit that S'ankara's system might have had its representatives in Bâdari, Kâśakṛitsna and to a certain extent in Audulomi. If the towering personality of Bâdarâyana, with his irresistible and hitherto unquestioned authority were to be ignored from the field, then a chain of tradition of S'ankara's system can be maintained from Bîdari to Gaudapâda, Govinda and S'ankara, and with this reservation Gough's position would not be wrong. It may be, as pointed out by Bhâskara,¹ that S'ankara's system was independent of the Sûtras, and that by the force of his powerful genius he attempted to superimpose his system on the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. No other commentator has tried to correct or modify the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana, while S'ankara's commentator² actually lays down the rule that where they conflict with the Veda, they are to be misinterpreted. This is possible only if Sankaras understood that there was a difference in the interpretation of the Upanishads between Bâdarâyana and themselves.

The spirit of S'ankara's system is certainly pessimistic. His imagining the existence of दुर्य in the आनन्दमय, his declaring that 'activity is दुर्य, and a preference for the

1. शुद्धभिरादमरुपा वर विप्रदत्तकामनाम् ।
अपन्नां देविदं दानं वरयेव लक्ष्मणे । म. भा. P. 1.
2. वेदवदोर्विरोधे 'मुने स्वन्दवद'नेति गुणवन्दवभेदनि । भाष्यी S. D. N. S. 1-1-19. P. P. 128, 129.
3. कवि च आनन्दपुरा इत्युक्ते दुःखविन्दवपि गम्यते etc., 1-1-19. p. 41. S. D.
4. 'कर्तव्यव दुःखवद्वार' 2-3-40. S. B. p. 192.

negative *vyūti*s, tend to the same conclusion. His rejection of आनन्दमय's Brahmanhood, and imagining the existence of misery in it have been the subject of an almost bitter remark¹ of Vallabha's commentator. From the way in which he defines his conception of Brahman, by negating everything of it except its existence, and declaring Brahman to be अविवक्षित, he makes it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish his system from Buddhism, and it appears that his system has evolved in a transition period when the Buddhistic doctrine of Void was being driven out of the field.

‘याम्ना एवेन सदा निरस्तदुहकं सत्यं परं धीमहि ।’

Appendix A.


तेन यतः प्रधोपनिषदाख्यात् परापरे द्वे मद्गणी अद्वीकृत्य, यदविचारितानाम-
रूपादिविशेषप्रतिपेधेनास्थूलादिशब्दैर्वक्षोपदिश्यते तत् परम्, यत्पुनर्नारूपविशेषाणां
केनचिद्विशिष्टमुपासनयोपदिश्यते 'मनोभयः प्राणशरीर' इत्यादिशब्दैस्तदपरमिति प्रति-
पादितम् । तत्र किं मानम् ? न तावदस्थूलादिवाक्यम्, मनोमयवाक्यं च । तत्र परा-
परशब्दयोरधवणात् । आये अक्षरशब्देनैव लक्ष्यनिर्देशात् । यदि च मुण्डके 'अय
परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यत' इत्यक्षरविद्यायां परत्वध्रावणात् तद्वेद्यस्याक्षरस्य परत्व-
मिष्यते । पाटम् । तदा पुरुषस्य ततोऽपि परत्वमेव द्रष्टव्यम् । 'दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः स
बाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः, अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः पर' इति तत्रैव ध्रावणात् ।
न च तस्य यावद्विशेषश्चून्यत्वम् । तदग्रे 'एतस्माद्भायत प्राण' इति मन्त्रेण तत् एव
सृष्टेः ध्रावणात् । 'अग्निर्मुधै'त्यादिभिस्तदूपोपन्यासाच्च । नाप्यक्षरस्य तयात्वम् । अस्य-
लादिध्रावणोत्तरं प्रशासनस्य वेद्यत्वद्रष्टृत्वादीनां आकाशोपादानत्वस्य च ध्रावणेन,
मुण्डकेपि 'यत्तददृश्य'मित्याद्युक्त्वा 'यद्भूतयोर्नि परिपरयन्ती' त्यादिजगदुपादानत्वसर्वश-
त्वादीनां ध्रावणेन यावद्विशेषश्चून्यताया वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । अत एव वाक्यान्तरेष्वपि
द्रष्टव्यम् । सर्वत्र एकस्यैव मद्गणः प्रतिपाद्यत्वात् । अत एव श्वेताश्वतरेपि 'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञ-
पतिर्गुणेशः,' 'यो मद्गणं विदधाति पूर्व'मित्यादीन् नानाधर्मबोधकानेव मन्त्रानुक्त्वा
'निष्कलं निष्क्रिय'मित्युक्तम् । 'स वा एष महानज आत्मे'त्यत्रापि शारीरमात्मने,
'अमादो बभूवान इति सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशान' इत्यादयो धर्मा उक्ताः । 'स वा एष
नेति नेती'त्युक्त्वा, 'अष्टयो न हि गृह्यते, अशीर्यो न हि शीर्यते, असत्रोऽसितो न
सज्जते न व्ययत इत्येवं निषेधो विद्यते, न तु यावदमपरत्वेनेति द्रष्टव्यम् । अतो
यत्रोत्कर्षस्य विभ्रान्तिः, अक्षराद्वा यदुत्कृष्टं तदेव परमिति मन्तव्यम् । उक्तमुण्डक-
श्रुतेः । 'अव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः पुरुषात् परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गति' रिति काठक-
श्रुतेः । 'अम्मस्यपार' इत्युपक्रम्य, 'अतः परं नान्यदणीयसं हि परात् परं यन्महतो
महान्त'मिति तैत्तिरीयश्रुतेः । पुरुषस्य च विरुद्धधर्माभ्यत्वमेतास्त्वेव प्रतिपादितम् ।
एतदेव परत्वम् । गीतासु च 'अव्यक्तोऽक्षर इत्युपस्तमाहुः परमां गतिम्, ये प्राप्य
न निवर्तन्ते तदाम परमं मम । पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यये'ति ।
'द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरत्याक्षर एव च, क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ।
उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः, यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य विमर्त्येव्यय ईश्वरः ।
यस्मात् क्षरमतीतोहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः, अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तम' इति
सदुपबृंहणात् । अत एव, 'न तत्समधाम्यधिकश्च दृश्यते' इत्यादिषु तस्य समाम्यधिक-
निषेधोऽपि युज्यते । ॥ च पुरुषोत्तमाक्षरयोः परापरभावाङ्गीकारे अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधः ।
गणितागणितानन्दत्वधर्मभेदेपि व्रत्त्वभेदेन द्वैताभावे तदभावात् । अमित्रादिवद्वैत-

धीयमानज्ञानविषयस्य ब्रह्मण पूर्वम्, न तत्र चक्षुर्गच्छतीत्यादिना यावत्करणगम्यताया उचत्वात्तन्म्य ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षादिरूपताया वक्तुमशक्यत्वादुपासनारूपत्व एव पर्यवसानेन तद्विषयस्य परस्याप्यपरत्वापत्तेः । नाप्युपशान्तत्वाभावात् । सर्वत्र परस्य ब्रह्मण एकत्वेन तस्य च विरुद्धधर्माधारताया उपपादितत्वेन तदभावस्यैवाभावात् । एतेनैव अवचनेनैव प्रोवाचेत्यनेनापि प्रत्यवस्थानमयुक्तम् । तत्राप्युपशान्तत्वस्यैवोक्तत्वात् । लौकिकयावद्भर्मराहित्येनैव तत्सिद्धेः । एवमिन्द्रो मायाभिरित्यादिवाक्यानामप्युभय लिङ्गाद्यधिकरणविचार एव विचारितत्वान्न तैरपि प्रत्यवस्थानावकाशः । अतः परविद्या-सूक्तानामन्यत्राप्युक्तानां परब्रह्मधर्माणामनाविधकत्वादलौकिकैर्नानागुणैर्यु-क्तमप्युपास्यरूप नापरब्रह्मरूपमिति नौपाधिकम् । × × × × × × × ×

किञ्च, तैरपि कचिद्गौणं शब्दो दृष्ट इति नैतावता शब्दप्रमाणकेर्धे गौणी न्याय्या, सर्वत्रानाश्वासप्रसङ्गादिति । 'तमिष्टस्य मोक्षोपदेशा'दिति सूत्रव्याख्याने यदुक्तं तदपि विस्मृतम् । अथवा, 'ईक्षतिसूत्रावतारणे वेदान्तवाक्येभ्य एव युक्त्याभासवाक्याभा-सावष्टम्भा सात्यादिवादिन उत्तिष्ठन्ते । तत्र पदवाक्यप्रमाणेन आचार्येण वेदान्त-वाक्यानां ब्रह्मावगतिपरत्वप्रदर्शनाय वाक्याभासयुक्त्याभासप्रतिपत्तय पूर्वपक्षीकृत्य निराक्रियन्त इति कथनाल्लक्षणा विरह्य वेदान्तव्याख्यानमाचार्यस्यैव सम्मतम्, नास्माकमिति बोधितमिति प्रभुचरणैर्दिकपदप्रयोगेण स्थापितम् ॥ p p. 1362—

1868. Anu Bhāshya Prabhāsa.

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B. A., LL. B.



Born, 23rd September, 1887. Left this Earth, 26th June, 1927.

The winner of the Bombay University prize for the foregoing essay passed away on 26th June 1937, at the early age of thirty-nine, and thus the life of a brilliant young man, wholly devoted to the cause of the uplift of **हिन्दुत्व**, suddenly came to an end. A short sketch is given here, depicting his life-work, and showing under what difficult circumstances, majority of Indian scholars have to work. He was born on 23rd September 1887 (Aso Sud 7, 1913) in the ancient and holy city of Bhiguncotkha or Broach situated on the right bank of the Narmada. It was here that king Bali performed his दत्तात्रेय, and gave Lord **वामन** three steps of earth. It is the abode from most ancient times of Bhargava and other Brahmins well-versed in **स्मृत्यारम्भ**. Further up the river are situated the holy places of **व्यासभद्र** and **दुर्गास्थ**, the abodes of **व्यास** and **दुर्गाचार्य**. He was born in a very rich and famous family of **विशामोद वैश्य**. The caste being a very small one, his grand-father Mr. Lalbhai was not married till he was about 55 years old. He went to the pilgrimage of **भीमेश्वर** and **काशी**, and at **काशी**, **गोस्वामी श्रीगुरुदेवताजी**, (who flourished later than his namesake the writer of **ब्रह्मसूत्र**) gave him a blessing that he would have two sons. He replied that he was unmarried and there was no chance of marriage at that age, but the **गुरु** smiled and asked him to go home. The **वस्तु** came to be true, he married and he had two sons. The family business of cotton also prospered, and their firm had agents at Palej, Miyagam and other places, and a branch at Bombay. A marriage of a member of the family was performed at

Gulalwady in the 3rd Bhowada, Bombay, with great pomp, and large vessels were given in gift by the family to Gulalwady, which even now may be traced. Their prosperity increased, and the cellars of their house were filled with silver bars. But when God shows special favour to any one, he takes away the burden of wealth, and it happened so in this case. A year before the birth of Mulchandra there came a sudden crash, there was a heavy loss and all the money vanished. On account of worldly worries and troubles with which his parents were surrounded, Mulchandra inherited a very poor lean physical body. At any time of life his weight was not more than 72 lbs., but this slender body contained a spirit which was dauntless, not ruffled by any outward show or pomp, and could easily spurn wealth, of which his family had more than enough till his birth. His early years were spent in playfulness and he was accustomed to run on the city walls and swim in the river. But he was always the top boy in his class. His memory was so sharp that he could easily remember what he read once. He was the pet of his teachers. The light jovial nature of this pugny monitor commanded willing obedience from the strongest, tallest and most mischievous boy in the class. After passing his Matriculation Examination in 1903 he joined the Wilson College for further studies. In the College hostel he picked up some knowledge of singing and music from his Deccan friends. He graduated B. A. with वेदान्त as his optional subject in 1907, and he was a favourite student of Mr. Bhadkambkar, Professor of Sanskrit. In the absence of any other calling he took up government service as a teacher in the *High School, Bombay*. Thence he was selected for the Training College with a scholarship of Rs. 50 per month, and this gave him an opportunity

nity to read up the course for LL. B. For some time, he lived with Mr. Khimji Cooverji at Walkeshwar, as a tutor to his son.

The first वैष्णवपरिषद् met at Baroda in 1906, the second at Patan in 1907, and the third at Nandurbar in 1909. After this, पुष्टिकिसुधा the well-known monthly magazine was started, and though he was a student, his constant and powerful contributions marked by his independent thinking and fearless expression created a stir in the वैष्णव world. Mr. Maganlal Ganpatram Shastri, the founder of the Parishad and the Magazine, found in him a young, able and resourceful co-worker. The fourth session of the परिषद् was held at Surat in 1910, and there also he attracted great attention.

He passed his final LL. B. in 1914, and in all probabilities it appeared that he would begin practice at Broach, as the same was his native place, but all were surprised when he took a High Court Sanad and came to settle in Bombay. The reason which led him to this decision without consulting any one, is as under:—

From infancy, he often got dreams in which he found himself flying in the air, and some dreams were suggestive of future events. While at Broach, one early morning before leaving the bed, he got a dream in which he saw श्रीनाथजी, the स्वर्ण in the Broach temple, swinging in पल्ला and smiling at him. He got up with great joy, and after प्रातः नित्यकर्म he went for दर्शन. He was greatly delighted to have the same दर्शन there, not in dream, but in reality. There was पल्लामनोरथ and the स्वर्ण was adorned in the same वस्त्रालङ्कार as he had seen in the dream, and there was the same joyful, smiling look. While he was returning home, Mr. Jankisandas, a life-long friend of Teliwala family, called him at his shop, congratulated him

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on his passing the 2nd LL. B. examination, advised him to practise in the Bombay High Court, and gave him Rs. 500 required for taking out a Sanad. Mulchandra saw God's hand in all this and without waiting to consult any one, he came to Bombay, took the Sanad, and began practice. He shared the chamber of the late Mr. Kashidas Narayandas Dalal who was the sub-tenant of Mr. Bhailal and who was the Secretary of Pandit Gattulâlâji's संस्था. He helped Mr. Kashidas in preparing the annual टिप्पणी, and from that time Mr. Kashidas took a liking for him. He allowed him full access to the Library manuscripts fully appreciating his great erudition and learning, and finally got him appointed a trustee of the संस्था along with the late Shet Tribhovandas Vurjivandas J. P. The reader will thus see that but for वरदान to his grand-father, the जन्म of Mulchandra was impossible, that at the time of his birth, the worldly wealth was all taken away by way of अशुभ, the suggestion and facility to settle in Bombay was all due to the Almighty's helping hand, and finally the greatest convenience for his life-work, viz the possession of an excellent manuscript library of the सम्प्रदाय was provided for him by God; and but for divine help, not one of these series of important events could



have been brought about by his own efforts. The astrologer of his family predicted from his कुशली that he would perform a great and memorable यज्ञ, and after more than half of his valuable publica-

tions were out, Mulchandra himself understood the meaning of this यज्ञ, and whenever there were difficulties in his work on account of illness or want of funds or want of manuscripts, he prayed to God, and the prayers were in many cases heard and difficulties solved.

Long before this, Mr Maganlal Shastri had begun to utilise the वेण्णव परिषद् fund for getting manuscripts copied from ५ मङ्गलजी's library in consultation with Mulchandra, but the fund was small, and the work was stopped after some time. In December 1914, Mr. Maganlal Shastri was transferred to the Deccan College, Poona, and he had to leave Bombay in January 1915. The daily Katha Mandli at the Khakhar Building came to a stop, and thereupon at the request of his friends, Mulchandra began reading अणुभाष्य and निबन्ध, every night. The Bombay University prescribed for मुत्तोलुळजी शाला वेदान्त prize for 1915 the following essay—'Discuss how far शङ्कराचार्य truly represents the view of the author of the मङ्गलसूत्र'. Mulchandra had gone through the प्रकाश of श्रीसुतोत्तमजी about four or five times, and with his powerful memory he had materials enough for the required discussion. He thought of writing the essay just a month before it was due and with the wonderful concentration of mind that he possessed, he wrote it out and gave it on the last due date. The language, the outer garment he had no time to correct or adorn, but the thought is so deep, the discussion so balanced, the judgment so impartial, that it is difficult to find fault anywhere, while the comparative method and the wide knowledge that he had gathered from प्रकाश having been fully utilised here must have compelled admiration of his examiners. The prize was divided between him and Mr. Kurtkot. The essay is published and is very widely read. Scholars like Dr Bhandachar, Dr Thibau, and many other Orientalists have long ago come to the conclusion that शङ्कर's interpretation of मङ्गलसूत्र does not represent वादरायण's views, but they had not before them अणुभाष्य and प्रकाश, and so they thought that शङ्कर had, however, well succeeded in making a समन्वय of all important उपनिषद्स. If this view were correct, शङ्कर would be wiser

than वादरायण. We have no doubt that a wide knowledge of अणुभाष्य, प्रकाश and रश्मि would dispel this view. Copies of the Essay were sent to many scholars and many have praised it, and some have expressed their inability to pronounce any judgment as they had not studied the various भाष्य by the comparative method.

In about 1915, at the request of Mr. Tribhovandas of Nadiad to translate सेवाफल, he began collecting साहित्य on it, and at first collected twelve Teekas, some in हस्ताक्षर of authors themselves. Such a collection was never to be found before in any one library or with any one गोस्वामी or ordinary वैष्णव, and he thought of publishing them. Mr. Tribhovandas had no funds for this work, so Mulchandra approached श्रीजीवनलालजी of पोरबंदर for the same. He immediately consented and sent Rs. 500 for the publication. The work was begun at once, and the first volume of his memorable series was published in December 1916. It established his reputation in the पुष्टिसेप्रदाय. So many commentaries were never thought of before by any one, much less seen, and now they had them before their eyes all collected, beautifully printed, and with a lucid introduction in Sanskrit. Three more commentaries were subsequently traced and published along with जलभेद. In this प्रकरणग्रन्थ, श्रीवल्लभाचार्य gives a brief and clear idea of the three sorts of realisations, according to one's अधिकार i. e. (1) अलौकिक सामर्थ्य, by which a भक्त obtains a vision of God, and enjoys indescribable bliss with Him, as is revealed in the श्रुति 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन् सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह मद्गुणा विपश्चिता; (२) सायुज्य, as is stated in 'ततो मां तत्त्वतो ज्ञात्वा विशते तदनन्तरम्'; and (३) वैकुण्ठदिपु सेवोपयोगिदेह, as is stated in यो यदंश स तं भजेत्. It also describes the three hindrances in the path of realisation, उद्वेग, प्रतिबन्ध and भोग, and various means to remove them. In spite of the विवरण, and the fifteen commentaries, the ग्रन्थ is difficult to under-

of its फल, a description of आनन्दमय ब्रह्म and अन्नमय, प्राणमय, मनोमय and विशानमय पुरुषः. Though श्रीवल्लभाचार्य had no time to write भाष्यः on various उपनिषद्'s, he clearly distinguished ब्रह्मवाद from मायावाद and other वादः, and chalked out a clear line; श्रीविद्वल्लभ showed by his writings how to progress on the line, and श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी and श्रीयोगिगोपेक्षरजी have done much by giving the meanings of various उपनिषद्'s, whenever they got opportunities, specially in प्रकाश and रश्मि. It is the duty of साम्प्रदायिक scholars to collect all the passages and compose उपनिषद् भाष्यः on these lines. श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी has also written complete भाष्यः on some उपनिषद्'s, and it is our duty to find them out and publish them. भक्तिवर्धिनी is another प्रकरणग्रन्थ published by him with fourteen commentaries. In order to make भक्तिबीज रह, a man should stay at home (not to leave गृहस्थाश्रम) and worship God with पूजा, भजन etc., without caring for व्यावृत्ति if possible, and always engage his mind in भजन etc., in such a way that he should gradually get प्रेम, आसक्ति and व्यसन, towards God. By प्रेम, the attachment to the world vanishes, by आसक्ति he gets अद्वि towards गृह and गृहस्थानां बाधकत्वं अनात्मत्वं च भासते, by व्यसन in कृष्ण, he becomes कृतार्थ, having followed the उपदेश in मन्मनाभव-मद्भक्तो etc. Even after reaching this stage, he should be very careful and live in the company of other भक्तः engaging himself in सेवा or कृपा till he lives. सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली is another प्रकरणग्रन्थ published by him with nine commentaries. The सिद्धान्त in a nut-shell is कृष्णसेवा. सेवा is उत्सवर्णं चेतः, and its साधन is again तनुजावित्तज्ञासेवा. The चित्त thus becomes तन्मय in कृष्ण, संसारदुःख vanishes and ब्रह्मबोध is the result. कृष्ण is परब्रह्म, अक्षरब्रह्म has two forms, the second one being जगत्, which is neither मायिक, nor सगुण nor कार्य, as represented by various schools of philosophy, but तदेवैतत् प्रकारेण भवतीति श्रुतेर्मसम्. Just as the water of the Ganges is आधिभौतिक गंगा, the power of the Ganges to give a worshipper भोग and मोक्ष is आध्यात्मिक and the देवी गंगा is आधिदैविक, so are जगत्, अक्षरब्रह्म and कृष्ण.

Hence it is no wonder that कृष्ण could show the whole जगत् to यशोदा in His mouth जीव is अक्षरात्मक and अणु in essence, and not by उपाधि It becomes ससारी by उपाधि of अविया When अविया is removed by प्रपत्ति, जीव knows its true nature of being ब्रह्मात्म, and worships कृष्ण as stated in यो यदश स त भजेत् or gets सायुज्य as stated in विशते तदनन्तरम्

सिद्धान्तह्रस्व is another important प्रकरणग्रन्थ published by him with eleven commentaries He published with it the much-abused and misinterpreted ब्रह्मसम्बन्धमन्त्र, and wrote a long and considered introduction in English, so that those who care to know the truth and nothing but the truth about the पुष्टिसम्प्रदाय may know it at a glance, and prejudices caused by rumours may be removed This ग्रन्थ teaches us that by establishing सम्बन्ध with ब्रह्म, all our दोष are removed, that in all कार्यs all things should be dedicated to God, that we should reject all things not dedicated to God, and that we should lead the life of a servant of God

That जीवs are essentially of three different kinds is taught by श्रीचन्द्रभाचार्य in पुष्टिप्रवाहमर्यादा which is published with four commentaries 'इच्छामात्रेण मनसा प्रवाह सृष्टवान् हरिः । वचसा वेद-मार्गे हि पुष्टिं कायेन निधाय ।' In प्रवाह, फल is only जायस्व, म्रियस्व, in वैदिक मर्यादामार्गे, फल is स्वर्गमोक्षादिरूप, and in पुष्टिमार्गे, फल is कायेन, आनन्दमात्ररूपादमुखोदयादिरूपेण पुष्टिजीवs are created for रूपसेवा of God, which सेवा is otherwise impossible In स्वस्व, अवतार, लिङ्ग and गुण there is no difference between पुष्टिजीव and God Among मिथजीवs, पुष्टपुष्ट are सर्वज्ञ, like नारद and ऋषभ, पुष्टिप्रवाहमिश्र are क्रियारत like धृतदेव and निमि, पुष्टिमर्यादामिश्र are गुणज्ञ like मीमा भगवान् is the फल of पुष्टजीव, प्रकट or manifest in सप्तहृदय and in लीलास्थान कृन्दावन &c नवतन्त्र is another प्रकरणग्रन्थ published with five commentaries It teaches that a मन्त्र who has devoted himself to the service of God should give up all anxieties arising from any cause whatever, should remember that he is merely a servant of God, who is merciful, he should always keep his चित्त in सेवा and live peacefully, removing,

चित्तोद्वेग, he should give up चिन्ता, thinking that whatever God does, is His वीला; thus he should stay on uttering श्रीकृष्णः शरणं मम.

पद्मावलम्बन, the challenge affixed to the door of काशी-विश्वेश्वर at Benares by श्रीवद्वभाचार्य, is published by him with the commentary of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी. It is one of the most difficult ग्रन्थs on वेदान्त we ever met with. वेदान्ताधिकरणमाला is a very clear and beautiful analysis by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी of all the अधिकरणs. The माला of the Fourth अध्याय was re-written by श्रीयोगिगोपेश्वरजी, as he could not get it. Mulchandrarao could fortunately trace a single manuscript in the Bhandarkar Research Institute, and published it together with गोपेश्वरजी's. भावप्रकाशिका मयसूत्ररुचि which he published is composed by the master-minds श्रीकृष्णचन्द्रजी and श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी. धृतिरहस्य contains the स्तुति of श्रीवद्वभाचार्य with quotations from वेदs of his अमिस्वरूप. शृंगाररसमण्डन, स्फुरत्कृष्णप्रेमायुत, मधुराटक, प्रेमायुत, परि-हृडाटक, रसाग्नि, ननोदृत and हृदयहृत are the प्रमेय group of ग्रन्थs published by him. The full significance of रसो वै सः cannot be understood unless one studies (1) सैत्तिरीदोषनिषद् (2) रसनिष्पत्तिप्रकार given by श्रीवद्वभाचार्य in वेणुगीत and elaborately explained by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी, (3) धृति passages quoted and explained in रासपञ्चाध्यायी, (4) आनन्दमयाधिकरण, लिङ्गभूदत्त्वाधिकरण and फलाध्याय, (5) the synthetical view of श्रीमद्भागवत given in भागवतार्थनिबन्ध, and the various passages scattered in मुञ्जोधिनी explaining the meanings of परमज्ञ, अक्षरब्रह्म, आत्मा and रस. If the ultimate reality were only अस्पृश्य, अनन्त, अहम्, अदीर्घ &c., and nothing more, it is a question why the Vedas selected for describing it the word मय derived from वृद् to grow or increase, आत्मा derived from अस् to spread, and रस derived from रस् to taste. All the three words are positive, and signify growth like that of a वृक्ष, spreading like that of a पत्र, and sport or वीला like that of a नट, respectively. The words themselves exclude the idea of a mere विवर्त, which is an illusion of the mind,

and they inherently imply परिणाम, nay, स्वस्वपरिणाम. The श्रुति 'पूर्णमद पूर्णमिद' also explains that though the जगत् proceeds from ब्रह्म, ब्रह्म remains पूर्ण as before. श्रीमद्भगवाचाय has explained भागवत in detail, giving the meaning (1) of the whole भागवतशास्त्र, (2) of each स्कन्ध (3) of each प्रकरण (4) of each अध्याय and (5, 6, 7) of each वाक्य पद and अक्षर, thus giving a synthetical view of the whole, and he states that a man who understands भागवत thoroughly becomes मुक्त. Fortunately the greater part of his commentary सुबोधिनी on भागवत has been published. The first three स्कन्धस have been already published and Mulchandra himself has published कलप्रकरण (दशमस्कन्ध पूर्वार्धे २६-३२) with all the available साहित्य on it, and he has also published दशमउत्तरार्धे (१-२१). The work of completing दशम स्कन्ध is in hand, and it will soon be in the hands of the reader. The depth and grandeur of श्रीवल्कभाचाय's teachings will be known to the world only when these works are studied.

Sometimes four or five works were in the press at the same time, and his countenance was full of joy, if on some उत्सव day he could publish them all together.

His first marriage took place at Ujjain in 1911-12, and he was blessed with a wife who was very pious, spending about two hours every morning in religious observances, highly devoted to her husband, and had a strong and healthy constitution. Mulchandra's mother also was called from Broach, and all lived in Bombay. His income being very limited, they had to live an extremely frugal life, devoid of all luxuries such as tea, vegetables and milk, but it was peaceful and contented. His first son was born in 1914, and a daughter was born in 1915. But even this little happiness did not last long. His daughter died, followed by his wife who died at Broach from fever incident on delivery in Diwali, viz., about October 1917, and Mulchandra and his son were

put to great difficulties for daily food. There were no means to engage a cook, or a servant to take care of the son. When the father went to court at 11 A. M. after locking the room, the son passed his time somehow with the neighbours, and if the father did not return at 6 P. M., the lonely son would sit in front of the door with a stream of tears flowing from his eyes down the cheeks, and with constant sobs which no amount of persuasion could check. When ultimately he did arrive, the boy would fly into his arms, and would not leave him even in bed and till next day's fateful hour 11 A. M. One source of his little income was some small commissions which were given to him by the Chief Judge of the Bombay Small Causes Court, who appreciated his value, thereby showing his great regard for him, for his sterling character and great learning. For this work, pleaders asked him to fix time after 5-30 P. M., which this junior Mulchandra did, but after some bitter experiences of the above nature, he avoided engagements after 5-30 p. m. It was under such difficulties that the life-work of Mulchandra was done.

In 1919 (Vaishakh 1975) he went to श्रीनाथद्वार and कांकोली at the time of यज्ञोपवीत ceremony of श्रीब्रजभूषणजी son of श्रीबालकृष्णलालजी. He had with him a company of friends including उत्सवलाल, चन्दुलाल, and others. With their help, he saw the libraries of कोटा and gathered important information from manuscripts from all possible sources. He also saw the Nathadwara Library. The library of श्रीविद्वेसाजी, the second house in which श्रीहरिरायजी and योगिगोपेश्वरजी flourished, could not be seen, though many efforts were made, and it still remains to be seen with a view to find out all the ग्रन्थs of श्रीहरिरायजी and श्रीयोगिगोपेश्वरजी. It was at the time of this trip that the publication of श्रीटिप्पणीजी was undertaken, and the circumstances under which it was done, and the important discovery of the पाण्डु draft in the

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हस्ताक्षर of श्रीगुसांईजी which it led to, are fully described in the introduction of श्रीटिप्पणीजी. His second marriage took place at Surat in 1920, in दशमोद caste. The dowry was fixed at about Rs. 750, but Mulchandra could ill afford this cash and he got a loan from a friend without asking for it. श्रीमन्मल्लालजी of Surat graced the marriage procession by his presence. His second wife has two sons and a daughter.

In 1917, his friend उत्सवदास invited Mulchandra to Anand, and told him in the course of conversation that he had seen रसि at Surat. Mulchandra sent him to Surat to fetch it, which he did. It was a portion found in a very bad condition, and since then Mulchandra tried to collect रसि manuscripts from all sources, and one of his great desires was to be able to publish माध्य प्रकाश and रसि together. Through the help of श्रीगोकुलनाथजी of बगमंदिर, Bombay, he succeeded in arranging in May 1925 to get funds from the Gordhandas Soondardas Trust administered by Sheth Lalji Naranji and others, and curtailed all other activities, so that he might be able to devote his undivided attention to the publication of this great work. He was able to publish only three volumes consisting of the First, Second and Third Padas of the Third अध्याय before his death.*

In 1927, Shree Tihāyat Maharaja Shree Gordhanlalji and Lalbāvā Shree Dāmodarlālji invited him to श्रीनाथद्वार and he went there accompanied by his friends Messrs. Jamnadas Kanji, Gordhandas Pragji and Hiralal Mulji. He was shown a few pages of the 3rd अध्याय

* After his death, the work is continued by us; the Fourth Pāda of the Third अध्याय is published, the First Pāda of the Fourth अध्याय is already printed, and the Second Pāda of the Fourth अध्याय is in the press.

tion of the first two सूत्रs of the Fourth अध्याय is subsequently added by श्रीगुसांजી. A minute inspection of the manuscript left no doubt in Mulchandra's mind that the author of the work was श्रीगुसांजી himself.

He had a very wonderful genius for research. His creative faculty, powerful imagination, extremely retentive memory and a deep alround knowledge of the Sāmpradāyika Gāthās helped this aptitude for research to such an extent that he compelled old worn-out manuscripts to speak out, to whom they belonged, from whom they were stolen, when they were written, in whose hand-writing they were and other special details about each of them, with a quickness and preciseness which would win the admiration of even the hero of a detective novel. We would give an instance and narrate the facts in his own words—

“નવ પુસ્તકના આધારે શ્રીટિપ્પણીનું શોધન કરી અમે મુદ્રણકાર્યમાં ફલપ્રકરણના પ્રથમાધ્યાયના અન્તભાગપર્યન્ત આભ્યા. ‘ક્રિયા સર્વાપિ સૈવાજ’ એ સુખોદધીનાદિકારિકાનું વ્યાખ્યાન કાંઈક વિલક્ષણ લાગ્યું. આથી શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજીનું તત્ત્વપ્રકાશ જોયો. આ પ્રકાશ પછી શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજીનો નિજ શ્રીહસ્તાક્ષર લખેલો અમારે ત્યાં વિરાજે છે. તે જોતાં નીચેની પંક્તિ વાચવામાં આવી:— ‘અથ કારિકાઘ્યાણ્યાનં દિવળીપુસ્તકેષુ દ્રવ્યતે સદ્ વાળ્કલિલ્લે નાસ્તીતિ શ્રી-મોહજનાપાનાં સદ્ પ્રતિમાતિ, લેખરીત્યાપિ તથેતિ ચ ।’ અહિં કારિકાવ્યાખ્યાનનું દર્શન ટિપ્પણીપુસ્તકમાં થાય છે, પાંડુલિખનમાં નથી, તેથી શ્રીગોકુલનાથજીનું તે હોય એમ લાગે છે, લેખરીતથી પણ તેમજ જાણે છે. એ કારિકાવ્યાખ્યાન શ્રીગોકુલનાથજીનું છે એમ શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજી કહે છે તે વાતને એ જ કારિકા-વ્યાખ્યાનનું સ્વતંત્ર પુસ્તક જે અમારી યાસે વિદ્યમાન છે તે યુષ્ટિ આપે છે. તે પુસ્તકમાં આ પ્રકારે લખેલું છે:—શ્રીમીવજ્રમો જયતિ । દશમના અધ્યાય ૨૬ ને સમાપ્તે શ્રીમાચાર્યજીવી કારિકા ૫ ॥ છે, તે મધ્યે પહેલી કારિકા જે ‘ક્રિયા સર્વાપિ સૈવાજ પરં કામો ન વિચયે । તાસાં કામસ્ય સંપૂર્તિર્નિષ્કામેનેતિ તાસ્તથા ॥ ૧ ॥ શ્રીમીહત્ત્વમ્ દિલ્લન.’ આના પછી યુદ્ધિત શ્રીટિપ્પણીજીમાં વિદ્યમાન સંસ્કૃત વ્યાખ્યાન અક્ષરશઃ આઘત્ત લખેલું છે. શ્રીગોકુલેશના અન્તરંગ સેવકા એએ-શ્રીને પુરુષોત્તમભાવથી શ્રીજસંપ્રાપ્તિ વ્યવહારે છે. આથી શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજીનું કથન કે આ વ્યાખ્યાન શ્રીગોકુલનાથજીનું છે તે સુદ્ધ થાય છે. આ તો અપ્રસ્તુત પ્રસંગ થયો, પરંતુ આ શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજીની પંક્તિથી અન્ય વાર્તા સ્પુરી. આ લેખથી

Its substance is — Having corrected the press copy of *श्रीटिप्पणीजी* with the help of nine manuscripts, we came to the end of the first अध्याय of कलप्रकरण. The explanation of क्रिया सर्वाणि सैवात्र seemed strange to us, therefore we referred to श्रीपुरोत्तमजी's प्रकाश on it. We have got a copy of it in his own handwriting. Therein we read the following line — "The explanation of कारिका is seen in टिप्पणी manuscripts, but it is not in the rough draft therefore it appears to have been written by श्रीगोकुलनाथजी, the style of writing also leads to the same conclusion." This opinion of श्रीपुरोत्तमजी is supported by another manuscript of कारिका-व्याख्यान which is with us. The following is found written in that manuscript — "At the end of the 26th अध्याय there are five and a half कारिका of श्रीआचार्यजी, the first of which is क्रियासर्वाणि etc. This writing is composed by श्रीजी." This is followed by the explanation given in टिप्पणी manuscripts. This line of श्रीपुरोत्तमजी led to another line of thought,

i. e., that the 'rough draft' must be of *શ્રીટિપ્પણીજી*, and it must be in *શ્રીબાલકૃષ્ણજી*'s મંદિર as *શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજી* lived at *Surat*. Led by these inferences, we wrote a letter to *શ્રીવ્રજરત્નજી* about it who searched his Library, but he could not get the rough draft, and wrote to us accordingly. But this reply could not satisfy our inner self, and we thought of going to *Surat* for it. We went there on *Aso sud 13*, and requested *શ્રીવ્રજરત્નજી* to show us the *હસ્તાક્ષર* deposited in *સેવા*. The *Maharaja* kindly granted our request, and the next morning—the *Rasotsava* day, we were overjoyed to have the *દર્શન* of *શ્રીટિપ્પણીજી* in the handwriting of *શ્રીગુણદીપજી* himself, referred to as rough draft by *શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજી*.

Besides tracing the original of *ટિપ્પણી*, some of the other important results of this genius for research which has put the whole *Sampradaya* in great obligation to him might be summed up as under:—

2. *મહર્ષી વૈષ્ણવ*s give the date of *શ્રીમદ્વજ્રભાષ્ય*'s birth as 1529, and not 1535, and the place of birth as *ચોગાપામ* and not *ચંપારણ્ય*. *Mulchandra* got an old manuscript of *જ્ઞોત* from these *મહર્ષી*s, in which one old *શ્લોક* (about 3rd or 4th) about *નામકરણ* or ordinary matter was deleted, and the *શ્લોક* specially mentioning date and place was substituted, scratching out the old one. There was not the slightest necessity of scratching out the old *શ્લોક* but the writer purposely did it with an ulterior motive. The manuscript was returned, and since then it is not produced by *વૈષ્ણવ* *હત્સવલાલ મહર્ષી* though repeatedly demanded. From the time we saw the mss., we were convinced about the interpolation, thus leaving no doubt that the date given by *મહર્ષી* 1529 is not correct, as also the place *ચોગાપામ*.

3. Very little was known to the *સમ્પ્રદાય* about *શ્રીજ્ઞાન-ચંદ્રજી*. It was he who pointed out the deep obligation under which *શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજી* was to his *ગુરુ* for adopting the comparative method of writing, to unearth and publish

as an appendix to Vol. III of भाष्यप्रकाशसहि, कृष्णचन्द्रजी's टीका on सुषोपसंहाराद, and to draw attention to the different इतिश्री's in the भाष्यप्रकाशिकादृष्टि showing which portion was written by श्रीकृष्णचन्द्रजी himself and which was collected, set right or written by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी.

4. It was he who obtained the Fourth अध्याय of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी's अधिकरणमाला from the Bhandarkar Research Institute, and published it. योगी श्रीगोपेश्वरजी could not get it, and so he wrote out the Fourth अध्याय himself, which also has been printed as an appendix, thus facilitating a comparison between the writings of two master-minds.

5. A copy of some portion of बृहद्भाष्य was found many years ago, and published in पुष्टिमञ्जुषा. It was well-known then to every student that this contained words, phrases and sentences which were also found in प्रकाश and इति. The portion was published for what it was worth for the information of the public. The matter rested there for several years. Two or three years ago, Mulchandra got a rough draft* of the same portion of the बृहद्भाष्य, and he had no difficulty in tracing it to रामकृष्णमह, the learned शास्त्री of काशीस्थ श्रीगिरिधरजी, and the टीकाकार of युक्तिरहस्य. In the introduction to भाष्यप्रकाशसहि ३-१-१ published in samvat 1982, Mulchandra wrote on p. 12 as under:—"In conclusion we ought not to omit reference to one work which passes in the name of श्रीमद्भाष्य of S'ri Vallabhâchârya. Some passages of the विज्ञासाधिकरण and the First Pada of the Third Adhyâya and 11 Sutras of the Second Pada have been seen by us. The portion from the Third Adhyâya has been published by us in the monthly Pushti-Bhakti-Sudhâ. From the style, this seems to be a clumsy attempt of a writer of recent times. All copies seen by us are new. The style is such as leaves

* The draft is with us at present.

little doubt in our minds as to the spurious nature of this production." Notwithstanding this, Mr. Jethalal Shah, who has recently published અનુવાદ of ૧-૨ અધ્યાયસ writes in his introduction on p. 9, "...અદ્યત તેલીવાલા એવું માને છે કે શ્રીવલ્લભાચાર્યે બ્રહ્મસૂત્ર ઉપર જે લાખ્ય રચ્યાં હતાં...તેના પુરાવા તરીકે પુષ્ટિભક્તિસુધાના વર્ષ ૬ માં પ્રકટ થયેલા લખાણને રજુ કરે છે અને તે પ્રકટ થયેલું લખાણ તે "શ્રીમદ્ભાષ્ય અગર બૃહદ્ભાષ્ય" છે." To attribute to Teliwala what he deliberately considered "spurious" is misrepresenting a departed scholar, misleading oneself and misleading the public. His conclusion which he puts in bold type on p. 16., "પાછળથી કૃષ્ણચન્દ્રએ બૃહદ્ભાષ્ય રચ્યું હશે" is also due to ignorance. To say that અનુભાષ્ય derives its name from the અનુત્વ of જીવ is absurd, because the જિજ્ઞાસા is not જીવજિજ્ઞાસા, but મદ્વજિજ્ઞાસા, and the અનુભાષ્ય is not જીવસૂત્રાનુભાષ્ય, but બ્રહ્મસૂત્રાનુભાષ્ય. The present requirements of the સમ્પ્રદાય are not arguments based on antiquated opinions, but investigation and research which would throw more light on the સમ્પ્રદાય.

6. It was he who identified a manuscript of સુબોધિની now at Dabhoi, as originally belonging to શ્રીદામોદરલાલજી, son of શ્રીગિરિપરજી, the eldest son of શ્રીયુસાંદજી. The additions made by શ્રીયુસાંદજી to સુબોધિની are put into brackets in this manuscript. While reading સુબોધિની, it was found difficult to establish any connection between some sentences, which difficulty is removed by શ્રીયુસાંદજી's additions being thus separated. The તામસકલ્પવૃક્ષ is published from this manuscript, by Mulehandra.

7. The idea of collecting all the ટીકાસ on ષોડશપ્રશ્નસ and publishing them together was his, he successfully carried it out, and helped ચીમનશાસ્ત્રી and હરિદેવશાસ્ત્રી with manuscripts to complete the series.

8. He collected ટીકાસ of શ્રીયુસાંદજી on સિદ્ધાન્તમુજાવલી and pointed out that શ્રીયુસાંદજી had made additions to the ટીકા at least four times.

9. It was he who first found out that श्रीवजराजजी of the first house wrote his टीका and sent them to his गुरु श्रीवह्मजी of the fifth house who made many changes in them. The copies made from the original became known as श्रीवजराजजी's टीका, and those that were altered became known as श्रीवह्मजी's टीका.

10. He went to श्रीनाथद्वार, identified the Fourth अध्याय of भाष्य as written out wholly by श्रीगुसांईजी, in which second interpretation of first two सूत्र is subsequently added, thus conclusively showing that the whole was written by श्रीगुसांईजी.

11. He found out फलप्रकरणप्रकाश in the हस्ताक्षर of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी and published the same.

12. He collected two copies of भाष्यप्रकाश, first in श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी's own hand and got and identified a subsequent copy of प्रकाश in which additions and alterations were made by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी. He adopted for publication the final copy of प्रकाश and hence we find differences in the readings of the प्रकाश in रश्मि, as रश्मिकार श्रीयोगिगोपेश्वरजी had got only the first copy of प्रकाश with him.

13. He threw new light on श्रीगुसांईजी's life, which is published in रश्मि Vol. IV and विद्वत्सम्बन्धन with dates as traced by him.

14. He found out that the सुवर्णमेखला that श्रीवह्मभाचार्यजी presented was not to श्रीविहङ्गनाथजी of पंढरपूर, but it was to श्रीविहङ्गनाथजी of विजयनगर, where there was a temple of श्रीविहङ्गनाथजी.

15. He obtained from श्रीवजराजलालजी of सुरत the will of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी and published the same.

16. He collected and published several स्वतन्त्रलेख in पुष्टिमक्तिसुधा and वेणुनाद.

17. He laboured hard and succeeded in collecting रश्मि, the monumental work of श्रीयोगिगोपेश्वरजी and with the help of श्रीगोकुलनाथजी of बडा मन्दिर, Bombay, he arranged for publication of the same.

On account of his wide knowledge about the history of the सम्प्रदाय together with a clear perception of the facts of the case put before him, he was consulted by गेस्वामिs in their cases, and his services were utilised by S'ri Gokulnathji of Bombay and his son S'ri Krishnaji in Madras and Dharangaon cases, in both of which they succeeded, and also by Shri Gopeshwarji who also won his case at Madras.

Again, if there was an attack against the पुष्टिसम्प्रदाय and his presence was required at any place, he never refused, but started immediately. He had thus to go to सिहोर (near Indore), Mehemdabad, Patan, Savali and other places.

The necessity of a Research Institute for the सम्प्रदाय was recognised through the efforts of Mulchandra by Shri Tikayat Maharaja of Nathadwara, and Shri Vallabhacharyaji, son of S'ri Devakinandanji offered him a decent block of four rooms in Chandrabag, and Mulchandra went to live there in Chaitra of 1983. But God willed it otherwise. He fell ill, went to Broach during the Summer vacation in the High Court, and when he returned in June 1927, he had not thoroughly recovered. He was attacked with unbearable neuralgic pain in the head on 18th June 1927, and he passed away on 26th June 1927.

Though he died young, his abilities as a great Scholar were recognised by Oriental scholars as well as Sampradayika scholars. Mr. Woodroffe, Mr. Keith, the late Mr. Tansukhram Mansukhram Tripathi, Anant Shastri of Shanti Niketan, Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, Bal Shastri and Nandkishore Shastri, all acknowledged his scholarship. Mr. Tansukhram was always delighted with his conversation, and gave him from his vast collection whatever manuscript or book was requir-

ed by him. Mr. Keshar Harshad Dhruva was so much delighted to read his introduction of *द्वारान्तर्गत* that he came to see him, and expressed a desire to read with him *सत्यदायि* works, and *द्वारान्तर्गत* was entrusted to him by Mr. Govardhanram's brother to make suitable changes for the second edition.

The guiding principle of his life was 'अतोऽन्यदातम्' a phrase in the *अन्यानित्राहण* of *बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद्*, meaning 'Everything else except God is painful.' He was born tired with the world, for which he had a deep-rooted disgust, and he had realised from very early age that real *सन्तुष्ट* was in *आनन्दमय सत्त्वान्* only. There was therefore a touch of cynicism in his words, which were mildly sarcastic even when talking with men most highly placed in life, and a sort of non-attachment in all his worldly deeds. But his spirit was always young, buoyant and playful, and one enjoyed innocent, slightly mischievous joy in his company.

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ed by him. Mr. Keshav Harshad Dhruva was so much delighted to read his introduction of शुभारस्तमण्डन that he came to see him, and expressed a desire to read with him साम्प्रदायिक works, and दयारामनो अक्षरदेह was entrusted to him by Mr. Govardhanram's brother to make suitable changes for the second edition.

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He had a very noble heart. Many Brahmins and friends came to him for recommendation-letters or support, and he did whatever he could for them. We were sometimes even puzzled to see how he could help one who had done him wrong or abused him. The whole of the Nirnaya Sagar Press, the Proprietor, Manager, Shastri, and compositors, all loved him, and they feel a void in their daily life without his cheerful presence. The compositors would whisper in your ears how he had helped them, and allowed their pro-notes passed to him for advances to be time-barred. It was due to this nobility that he freely acknowledged whatever help he received in his work by way of money, manuscripts or co-operation. This leads us to note another important trait of his which was complete आश्रय, viz., willing dependence on the will and wisdom of the Lord, at all times,

however critical and in all matters, however, important. His mind was therefore always at ease, and he was never oppressed with burden or weight on his head for anything whatever. "भगवदिच्छा सर्वत्र मूलम्, न बुद्ध्यादिदोषाः शङ्कनीयाः ।" सु. ११. १. १८. This was ingrained in him, and hence under most trying circumstances, he was most light-hearted.

This *आश्रय* resulted in other important traits, *viz.*, *अभय*, *स्वमान* and *निःस्वार्थ*, fearlessness, self-respect and self-sacrifice. Though he had nothing, he seemed to possess everything; he could talk straight to a king on equal footing, and while engaged in *सम्यदायसाहित्यसेवा*, in his small room, he acted like a happy king, surrounded by co-working companions all merry-making, sometimes sitting two on broken chairs, or comfortably couched on the broad handles of a broken easy-chair. The chairs were sometimes discarded and heaped out of the room near the door, for making room for men. His children cried and ran to him to escape the wrath of the mother, and insisted on sitting on his table, full of old manuscripts, or in his lap, while he was deciphering some knotty passage in an old manuscript. The mother of the children perhaps silently cursed the man for his neglect of the house and its inmates, and even expressed her disapprobation in sharp significant words. This was all well as it was, because it was God's will, which is always best, and the work of comparing and correcting manuscripts, sometimes five, sometimes ten at a time, went on till midnight with the help of a jewel-lamp in the middle. *गोस्वामी धीमज्जलालजी* of Surat, as well as most prominent personages and *दैवज्ञ*s from Kathiawad, Sind, Calcutta, Nainital and Madras saw him in this room. The difference between the small room and the great man, who was doing the abstruse work of deciphering and publishing old manuscripts was patent to all.

This *अप्य* and *ये* resulting from it kept him always collected, though there was the greatest cause for losing one's temper. If there was a caste-dinner at his place, and there was none to work and no invitations were sent, he was calm; if there was a procession, and no band was available, he was calm; if people did not pay the money due to him, it was God's will; if members of the family were laid up with illness, if he was unjustly attacked in news-papers, he was not the least disturbed. He went on quietly with his self-imposed work, with a concentration of mind and with a non-attachment to surroundings (*असंग*) simply marvellous. This concentration continued even in sleep, and then naturally he got dreams. His little room was filled with hallowed light (so he said and we fully believe him) and he saw, (at any rate he believed he saw) at one time श्रीगुरुदेवजी and at other times other great persons or *गुरु*s. When he woke next morning after such a dream, there was a joyous smile on his face which was unmistakable, and the writer can never forget the innocent smile on his face on the morning of the last day of his life on this Earth, the 26th June, which clearly showed that he had some दर्शन in dream.

His sudden death was a great loss to the सम्प्रदाय, and the hearts of almost all वैष्णवस were moved by this great loss. Two telegrams were received from गोस्वामी श्रीगुरुदेवजी. One to take care of his wife and children, लालजी तिलकायित, one to hold a meeting to which he promised and the other to hold a meeting to which he promised to send his representative. A similar telegram was received from लालबाबा श्रीदामोदरलालजी to the same effect, and many others followed in quick succession. A meeting was immediately held in Bada Mandir, Bombay, and गोस्वामी श्रीगुरुदेवजी announced Rs. 500 as his subscription to the fund for a memorial to be raised after him. Mr. Ranchhoddas Patwari also subscribed Rs. 251. Meetings

were also held at Ahmedabad, Dabhoi, Sankheda, Mangrol and a dozen other places, and a grand meeting was held in Bombay on 24th July 1927 in Mulji Jetha Market Hall under the presidentship of the Hon'able Mr. Justice Krishnalal Mohanlal Jhaveri. Goswami S'ri Gokulnathji moved the first resolution as under:—

“વેદાન્તના સુપ્રસિદ્ધ ગુજરાતી વિદ્વાન્ અને પુષ્ટિમાર્ગીય વૈષ્ણવ સંપ્રદાયના સાહિત્યપ્રકાશક સદ્ગત વૈષ્ણવ મૂલચન્દ્ર તુલસીદાસ તેલીવાલા વી. ઇ., ઇલ.ઇલ. વી., ઇમ. આર. ઇ. ઇસ., વકીલ, હાઈકોર્ટના, જેઠ વદ ૧૨ ને રવિવાર તા. ૨૬ મી જુન ૧૯૨૭ ની રાત્રિય થયેલા અકાલ અવસાન થઈલ મુંવરના આચાર્યોની, વૈષ્ણવોની અને સદ્ગતના મિત્રોની તેમજ વચ્ચાણનારાઓની આ સભા પોતાનો અત્યંત શ્રેષ્ઠ પ્રદર્શિત કરે છે, અને તેમના અવસાનથી સમસ્ત ગુજરાતને, અને વિશેષતઃ પુષ્ટિ-સંપ્રદાયને ગયલી મોંઘી છોટની દિલગીરી સાથે નોંધ લે છે, અને સદ્ગતના કુટુંબ ઉપર આવી પડેલી આ અળધારી આપત્તિમાં તેમના પ્રતિ પોતાની દિલસોજી દર્શાવે છે.”

This resolution was seconded in suitable language by Goswami S'ri Ranchhodlalji, son of S'ri Jivanlalji of Porebunder, and supported by Mr. Hanumanprasad M. A., the representative specially sent to Bombay from S'ri Nathadwar by S'ri Govardhanlalji Tilakayit Maharaja and his son S'ri Damodarlalji. He read in the Meeting the letter of condolence sent by His Holiness S'ri Govardhanlalji and gave Rs. 1001 for a suitable memorial. The second resolution was moved by Sheth Lalji Naranji and seconded by Rao Sahab Harjiwan Valji as under:—

સદ્ગત રા. મૂલચન્દ્ર તુલસીદાસ તેલીવાલાજી અતિશય પરિશ્રમ સહીને પ્રાચીન દુષ્પ્રાપ્ય સામ્પ્રદાયિક સંસ્કૃત સાહિત્યને સર્વાંગ સુંદર પ્રકારે પ્રસિદ્ધ કરીને આપણને જે ઋણમાં મુખ્યાં છે, તે ઋણમાંથી કાંઈક ઊંશે મુક્ત થવાને તેમનું યોગ્ય સ્મારક ઉઠું કરવાને તથા તેમના કુટુંબના શિક્ષણાદિ સર્વ પ્રકારક સંરક્ષણનો પ્રબંધ કરવાને તેમને આ ધંને વાવતની સર્વ વ્યવસ્થા કુલ સત્તાસાથે કરવાને નીચેના સમ્યોની પોતાની સંખ્યામાં વધારો કરવાની સત્તાસાથે કમિટી નીમવાનો આ સભા ઠરાવ કરે છે.

Decent sums were announced for the memorial and a representative committee appointed to collect funds.

SELECT OPINIONS.

'Discuss how far S'ankarāchārya truly represents the view of the Author of Brahmasūtras.'

A masterly essay, criticism sober, unbiassed and scholarly. Should be carefully studied by all the students of the Brahmasūtra.

—Modern Review for September, 1918.

This is an able and scholarly dissertation on the well-known subject of the correctness of S'ankara's interpretation of the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyana

.... . It must however be said to the author's credit that he sets out the views of other Bhāshyakāras like Rāmānuja, Shrikantha, Nimbārka, and Bhāskara in various places, and his exposition of the difficulties to which Sankarāchārya is reduced by his desire to get the nirgunavāda out of the Sūtras, must be convincing to all except those who are pronounced in their 'nirviśeshatvāgraha "

—Indian Review for November, 1918

It is scholarly and shows marks of deep study and thinking

—Dr. S K Belvalkar, M A , Ph D ,
Prof of Sanskrit, Deccan College, Poona.

I have found it very interesting reading, and you have well developed the points on which you rely as showing the differences between Sankara and Bādarāyana . The discussion has brought to my mind a question to which I have elsewhere alluded, namely whether it is not better to hold to two apparently contradictory affirmations, leaving spiritual experience to realise rather than to neglect one at the cost of other.

—Sir John Woodroffe—Judge, Calcutta High Court.

श्रीमद्ब्रह्मभाचार्याखण्डशुद्धाद्वैतब्रह्मवादोपयुक्तेषु संस्कृतमुद्रितपुस्तकेषु
केपाधिनामानि मूल्यं मार्गव्ययरहितम् ।

	रु. आ. पे.
१. गायत्रीभाष्यम् ।	० ४ ०
२. तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्भाष्यम् ।	१ ० ०
३. छान्दोग्यप्रथमाध्यायभाष्यम् ।	० ८ ०
४. माण्डूक्योपनिषदीपिका ।	० ८ ०
५. नृसिंहोत्तरतापिनीदीपिका ।	० ८ ०
६. श्रीमद्भगवद्गीता तत्त्वदीपादिसहिता ।	० १२ ०
७. " अमृततरङ्गिणीसहिता ।	२ ० ०
८. शाण्डिल्यभक्तिसूत्रभाष्यम् ।	० ८ ०
९. जैमिनिसूत्रभावार्थपादभाष्यं सविवरणम् ।	० ८ ०
१०. ब्रह्मसूत्रपाठः पाठान्तरसहितः ।	० ४ ०
११. श्रीमद्ब्रह्मसूत्राणुभाष्यं मूलमानम् ।	३ ० ०
१२. " सप्रकाशम् ।	२२ ८ ०
१३. " त्रिसूत्रीसाहित्यमात्रम् ।	२ ० ०
१४. " पाठकशास्त्रिटीकायुतम् ।	६ ४ ०
१५. " सप्रदीपं स्तवकद्वयात्मकम् ।	३ ० ०
१६. " सप्रकाशरश्मि-तृतीयाध्यायः ।	४ ० ०
१६. अ. " " चतुर्थाध्यायप्रथमद्वितीयपादौ ।	१ ८ ०
१७. ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यप्रकाशिकावृत्तिः ।	३ ० ०
१८. " मरीचिकावृत्तिः ।	२ ० ०
१९. अधिकरणमाला ।	१ ० ०
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२१. श्रीभागवतं सुवाधिनीसहितम् । प्रथमस्कंधः ।	४ ० ०
२२. " " प्रकाशः ।	१ ० ०
२३. " " द्वितीयस्कंधः ।	२ ० ०
२४. " " तृतीयस्कंधः सप्रकाशः ।	६ ० ०
२५. " " दशमस्कन्धजन्मप्रकरणं सप्रकाशम् ।	४ ८ ०
२६. " " सर्वसाहित्यसहितम् ।	५ ० ०
२७. " " फलप्रकरणं लेखसहितम् ।	३ ० ०
२८. " " प्रकाशः ।	१ ० ०
२९. " " योजना ।	० ८ ०
३०. " " दशमस्कन्धाष्टादशाध्यायः (वेणुगीतम्) सर्वसाहित्यसहितः ।	१ ० ०

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उत्तरार्धे प्रथममध्यायसप्तकं सलेखम् ।

२ ० ०

३२. " " द्वितीय " " ।

२ ० ०

३३. " " तृतीय " " ।

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३४. " " वेदस्तुतिसूत्रमटीका ।

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३५. श्रीदशमस्कन्धटिप्पणी ।

२ ० ०

३६. तत्त्वदीपनिबन्धः सप्रकाशः ।

३ ० ०

३७. " " सप्रकाशावरणभङ्गः प्रकरणद्वयमात्रम् ।

७ ८ ०

३८. " " भागवतार्थप्रकरणे स्कन्धद्वयार्थः ।

१ ० ०

३९. श्रीमद्भागवतं बालप्रबोधिनीसहितम् ।

२५ ० ०

४०. पञ्चायलम्बन सविवरणम् ।

१ ० ०

४१. श्रीयमुनाएकं सर्वटीकोपेतम् ।

१ ० ०

४२. बालबोधः " ।

१ ० ०

✓ ४३. सिद्धान्तमुक्तावलिः " ।

१ ० ०

✓ ४४. पुष्टिप्रवाहमर्यादा " ।

१ ० ०

✓ ४५. सिद्धान्तरहस्यम् । " ।

१ ० ०

४६. नवरत्नम् । " ।

१ ० ०

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१ १ ०

४८. विवेकधैर्याश्रयः " ।

१ ० ०

४९. कृष्णाश्रयः " ।

१ ० ०

५०. चतुःश्लोकी " ।

१ ० ०

✓ ५१. भक्तिवर्धिनी " ।

१ ० ०

५२. पञ्चपद्यानि जलभेदश्च " ।

१ ० ०

५३. सङ्ख्यासन्निर्णयः " ।

२ ० ०

✓ ५४. निरोधलक्षणं " ।

१ ० ०

✓ ५५. सेवाफलम् " ।

१ ० ०

५६. पुरुषोत्तमनामसहस्रं चन्द्रिकामुतम् ।

१ ० ०

५७. त्रिविधनामावलिः सटीका ।

१ ० ०

५८. मधुराष्टकम् सटीकम् ।

अमूल्यम्

५९. प्रेमाभूतं परिवृढाष्टकं च " ।

१ ० ०

६०. सार्धश्लोकत्रयी शिक्षा सटीका ।

१ ० ०

✓ ६१. विद्वन्मण्डनं मूलमात्रम् ।

१ ० ०

६२. " सप्तयणसूत्रम् ।

३ ० ०

६३. " सर्वटीकोपेतम् ।

५ ० ०

✓ ६४. ज्ञानारत्नमण्डनम् ।

२ ० ०

६५. श्रीसर्वोत्तमस्तोत्रं टीकाद्वययुतम् ।

० ८ ०

६६. धीवल्लभाष्टकम् " त्रय " ।

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६७. सौन्दर्यपद्यम् सटीकम् ।

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६८. भक्तिहंसः सटीकः ।	१	०	८
६९. " हेतुनिर्णयः " ।	१	०	८
७०. वृथासुरचतुःश्लोकी " ।	१	०	०
७१. नामरत्नस्तोत्रम् " ।	१	०	०
७२. ब्रह्मवादः ।	०	८	०
७३. प्रस्थानरत्नाकरः ।	१	०	०
✓ ७४. वादावलिः ।	२	०	०
७५. भागवतशङ्कानिरासवादः ।	०	४	०
७६. उत्सवप्रतान ।	२	०	०
७७. द्रव्यशुद्धिः ।	२	०	०
७८. निर्णयार्णवः ।	०	८	०
७९. सेवाकौमुदी ।	०	८	०
८०. अशौचनिर्णयः ।	०	४	०
८१. भक्तिमार्तण्डः ।	३	०	०
✓ ८२. ऊर्ध्वपुण्ड्रमार्तण्डः ।	०	४	०
✓ ८३. शुद्धादितमार्तण्डः सिद्धान्तमरीचसहितः ।	२	०	०
८४. सप्रकाश शुद्धादितमार्तण्डः प्रमेयरत्नार्णवश्च ।	२	८	०
८५. धृतिरहस्यम् ।	२	०	०
✓ ८६. सत्सिद्धान्तमार्तण्डः ।	३	०	०
✓ ८७. प्राभञ्जनः ।	३	०	०
८८. " मास्तशक्तियुतः ।	३	०	०
✓ ८९. वेदान्तचिन्तामणिः ।	२	०	०
९०. श्रीवल्लभस्तुतिरत्नावलिः ।	१	०	०
९१. साम्प्रदायिकबृहत्स्तोत्रसरित्सागरः ।	५	०	०
९२. श्रीमद्वल्लभाचार्यचरितम् ।	०	२	०
९३. रसाधिपमहाकाव्यम् ।	१	०	०
✓ ९४. मनोदूतम्-हृदयदूत च । गुर्जरानुवादसमेतम् ।	१	०	०
९५. श्रीमन्नोपालपूर्वतापिन्युपनिषद्	१	८	०
96. An Examination of S'ankara's refutation of the Samkhya system ...	2	0	0
97. Discuss how far S'ankara truly represents the view of the author of the Brahma Sutras. ...	0	12	0

पंडित गङ्गलालाजीनी पाठशाला केथिङ्गलस्ट्रीट भूलेश्वर

मुंबई नं० २